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

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The
STORY OF THE GREAT WAR

DIPLOMATIC AND STATE PAPERS

Austin M. Knight, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy. President of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, since 1913. *Author of "Modern Seamanship"*

VOLUME II

P. F. COLLIER & SON, NEW YORK

Alfred T. Mahan, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy. President of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, since 1886. Author of "Modern Seamanship"

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PART I—ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I

GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY

OVERSHADOWING all other issues which brought the European nations into conflict loomed the fundamental differences between Great Britain and Germany. A large body of expert opinion, not inadequately substantiated by a cumulation of symptoms and events, held that the war as between those two countries was due to commercial jealousy, which had fomented so long that any unrelated incident would suffice to bring on war.

Certainly that is what happened. In the German apologies for the war Great Britain was bitterly accused of envying German prosperity and of welcoming the war as an opportunity to crush German commercial and industrial competition. The strenuous efforts of British business interests to capture German trade have been cited as proof. For the British it was submitted that Great Britain entered the war only after extreme hesitation, and that the war on German trade was a result rather than the object of the conflict. Germany, the British charged, was waging war for economical aggrandizement. Bearing upon this accusation, the dynamic forces which swung Germany into the front rank of nations as an ambitious competitor of the world's trade in a comparatively short time may be reviewed. Besides a sentimental yearning for national unity, two factors operated together to mold the many petty German states into a united nation. The spectacular part was played by the Prussian army, under the control of domineering land-owning aristocrats like Prince Bismarck. Equally important, if less striking, was the work of the industrial capitalists. They had built railways binding the

Germanys together with bonds of steel; they had economically federated the Germanys in the Tariff League (*Zollverein*), preparing the way for political union. After the formation of the German Empire, 1871, the influence of the two elements—the landed aristocracy of army officers and the business aristocracy of wealth—was manifested in the demand for a protective tariff. The former demanded a high tariff on imported foodstuffs to raise the price of their own farm products; the latter required a tariff wall to keep foreign manufactures from entering into competition with German articles in the home market. Bismarck adopted the protective-tariff policy in 1879.

The principal motive for the high tariff in Germany has been viewed as political, and in a narrower sense dynastic. It has been indicated by Professor Veblen that the ruling class in Berlin had intentionally manipulated customs barriers from the time of the *Zollverein* in order to weld together the German race and differentiate it sharply from its neighbors. From this the German universities had devolved a school of "patriotic economy," which had really a remote relation to economy, being termed a most uneconomic industrial nationalism.

Whether due to tariff protection or to the German genius for applying natural science to industry, or to German thoroughness, or to aggressive commercial methods, the business interests prospered under the German confederation. Mills and mines multiplied wealth. Titanic ocean steamships carried German wares to the ends of the earth. By 1912 Great Britain's foreign commerce exceeded Germany's by about $1,300,000,000; but German commerce had trebled since 1883, while British commerce had not quite doubled. The German Government derived rich revenues from the customs duties on an expanding commerce, and viewed with satisfaction the prodigious increase in wealth and population; population increased from forty-one to sixty-six millions between 1871 and 1912, which furnished men and money for an ever-growing army. On the other hand, the industrial and land-owning classes considered the army as protection and insurance for their interests. In one respect, however, the Ger-

man business community was dissatisfied. The German merchant marine, although it had rapidly expanded, was still four times outranked by British shipping. Great Britain's superiority was ascribed to her earlier economical development, to the fact that Germany had very little seacoast, and to the superiority of the British navy. Germany, therefore, set herself to overcome these handicaps. There was evidence that German business interests consciously hoped for the overthrow of British naval power and for the annexation of an Atlantic port by Germany.

The open confession of such desires by German journalists like Maximilian Harden and by German shipping magnates like Herr Ballin explained why Belgians feared the loss of Antwerp and Ostend, and the British the loss of the sea.

The striking feature of Germany's development was her rapid conversion into what might almost be termed a condition approaching an industrial unit. Her industrial and commercial population, which in 1882 was only 45 per cent of the whole, was in 1895 50 per cent, and in 1907 56 per cent. It was possible for a country sufficiently vast in area and varied in resource to expand its manufactures without ceasing to be self-contained; the United States would be a case in point were it not for its cotton export. But in a country like Germany its vast manufacturing expansion could not have taken place without the acquisition of a wide foreign market; and as manufacturers required raw materials, and as foreigners could not buy unless they also sold, large exports necessitated large imports. The exports of Germany steadily came to consist more and more of manufactured goods, and its imports more and more of foodstuffs and raw materials. Germany again might conceivably have been so placed as to have access by land to its chief markets. She has, indeed, access by land to a large part of the European continent; but that only furnished a comparatively small part of the market she obtained. As long ago as 1900 a German economist estimated that 70 per cent of German foreign trade was overseas, and the proportion in 1914 was even greater.

ITALY BEFORE UNIFICATION (1815)

When the bill creating the German navy was pending in 1900 Germany's leading economists combined to publish a series of lectures in its support under the significant title of "The Politics of Trade and Power." The recurrent refrain was that unless the sea could be kept open the well-being of the German nation was insecure. One of their persuasives for a big navy ran: "In one way or another, twenty-four to twenty-six millions of Germans, out of a population at that time of some fifty-five millions, are dependent for their livelihood and work upon unrestricted import and export by water. The freedom of the sea and vigorous competition in the world's markets are, therefore, questions of life and death for the nation, and questions in which the working classes are most deeply concerned."

Germany's situation in this respect did not improve as time elapsed. It was left to Prince von Bülow to state the position with the utmost emphasis: "We are now vulnerable at sea. We have intrusted millions to the ocean." Were Germany deprived of them she "could not have returned to the comfortable existence of a purely inland state. We should have been placed in the position of being unable to employ and support a considerable number of our millions of inhabitants at home. The result would have been an economic crisis which might easily attain the proportions of a national catastrophe." According to these economists and to Prince von Bülow, the one way to ward off this catastrophe was to build a gigantic navy.

It has been denied that Great Britain was envious of Germany's commercial achievements. "We were always told," said the British in effect, "that we must wake up and emulate German enterprise and German industry in manufactures or we should be outstripped in the race. But we did not even put up a tariff on German goods. We knew that Germany was our best customer. As for any thought of drawing the sword to destroy a commercial rival, no one who knows this country believes that it was ever entertained. Yet to Germans without number this belief has been an article of faith."

A free spokesman of this belief was Dr. Bernhard Dernburg while in the United States. Sketching Germany's commercial

progress the world over as an earnest German propagandist, he wrote:

"The German iron industry has, because of its improved methods, obtained a great part of England's trade. German machinery, except in the textile business, is more efficient than English machinery. The field of electricity has been entirely abandoned by England to America and Germany. German dyestuffs are now even shipped by way of America and Canada and back to England. German proprietary medicines have conquered the world market, and German competition is felt everywhere. Then, too, is the enormous increase in German shipping. Germany has been building up a magnificent merchant marine, with ships that exceed in comfort and size anything launched from England's shipyards. Even in the tramp-steamer business, the backbone of English shipping, the Germans have made big inroads. So while the trade of Great Britain and Ireland since 1870 has risen from $2,000,000,000 to $5,500,000,000, that of Germany has risen from $1,000,000,000 to $5,000,000,000—in other words, while Germany's trade is now, 1914, five times what it was in 1870, English trade is only two and a half times its former amount. For a commercial nation such as England this condition is very serious. It goes to the very core of the nation's existence. Therefore Great Britain faced the alternative of getting better habits of work, improved machinery, better education, better knowledge of foreign languages—that is, being more industrious, less luxurious, and more painstaking, or of fighting."

It was not Germany's militarism which England feared, Dr. Dernburg held, but German trade and commerce, which she could not destroy because of the military and naval forces behind them. Nevertheless, she entered the war, relying on her allies to do her share of the land fighting for her.

Dr. Dernburg's sketch of his view of Great Britain's predicament as a result of successful German competition may well be read in conjunction with a picture drawn of Germany's internal condition, seen as actually due to being gorged with industrial productiveness by an English authority, C. R. L. Fletcher. In

endeavoring to weigh the causes that determined Germany to strike in 1914, he concluded that her economical position was the leading factor:

"We have the fact that the enormous increase of the mineral, agricultural, and manufacturing output of Germany herself has, instead of leading to greater contentment and prosperity inside, actually been leading in the reverse direction—toward an economic and financial crisis. There are not nearly enough markets or outlets for this newly accumulated wealth. It is manipulated by financiers for their private ends, and these have speculated with it beyond the bounds of prudence. Much of German capital is locked up in hazardous enterprises both inside and outside Europe. Credit was not actually impaired in the early months of 1914, but it was in danger of being impaired; creditors were becoming 'nervous,' and a 'sensitive' condition of credit is a very dangerous condition. The last loans of the German Government were not at all readily subscribed; the expenses of the army had frightened all who were willing to lend, and the expenditure on public works and on experiments in 'state socialism' frightened them even more.

"Moreover, the increase of population has, during the last ten or more years, led to a necessary importation of corn and meat on a very large scale, and this to feed a country whose fleet emphatically does not command the seas of the world. The agricultural interest has cried out against this importation, and the Government had to conciliate it by imposing a high tariff on such imports—result, the prices of food have gone up, and there has been a quarrel between the country producer and the town consumer of food.

"On the other hand, for want of a market, the prices of manufactured articles have actually gone down. The manufacturers have not dared to stop the output of their goods for fear of angry workmen and strikes; and they are hard put to it to pay wages. This, above all things, is at the bottom of the cry for more colonies and for larger markets abroad. And the trade that has been hardest hit by this want of markets is just the iron trade, whose fluctuations affect not only the provinces of the Rhine and West

phalia, but the provinces of Silesia as well; in fact, the naturally richest provinces of the empire.

"But the governing classes, the Prussian noblemen, the great financiers, the great shipmasters, and the great manufacturers know perfectly well that anything like an economic or commercial crisis, nay, anything like what English financiers call a 'panic,' would bring them toppling to the ground. France could survive a great many panics, though she would squeal very loudly when they came. In England, city men used to say there was one panic every nine years. We take our panics calmly. Germany cannot afford to do so. Indeed, she cannot afford to take anything calmly, and she does not try. There remains, then, for the German—loose and absolved from the older form of the ten commandments—but one resource, war. His own goods (credit, capital, finance, or whatever you like to call them) may fail him. But his fist is mailed; his machine is ready; his neighbor is weak."

There remains another and final view to be cited—from a British source—in which the Germans discerned the true attitude of England toward their maritime and commercial development. It was revealed in a certain article in the "Saturday Review" in September, 1897, which caused a considerable stir. As England and Germany competed in every corner of the globe the view was frankly expressed that England's prosperity could only be saved if Germany were destroyed:

"In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, in the islands of the Southern Sea, and in the Far Northwest, wherever—and where has it not?—the flag has followed the Bible, and trade has followed the flag, there the German bagman is struggling with the English peddler. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman are struggling to be first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city

or a right of succession. Must they not fight for £250,000,000 of commerce?" At that time, it will be seen, a most tangible conflict of economic interests existed between England and Germany, and England, moreover, was the only great power which could make war on Germany without running an enormous risk, and even with a prospect of success.

CHAPTER II

INDUSTRIAL RIVALRY

GERMANY'S industrial progress had increasingly approached that of Great Britain. The economic conditions of both were becoming alike. Germany too existed, as has been shown, more and more by her world commerce and less by her home industries. The difference between the two countries lay in the fact that England was bound up in her world commerce and that all world affairs were her own. This was not yet the case with Germany. Trade figures alone did not make a world power. From the German viewpoint the spirit of world politics was needed. Germany had great exports and imports, built ships and produced coal, iron, machinery, and dry goods in large quantities. But the spirit of world politics was not yet Germany's and to inculcate it became a mission of the German pamphleteers. German trade competition in the world's markets, however, reached out, and its success did not suffer from the fact that it was not avowedly in pursuit of nationalism but of profit.

Due to commercial rivals abroad, British industry was at low ebb as far back as 1879, when Parliament appointed a commission to study the subject. It was left for another commission on the depression of trade to discover, after investigating the matter for sixteen months in 1885 and 1886 by means of an immense number of consular reports and statistics, that the trouble was German competition. Another parliamentary commission reached the same conclusion in 1896.

Germany was battering against a considerable financial wall built of accumulated British wealth abroad. The aggregate capital value of British over-sea investments at the outbreak of the war was approximately $19,500,000,000, and the aggregate income therefrom $1,000,000,000. The geographical distribution of these investments was as follows:

IN BRITISH DOMINIONS, COLONIES, AND POSSESSIONS

India (including Ceylon)	$2,235,000,000
Australia and New Zealand	2,040,000,000
Africa	2,005,000,000
Canada	2,115,000,000
Other British Possessions	455,000,000
	$8,850,000,000

IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

United States	$3,160,000,000
Argentina	1,645,000,000
Brazil	675,000,000
Mexico	405,000,000
Japan	370,000,000
Chile	285,000,000
Egypt	375,000,000
Uruguay	200,000,000
China	190,000,000
Peru	160,000,000
Cuba	145,000,000
European countries	850,000,000
Other foreign countries	460,000,000
	$8,920,000,000
In British dominions	8,850,000,000
Grand total British possessions and foreign countries	$17,770,000,000

THE BRITISH EMPIRE (NAVAL STATIONS)

This total comprised the capital invested in colonial and foreign loans and in public undertakings or companies. It did not include any provision for the very large amounts of British capital privately invested abroad in land, buildings, etc., nor embrace the large amounts of capital employed abroad by the large banking, mercantile and shipping houses of London, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, etc., in financing international trade. Authorities have assumed that these private investments amount to 10 per cent of the public investments (which is deemed a very moderate estimate), and on this estimate a further sum of $1,775,000,000 must be added to the total already arrived at, making an aggregate of $19,545,000,000. This estimate was confirmed by calculations based upon the capitalization of the income tax reported from abroad for assessment to the British revenue authorities.

The geographical distribution of British foreign and colonial investments, upon further scrutiny, showed that only $850,000,000, or 4.4 per cent of the total was placed in Europe, the remaining 95.6 per cent being invested where it could not suffer disturbance or even partial damage by the war. The earning power of the various undertakings—railways, manufactories, mines, street railroads, electric lighting undertakings, cattle ranches, tea, coffee, and rubber plantations, water works, nitrate fields, etc., were probably seriously impaired for a time, and while that condition continued the British income underwent a reduction.

No other country occupied such a strong position as Great Britain in this respect. Germany's over-sea investments had a capital value of about $5,000,000,000 at the outbreak of the war. Of this total $850,000,000 was placed in Russia, and became dead capital. The German investments in Turkey, about $200,000,000, and in Rumania, about $225,000,000, may almost be similarly classified till the war is over. The remainder of Germany's foreign investments was overseas—$750,000,000 in the United States and $600,000,000 in South America.

British exports of manufactured goods in 1912 were worth $1,925,000,000. Those of Germany and Austria together

amounted to $1,790,000,000, or nearly as large. The war stopped this latter trade, but the figure is presented to show its approximation to that of Great Britain. Again, in the British Empire alone Germany's trade had been worth about $500,000,000 a year, of which the British over-sea possessions took about $125,000,000. In every British market Germany was increasingly successful in selling her goods, notably iron and steel manufactures, electrical goods, brass goods, railway materials, china, earthenware and glass, hardware, cutlery, musical instruments, paper, clocks, and textiles. In respect of many of these commodities German competition meant as much to Great Britain as that of all the rest of the world put together. In other parts of the world Germany had been equally or even more successful in establishing her commerce. The following statement shows the comparative success of Great Britain and Germany in supplying the chief foreign markets in the year 1913:

	From Great Britain	From Germany
Russia	$75,000,000	$266,000,000
France	210,000,000	196,000,000
Austria-Hungary	51,000,000	293,000,000
Italy	115,000,000	125,000,000
Belgium	101,000,000	140,000,000
Holland	148,000,000	438,000,000
Norway	41,000,000	46,000,000
Sweden	53,000,000	126,000,000
Denmark	37,000,000	87,000,000
Switzerland	23,000,000	130,000,000
Portugal	22,000,000	13,000,000
Spain	40,000,000	28,000,000
United States	280,000,000	178,000,000
Mexico	11,000,000	25,000,000
Brazil	80,000,000	54,000,000
Argentina	118,000,000	64,000,000
Chile	39,000,000	34,000,000
China	57,000,000	35,000,000
Japan	62,000,000	33,000,000

In this list of nineteen countries it is to be noted that Germany was the largest exporter to ten, and in the remaining nine she was Great Britain's most formidable competitor. Even in Latin America, which was chiefly developed by British capital, German goods obtained a great hold. In Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, British capital has about $3,000,000,000 invested. These four countries took in 1913 $177,000,000 of German goods. Year by year the Germans successfully wooed these important South American markets. In Chile Germany had almost as much trade as Great Britain, although British investments in that country were worth nearly $300,000,000.

Nevertheless Germany was not satisfied with her legitimate encroachments on the British hold of international trade. There were other fields for her to conquer. The British share of the world's trade was 26.5 per cent, while Germany's was 12.5 per cent, so that the latter had considerable headway to make before outpacing her competitor. Austria's share was 3 per cent; France's 9.3 per cent; Belgium's 6.5 per cent; Russia's 4 per cent. The six powers named thus had 61.8 per cent of the world's trade, so that countries transacting three-fifths of the commerce of the globe were directly involved in the war.

The connection between this commercial rivalry and colonial expansion is very close. The two questions were constantly interlocking. In face of her increasing need of foreign markets there had been a growing discontent in Germany over her meager share in the colonial world. Inevitably her attention turned enviously toward the prosperous colonies of her weaker neighbors.

Little Holland and little Germany were more fortunate in acquiring over-sea possessions than great Germany. When Germany asked Holland to join the empire she not only wanted the mouths of the Rhine (which are Dutch) as trade outlets, but to share in the rich Dutch colonies. She had also tried by legitimate offers of purchase to acquire the colonies of Portugal and Belgium. A frequent criticism of Bismarck was that he ought to have taken Algeria from France instead of Alsace-Lorraine. No country being in such real need of raw material, Germany claimed that

she could make better use of Walfish Bay, Portuguese Angola, or the Belgian Congo than their present owners.

In looking for colonies Germany found that the land not already occupied by the other colonizing nations was inconsiderable in area, unfavorably located, thinly populated, and not possessed of commercial advantages. But such as was available Germany occupied, not because she deemed it adequate for her needs, but because at the moment she saw no other chance of meeting the exigencies which she knew were certain to arise in the near future. The colonies thus founded on the west and east coasts of Africa and in the South Seas speedily proved their unsuitability for colonization by white men, and the improbability of their affording, before the lapse of a century, anything like an adequate market for German manufactures. These colonies certainly were in area nearly a million square miles, but their products were not greatly in excess of $5 per square mile, a sum too small to be consequential. The population of 14,000,000 was too undeveloped and too sparse to make the creation of a state possible. All the desirable land for colonies was already in the hands of other nations, and the Germans realized with bitterness that they had been able to secure what they held simply because other nations did not consider it to be of value. Hence it became clear that any project for colonial expansion could not be pursued without running into conflict with other nations.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY IN THE EAST—WORLD POLICY

GERMANY, laboring under these unfavorable conditions, cast her eye in one direction where no other country had a prior claim. She saw in Asia Minor a market most suited to her wares, and entered upon a scheme for building a railroad through that Turkish territory to Bagdad. The dense valleys of Mesopotamia, which once supported dense populations, were deserts

that could be reclaimed by irrigation. The German colonial enterprises in other directions had been thwarted and limited by other powers. Yet in the financing of the Bagdad Railroad Germany had a considerable rival in France and they fought to control it until an agreement was reached. The plan did not proceed without Great Britain's intervention. The dominant English view was that the German plea of the need of economic development in Asia Minor was merely a blind to a sinister political project of wresting Egypt and India from the British Empire. Germany had wrung sweeping concessions from the sultan. The enterprise came to be known as the Bagdad Railroad, although the rights Germany obtained to construct the line from the Mediterranean coast to Bagdad represented the smallest part of the concessions. The German promoters had the privilege to extend the rails in almost any direction. They were granted vague, all-embracing "development" concessions for irrigating, land purchase, mining, trading, and forest rights. But to be really profitable the railroad must extend to the Persian Gulf. Germany needed an eastern port for a terminus. Great Britain balked this extension by reviving a shadowy protectorate over Koweit, a little principality which contained the logical harbor for a gulf terminus. The Germans complained that Great Britain wrested this important point from Turkey, and through her possession of the Bahrein Islands and Cape Jask increased the obstacles with which she could oppose all competing shipping going out of the Persian Gulf. For the British it was contended that they were suspicious of a certain clause in the Turkish concession agreement which granted the right to the Germans of taking necessary measures to protect their property from the Bedawi bandits who infested the desert. This privilege, the British feared, might readily serve as an excuse for the establishment of a military outpost under the guise of a commercial center on the confines of India. Such a German port on the Persian Gulf might even form a base for spies to encourage Hindu sedition.

The Bagdad Railway concession was viewed as the first step toward a German protectorate over Turkey, which incidentally

meant to Russia the end of her dream of reaching Constantinople. The British even denounced it as "crooked." The Turkish Government had not only surrendered very valuable rights, but had guaranteed the railway builders a certain annual income for every mile they put in operation. In the opinion of qualified authorities there was no prospect of the railroad earning anything like the amount of this guarantee for a great many years. This meant a heavy drain on the already bankrupt Turkish treasury. In other words Turkey had become heavily indebted to Germany.

Having placed every obstruction she could to prevent the project extending toward the Persian Gulf, Great Britain later came to an agreement with Russia regarding their respective spheres of commercial influence in Persia, so as to erect a new barrier between India and Germany's ambitions in the east. There were also valuable oil fields in Persia to be safeguarded from any extension of Germany's influence in that quarter.

Great Britain's interference with the Bagdad Railway project added another grievance to the others which Germany harbored against her great rival. Most Germans viewed it as a legitimate development scheme which the British had ruined from pure spite. They placed it beside Walfish Bay as an example of the British policy, as one critic put it, "of trying to smother Germany—of denying it a place in the sun."

Foiled or restricted in her economical schemes of colonial expansion, Germany also fretted under the disadvantage of all the trade routes being securely held by Great Britain. Look where she may, she found Great Britain's commerce everywhere safeguarded. She had established herself on every island of the oceans and at every other point which commanded the trade routes. At Gibraltar she controlled the entrance to the Mediterranean; at Malta the communications between that sea's eastern and western basin; at Cyprus the entrance to the Suez Canal and Egypt. Germany had to bear with the condition that Great Britain thus controlled the shortest water route to India, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Great Britain had also extended her influence over the longer route by way of Africa, through St.

Helena and Ascension, as well as through her African colonies, while the route through the Red Sea into the Strait of Babel Mandeb was protected by the island of Perim. The way to the Pacific Ocean led furthermore through the Strait of Magellan, on the route to which lay the Falkland Islands, while in the Pacific was the important British port of Singapore.

The construction of continental railroads (the Siberian Railroad among them) was designed to afford the European nations scope to be independent of the water routes under the control of Great Britain. The Bagdad Railroad certainly appeared to have this among its aims.

Germany did not possess a single port of call along the entire route from her possessions in Africa to the Pacific. Great Britain monopolized coaling stations on islands and at seaports which afforded sufficient protection for the transfer of coal, a policy which proved an efficient weapon for Great Britain to wield in her commercial rivalry with Germany. The latter's nationals complained that Great Britain had succeeded in thwarting every attempt of Germany to obtain naval and coaling stations. German merchantmen and warships were therefore obliged to obtain supplies from coaling stations owned by other nations, chiefly those of Great Britain. The fact that the latter benefited in this way through Germany's lack of stations added to the indictment against her.

"Here was an actual example of Germany's need of elbow room," one German writer charged, "and of the manner in which England has set up an iron barrier in the way of Germany's necessary expansion. It is evident that sooner or later it will be absolutely necessary for Germany to break away from these bonds which, in the long run, will render her navigation unendurable."

As outlined by Dr. Dernburg, Germany's colonial ambitions were legitimate enough. The aims he assigned to Germany in her colonial policy were: Safe outlets for a rapidly increasing population in a restricted territory; arable lands to provide cheap food for her people; regions where she could procure her raw materials without let or hindrance; productive districts to

prevent monopolies in the markets of certain foodstuffs; and the consolidation of her money market by buying in her own colonies foodstuffs which if bought from foreigners, would deplete her store of gold.

As to German colonies being a safe outlet for a rapidly increasing population in a restricted territory, a French authority, Professor Andler of the University of Paris, took this view:

"It is usual to say that Germany requires new territories for her surplus population. But, as a fact, it is no longer the German masses who emigrate. The emigrants number barely 20,000 a year. They are an intellectual proletariat, rich in diplomas and light in pocket. German industry is capable of absorbing the million surplus men who are born each year. It cannot absorb the 20,000 surplus technicians manufactured by its schools of arts and crafts. Germany is not suffering from a plethora of men, but from an excess of certificated students, clerks, doctors without patients, engineers without employment. It is not that her population is overcrowded, but that her division of labor is ill devised. Suffering at home from this curse of innumerable *déclassés* too ambitious to work with their hands, she exports them, and inflicts them on the world at large. She gains by getting rid of them herself, and by increasing her sphere of influence abroad through them. But it is the greed of these adventurers which feeds the Pan-German press with its dreams."

Against this view of Germany's colonies being an asylum for sybarites we have Admiral Werner's dictum that "the German colonies have another and a greater destiny than to offer an easy refuge for men who are weary of Europe and the derelicts of our nation." The "greater destiny" was indicated by Baron von Stengel. "Without colonies," he said, "the German Empire may be a great European power, but it can never be a World Power. Now Germany must be a World Power, if she would not be crushed by such World Powers as Russia and America."

Utterances of discerning and highly competent publicists, flowing intermittently throughout the present kaiser's reign, showed all too clearly the trend of the German national mind.

Germany, in the classification of nations, had become an industrialized country, needing elbow room and new arteries of trade for her surplus products. Hence behind the more or less official publicists demands for continental and colonial expansion and for race ascendancy was the driving momentum of economical necessity.

These aspirations became shaped in the economic World Policy of Germany (*Weltpolitik*), initiated in Palestine by the kaiser in 1898, and menacingly hinted at by Prince von Bülow, the then chancellor, in a speech before the Reichstag the following year, when he declared: "It has been said that once in every century there is a great settlement, a great liquidation, in view of a fresh distribution of influence, power and possession on the globe. Are we on the eve of such a new partition of the earth? In any case . . . . we cannot and we will not stand apart, like dreamers, while others divide the cake between them. If the English talk of a Greater Britain, and the French of a New France, if Russia is opening up Asia for herself, we too have a right to a Greater Germany."

This world policy has been given several interpretations by the Germans themselves. The earliest definition attempted appeared to be that it was the duty of the imperial government, whether by subventions or by the intervention of its official representatives, to help Germans to extend their commerce throughout the world. Then it became enlarged to embrace projects, either of peaceful penetration or of dismemberment, especially in countries which seemed disorganized, to provide an outlet for the population of Germany. Instead of permitting emigrants to settle in the United States, where they were lost to Germany, the Government should direct them to unoccupied territories, where they could form colonies of settlement under the direct control or under the influence of the empire.

A later development of the policy laid stress on a new condition, which was that Germany, with her colossal industries and highly developed agricultural system, had no longer any surplus population for emigration. She had actually to induce foreign laborers to join her workers. She must seek, therefore, not

colonies for settlement, but colonies to be exploited. These were to be developed by German capitalists, engineers, planters and capitalists, who would direct the labor of the native population. They would thus learn to become, like the British, "a nation of masters." But for this purpose vast territories were needed, and it was the duty of the Government to acquire them.

Finally the aspiration grew, and became expressed as a plank of the world policy, that Germany did not play a part in world politics proportionate to her strength. So henceforward Germany's voice must be raised, and heard, on every question economic, colonial or other considerations stirred in any part of the world. The Government must not allow any acquisition of territory, influence or economic advantage by another nation to pass without claiming its share or compensation.

CHAPTER IV

THE CUSTOMS UNION

THE war had not been long in progress before Germany, forehanded as is her wont, planned to establish on the conclusion of hostilities a customs union of the Central Powers on aggressive lines. After her occupation of Belgium reports were current that she contemplated or had extended her Zollverein to that country. An aggressive customs union means an economic war. Before the conflict came Great Britain had charged that Germany employed the most-favored-nation clauses in her commercial treaties to the detriment of British interests and those of the other allied countries. In her preparation for the war, Great Britain complained, Germany had used her resources and commercial relations with Great Britain for purposes of aggression. It was predicted that the economic war foreshadowed by Germany's plan to form an aggressive customs union would be a permanent barrier to the peaceful development of Europe.

This threatened economic effect of the war has a deep root.

The plan of a customs union, continental in scope, dates as far back as the accession of the kaiser, and must be recognized as among the indirect economic causes of the war in that it was one of the seeds of Pan-Germanism, whose later developments brought Germany to the heroic frame of mind of challenging Europe to combat.

In 1914 it was not difficult to discern symptoms of present-day Pan-Germanism in an economic program ventilated through a semiofficial source in 1892. It was contained in a anonymous work ascribed to a distinguished publicist of the time, Julius von Eckardt, who for many years superintended the press bureau of the German foreign office. In it was set forth the Neuer Kurs (the "New Course"), as the aspirations of the new imperial was called.

German opinion, up to that period, had accepted as a program and as a limitation of German action in the East:—(1) The open door in the markets of the Balkan Peninsula, and guaranties against Russian encroachments. (2) As an extreme measure, pressure brought to bear upon Serbia to induce her to enter into the sphere of influence of Austrian power and economy. Beyond those limits it was not deemed wise to involve the empire. Von Eckardt, as the spokesman of a broader imperial economic policy, viewed that Germany's great position imposed duties which did not exist for old Prussia under Wilhelm I, as she was only a second-class power. With Europe divided by rival ambitions by the Balkan policy of Russia, which ran counter to the designs of Austria, and by the incurable resentment of France, with Russia and France intrenching themselves economically behind high protective tariffs, and with the McKinley tariff bill confronting all Europe by a North America armed against European industrial competition, it was necessary, Von Eckardt submitted, to organize Europe. As he foresaw the future, it was incumbent on Germany to found a customs union as well as a military union of the central European states. These central states alone remained of Europe if Russia and France pursued their separate paths, and if England relied only on her own resources and the markets of her vast colonial

dominions; and those states only remained on condition that they formed an economic unit large enough to be able to adopt an independent customs policy. The solidifying of the Triple Alliance was thus necessary:

"If it were possible to give the Triple Alliance a basis other than that of immediate political and military exigencies; if the object were to give it a durable character, this could only be done by providing the allied nations with an economic interest in the maintenance of the system politically followed by their governments. The establishment for a long series of years of an alliance at once political and economic between the three Central European Powers might become the starting point of a new European system. If the three leading states combined to form a rampart which would permanently repel invasion of central Europe from east and west, the adhesion of the other powers might be counted almost as a certainty."

Here the attractive picture was presented of an economic union, buttressing the political and military union of the Triple Alliance, which would draw neighboring nations into the bund. Germany would be in a position to disarm the dislike and distrust of her neighbors by a "great civilizing enterprise," *i. e.*:

"A great customs union, created on the initiative of Germany, would prove to the world irrefutably that the foundation of the German Empire had been a necessity and a benefit to Europe. If we could effectively demonstrate that the concentration of national forces had made us capable of solving great problems of civilization, it could be no longer cast in our teeth that the great German undertaking of 1870 had resulted merely in increased armaments, universal military service and an elaboration of militarism, which is sucking out the marrow from the bones of all the nations.

"The Triple Alliance, created with a view to war, would become an instrument to serve the interests of peace. This transformation would be no less advantageous to the immediate ends of the Triple Alliance than to its European position. No method could be more profitably employed to effect this transformation than the establishment of a customs organization open to all

friendly nations. Nothing could better prove the mission and importance of a unified Germany than the initiation of an undertaking so essential to the program of civilization.

"This project of transforming the purely political alliance founded by Prince Bismarck into an alliance at once political and economic, which would keep the door open for an *entente* embracing the whole of central Europe obviously exceeds the program of the founder of the empire. Yet the idea is not antagonistic but complementary to the first conception."

French critics interpreted the proposal as primarily one designed to create an industrial trust of the central European states, strong enough in itself to resist American competition, with an attraction to neighboring states so potent that they would of their own accord ask to enter it in order to avoid impoverishment. The delicate question was hinted whether the *entente* would be confined to customs, with a reminder of Friedrich List's old axiom, affirmed as a truth proved by experience, that commercial union and political union were twins, and that "one could not be born without the other." States united by a Zollverein, it was observed, readily entered into military conventions. If the Scandinavian states, Belgium and Holland were so impressed by the commercial splendor of Germany as to join the Triple Alliance, would military conventions with those states be long delayed? The French commentators only saw in any such customs union a forerunner to a military pact by pointing to the history of the German Zollverein as an answer to the question. So they perceived in the new European system aimed at by the "New Course" a military and commerical organization of Europe formed in the initiative and hence under the hegemony of Germany. If matured, neither Serbia nor Bulgaria, nor any other Balkan state could long remain outside its sphere of influence. France's inclusion in the Austro-German customs union, her watchful publicists discerned, was an objective of Germany, who might draw her in by persuasion before bringing more active pressure to bear upon her. They saw this in an early remark of Bismarck's revealed in a conversation (recorded in 1884) the chancellor had with Comte de Saint-Vallier, the

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French Ambassador to Germany: "The irresistible pressure and even violence by which the Russian political organism was forcing its way toward the light and warmth of the Mediterranean, not only threatened the existence of Austria, but deprived French influence and interests of possible future in the East." Bismarck himself, however, with an unerring eye for facts which saved him from any allusions as to the opposition of hostile forces, or as to his own strength, had abandoned the idea of a customs union for Central Europe. Such a plan presented to him in 1880 brought the response: "I too look upon a customs *entente* embracing the two empires as an ideal end which could dictate the direction in which we should develop all our politico-commercial activities." But beyond this he did not go.

German publicists did not allow the project to rest. While their utterances could not always be accepted as straws showing the course whither the immature economic policy of the Wilhelmstrasse was tending, they were viewed as echoes, when they were not inspirers, of German public opinion. Their ideas, as the present war has shown, have acted as powerful suggestions both on the German people and government, and, at the least, were always symptomatic. Hence a history of any great economic movement, especially when it hinges on eventual war, cannot ignore them.

One of the most prominent of Bismarckian publicists, Paul Dehn, wrote in 1884: "In the economic life of the old world, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy must maintain a close union defensively against the superior and overpowering competition of the English, the French and the Russians, who are now in the ascendency; and to recapture their rightful share in the exchange of wealth between Europe and the East. From this point of view Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, bound together by common economic interests in Central Europe form a great domain which would be very happily rounded off by the adhesion of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland in the West, and of Poland and Lithuania in the East. If the states of central Europe wish to insure their commercial vitality, and consequently

their political life and independence, they must unite with a full consciousness of their intentions; they must seek new forms within which this great domain of common interests might be realized without violence to national sentiment or to existing conditions which have the sanction of political rights. Germany, by virtue of her situation in the heart of Europe and the economic importance of this situation is called upon to play the leading part in the center of this domain of interests."

This advocate of a vast European Zollverein was content to depict its need and advantages without entering into the thorny question of how Poland, Lithuania, or even Holland and Switzerland could be brought into the commerical Triple Alliance without a war. But he suggested some elastic combinations. One was a customs parliament or a customs federal council to deliberate on the customs business of the entire confederation; another a narrow confederation to which the countries not reduced to complete economic dependence should be attached by simple but permanent treaties of commerce.

The gain to Germany by a readjustment of the economic frontiers of Europe was generally seen to be "an appreciable reenforcement of her economic power." A customs alliance with nations who remained more agricultural than Germany would give Germany extended outlets for her manufactured products, additional markets to buy raw materials and cereals, and stable guarantees for the price of foodstuffs. Austria-Hungary would also be enabled to dispose of her surplus crops among the growing industrial population of Germany, while Austria's then infant industries would find support in the powerful industries of Germany.

As to this prospect, seemingly assured to the self-interested nations, French commentators again interposed with an inquiry: Would Russia be induced to detach Poland and Lithuania from her economic system and allow them to join the Austro-German customs union? The question, asked in those early days, loses none of its pertinency in being repeated in the midst of the war of 1914, which duly made Poland and Lithuania part of Germany's captured territories with which to trade in the peace proposals.

The radiating force of the military and economic alliance of the Central Empires was moreover seen by Paul Dehn to extend inevitably to Rumania and Turkey. "And even France," he predicted, "would find it advantageous to enter the union. Within it she might form friendships that would be of service to her against Transoceanic competition, from which she suffers as much as Germany and Austria-Hungary." Here it will be seen that American competition was not lost sight of.

German economic aims, then, in the eighties of the previous century embraced France, and bred a pacific policy toward that country provided France raised no objections to the projects for the commercial absorption of all the small adjacent nations from the Baltic and the Rhine to the Hellespont. Apparently Germany awaited the time when the pressure of economic life and the efforts of publicists induced France to enter the customs union for the protection of her commercial enterprises.

Seeking the line of least resistance the Pan-German advocates of an economic union became mainly preoccupied with Holland and Belgium in 1897, and onward. As to Holland, one publicist, Fritz Bley, identified with the Pan-German League wrote:

"We require these Dutch territories, already fertilized by German blood, for the indispensable expansion of our economic dominions. On a Rhine that has become German to the mouth we need the free traffic which the silent resistance of Holland now hampers. A customs union, a common organization of naval and military strength—the language of command being High German in the army and Low German in the fleet—a joint management of our possessions beyond the seas, carried on in a spirit of Dutch prudence and practical utility—these would be the objects of a Germano-Dutch alliance. If Holland were merely a continental power, this alliance would not be consummated until the day when Germany would impose her just claims by force. But as the vast transoceanic possessions of Holland are daily crumbling away under a growing menace, the merchant princes of the Amstel and the Meuse are impelled by considerations of personal interest to make common cause with us."

The persuasive here advanced for Holland to amalgamate with Germany, economically and otherwise, was that the colonies were threatened by Japan, and that in fear of Japanese aggression Holland should place herself under the protection of Germany. Holland's destiny would thus be established in unison with that of the other nations embraced in the customs union:

"Consider our history and contemporary world economics. Such a consideration would lead to an urgent demand that Germany, Austria, Italy, the Balkan States, the two Netherlands, Switzerland, and finally, if possible, the Scandinavian countries, should, with their colonies, combine in a common customs union, adopting a system of free trade or graduated tariffs internally, but vigorously protectionist externally. By no other means will they be able to maintain their right to existence, and insure the food supply of their populations as against the vast territories of Russia, England, and North and South America. Similarly with the Dutch we desire an international alliance. We do not wish to form a single state with them."

The actual existence of Holland was even viewed as incompatible with the safety of Germany by another publicist, Ernst von Halle, whose deliberations carried weight:

"Germany has on various sides military and political, national and economic frontiers, which in course of time will be untenable, in view of the exigencies of modern national life. It is monstrous from the economic and geographic commercial standpoint, that the mouths of two of her greatest rivers, the Danube and the Rhine, especially the latter, the most important artery of national traffic, as well as a series of the leading ports for German international exchange, should be in the hands of foreigners. A little coast nation is in a position to influence traffic on the lower Rhine, and to take measures there which are solely to its own interest, and not to that of the Hinterland. In the future the German Empire must be able to establish and support her lines of defense on the most favorable position. A Holland too weak on land is a permanent danger to Germany's most important industrial regions."

Economic factors thus entered largely into the Pan-Germanic schemes for European and colonial expansion for which the proposed customs union embracing her neighborhood was, as viewed by Germany's foes, an entering wedge. The manifold extent of these aspirations toward a greater Germany may therefore be glanced at. Some of them were so visionary that even official Germany, much as it might have jogged on the pamphleteers, could hardly be taxed with being the progenitor of them all. Ancient anti-Russian currents were set flowing in 1881 by Paul de Legarde, who wrote: "We must create a central Europe, which will guarantee the peace of the entire continent from the moment when it shall have driven the Russians from the Black Sea and the Slavs from the south, and shall have conquered large tracts to the east of our frontiers for German colonization." Constantin Frantz sought a great confederation of the central European states, whose central core would be the western German states, rounded off by Russia and Austria, with a belt of smaller states, Holland, Belgium, Flanders, Lorraine, Switzerland, Franche-Comté, Savoy, and, in the east, all the Balkan States together with others to be carved out of Russian Poland. For the construction of this confederation, Russia would have to be thrust back beyond the Pruth to the Dniester, and the reconstituted Russo-German frontier would be the line marked by Brest-Litovsk, Bialystok, and Grodno.

The Franco-Russian alliance intervened to sober the Russophobia of the publicists for a few years. Then followed a propaganda aiming at pure Germanism. Between 1894 and 1904 the future of Germany was seen to lie in a violent setback to Russia. In this struggle Austria, which was to be a bulwark against Slavism, was becoming more and more Slav herself. Hence Austria must be colonized with pure Germans, as Russian Poland and all the conquered Lithuanian territory would be, this emigration to be organized, administered, and insisted upon by the Imperial Government. Friedrich List had earlier planned the intensive colonization of Hungary and of the riparian regions of the Danube: "The right and left banks of the Danube, from Pressburg to its mouth, the northern provinces of Turkey, and the east-

ern coasts of the Black Sea offer large tracts of land, naturally fertile and as yet unexplored, to German colonists." He dreamed of a vast Germano-Magyar Empire, stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea.

CHAPTER V

THE PAN-GERMAN LEAGUE

THIS plan of continental expansion was fathered by the Pan-German League, whose "nebulous dreams of the future," as formulated by Professor Ernst Hasse, the league's head in 1894, produced a rebuke from Prince von Bülow. On all the frontiers of Germany, Hasse wished to delimit a military "glacis," the width of a day's march, where only pure-bred Germans might live, chosen from among former noncommissioned officers, to whom the state would assign lands at minimum rents in payment of their services. Military boundaries, like those which protected the Russians and the Austrians against the Tartars, would form a closely guarded girdle round Germany, where no foreigner would be allowed to own landed property or investments. Von Bülow's policy had already adopted and set in motion this process of expropriation in Poland. In twenty years 60,000 German colonists had been established on the dismembered estates of the great Polish landowners. This was a negligible percentage according to Hasse, who considered that on the Polish frontier alone some million portions of land should have been allotted to the surplus German population. Hasse demanded the return of the Netherland countries (Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg) to the German confederation; other parts of France in addition to Alsace-Lorraine; Bohemia and Moravia from Austria; the restoration by Russia of all the territory lost to Prussia by the treaties of 1815, from Cracow to Grodno, including Warsaw (the war of 1914 has already brought this area into Germany's hands), while Austria could be compensated by Saloniki.

A Germanic Europe found favor, especially in its economic aspects, among the numerous professors in the ranks of the Pan-German League. The part the German universities played in shaping the national aims, economic, military, political, or racial, cannot well be overlooked, as their professors were ardently occupied amid their specific duties in molding the thought of the ruling class and inspiring its scions with a proud and aggressive ambition. Professor Albrecht Wirth of Munich in 1906 thus viewed the project of pure Germanism aforementioned:

"In order to live, and to lead a healthy and joyous life, we need a vast extent of fresh arable land. This is what imperialism must give us. Germany may reap the fruits of Russian policy if she has sufficient courage. What would be the use of a Germanism flourishing in Brazil or in South Africa? It would further the expansion of the German race very greatly, but it would contribute very little to the might of the German Empire. On the other hand, the continental expansion of German territory, the multiplication on the Continent of the German peasantry, whose activities and capacities are so immeasurably superior to the obtuse nonchalance of the muzhiks, would form a sure barrier against the advance of our enemies and a secure basis for our growing power."

Aims toward colonial expansion, however, did not fade in the face of a preference for continental expansion. Economic considerations in favor of the former were too weighty. So colonial projects no less vast and aggressive were coupled with the continental plan. They were focused on all the unoccupied territory of the world, and also on much that was occupied—long preempted and possessed by other powers. Even to a neutral onlooker they revealed an insatiable appetite for conquest.

In this colonial struggle, with Great Britain as the rival to eclipse, the projects contemplated, as already mentioned, were those of penetration and dismemberment. The semiofficial pamphleteers trained their guns on the South American republics. Thus Professor J. Unold of Munich:

"The Germans seem marked out by their labors and their aptitudes to be the teachers, and the intellectual, economic, and

political leaders of these peoples (the Spanish and Portuguese Americans). If they fail in their mission, sooner or later these countries will fall, as a result of political or financial bankruptcy, under the domination and exploitation of the United States."

Emigration must be organized, the German publicists demanded, and the German Empire must direct it. "A farseeing policy is required," Friedrich Lange urged, "ruthlessly applying all the resources of its (the state's) power in concluding treaties with foreign states, which are eager to receive our emigrants, and so would in the end accept the conditions accounted necessary by our Government. The Argentine and Brazilian Republics, and in a greater or less degree all those needy republics of South America, would accept advice and listen to reason, voluntarily or under coercion."

Another publicist, Josef Ludwig Reimer, foresaw the Latin-American states as eager and willing to accept an accession of German colonization and money, with territorial concessions and representation for Germans on their public bodies. In this "moral and material assistance," they would see "an efficacious reenforcement against their natural enemy, the United States of the North, an enemy who will not only exact commercial concessions from them, but territorial concessions, and even the relinquishment of their nationality, as soon as it is powerful enough." The Pan-German theorists also staked out claims in the United States, relying on the German-Americans to pave the way for pure Germanism there, and in Australia, where they looked for a decadence of English power.

These were remote dreams of economic and colonial aggrandizement. More within the purview of practical national enlargement seemed projects of dismemberment, opening easier doors for German domination in Turkey, Morocco, and Central Africa, where African Germany was to include, plus existing German colonies, the Portuguese possessions of Mozambique and Angola and the Belgian Congo; also, in the event of a victorious war, the French Congo and the British possessions.

Maximilian Harden, whose editorial pen has been wielded with greater effect than any other German publicist, saw in the next

century only three or four great powers in the world—Russia, China, and the Anglo-Saxon confederations (the British Empire and the United States). To counterbalance her three great rivals Germany, he reasoned, in 1911, must have all Europe; but France alone stood in the path of this consummation: "We are in a position to offer the French more than any other power could offer them—guarantees for a great African Empire; the possibility of reducing expenditure in the army and devoting the surplus to ship building; safer and more remunerative investments for their capital than the stock of the eastern states of Europe; organizers of industry and commercial agents." As the war of 1914 proved, France remained in the way.

Behind Austrian economic ambitions in the Near East were similar propelling forces which aimed at more than commercial supremacy. Pan-Magyarism, a twin sister of German imperialism, an auxiliary of Pan-Germanism, flourished in Hungary. This party viewed Hungary as the natural guardian of the independent development of the southern European states. The Magyars were willing to be the friends of Rumania, Serbia, etc., provided they were not asked to grant rights to the Rumanians and Serbians of Hungary. They further agreed to form an alliance with Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria on condition that the Magyars were masters in this confederation. Opposed to this Pan-Magyarism was an Austrian Pan-Germanism which aimed at securing a share of the glory, the power, and the prosperity of Germany for Austria by attaching the German provinces of Austria to the German Empire. Another party that developed and adopted a form of imperialism known as "Trialism," espoused by the murdered Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Its program sought the inclusion of a southern Slav kingdom in the Austro-Hungarian compromise, abolishing "dualism," and substituting a composite monarchy, the framework of which would henceforth be triple, not dual. In the view of this party, there were two pursuits Austrian foreign policy must never forego: Austria must have access to the Mediterranean, and she must be supreme in the western Balkans. Always was Saloniki a coveted objective kept in view. "The commercial route

to Saloniki must be kept open to us," wrote Leopold von Chlumecky, describing this party's external policy in 1907. "Saloniki is destined to be the furthermost postern in the south-east for southern Austrian and Hungarian trade. Saloniki is our hope of the future. Some day, when Asia Minor is opened up to civilization, when railways traverse Mesopotamia and connect Smyrna with the Persian Gulf, Macedonia, the highway of the vast transcontinental traffic, which will pass from central Europe to Asia Minor, will enjoy a new prosperity, and Saloniki will be a place of considerable importance."

Following these parties came a maritime party, which aimed at colonial and naval expansion, thereby indicating substantial prizes of another sort for Austria-Hungary. Its policy taught that all nations had a right "to live their lives," which the nations of to-day sought to do by a vast universal commerce. It pictured Trieste as a great trading emporium and the Danube a mighty artery, through which all the trade of central Europe would flow into Asia Minor, by the adoption of a strong naval and commercial policy. Its partisans pointed out that Austria had at her disposal one of the most daring sea-faring populations in the world—the sailors of Dalmatia—and that the Suez Canal might have made the fortune of Trieste more readily than that of any European port if Austria had been able to create a suitable maritime equipment. They cherished the hope that the opportunity for insuring this prosperity would return on the not distant day when the New World had become industrially self-sufficing and when European trade sought outlets in Nearer Asia, and in the Far East, thrown open to European civilization. As to territorial ambitions of this party, they were colonial rather than continental. They wanted Austrian colonies on the Mediterranean shores. They deprecated looking to Saloniki as an objective, predicting that its trade would never have more than local importance until Trieste developed into a great port.

But of all these policies that of Pan-Magyarism has prevailed, and, starting with the economic crushing of Serbia, instigated the Great War.

PART II—DIRECT CAUSES OF THE WAR

CHAPTER VI

ASSASSINATION OF FRANZ FERDINAND—AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM

IT was the boast of the greater European powers, during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, and after, that the "conflagration in the Balkans had been localized"—i. e., that none of the western nations would be involved in the complications growing out of the trouble in the Balkans. The conflagration in the mountainous peninsula had been "localized," it was true; but the smouldering fire that remained after the Balkan Wars was to flare forth, during the summer of 1914, to spread over Europe from the Shetland Islands to Crete in one grand flame, and to drop sparks on the remaining four continents. That smouldering fire was the doctrine known as Greater Serbianism, sometimes wrongly spoken of as Pan-Serbianism.

As during the nineteenth century one after another the Balkan States gained independence from Turkish sovereignty and the germ of what is called Nationalism was born in them, each looked about to see in what direction its boundaries might be extended. The appetite of Nationalism, with these small states as with the greater countries, demanded that under the flag of a given nation must be gathered all the peoples of that nation; if some of them dwell in foreign lands those lands must be conquered; if foreigners live within the borders of the country those foreigners must be "ironed out"—the crushing machinery of despotic government must be brought into use to force them to adopt the language, literature, traditions, and religion of the

nation which considered them alien. And the appetite of Nationalism demanded one thing more—that the political boundaries of a nation conform with the "natural boundaries" as they seemed to be delimited by mountains, rivers, and coasts.

The kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro had shown symptoms of Nationalism long before the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913; when they emerged from those wars with their territories almost doubled the idea took even greater hold on them. As Turkish sovereignty and influence became less feared, Austrian dominance replaced them.

Austria did nothing to allay this fear; she stood as a Teutonic bulwark between a growing Slavic menace (in Serbia and Montenegro) on the south and the already formidable Slavic menace (Russia) on the east. In her provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were transformed from protectorates to integral parts of the Austrian Empire in 1908, there dwelt thousands of peasants who were of Serbian nationality; in more concise terms they were of the same racial stock as the Serbians. After Serbian prestige rose as a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 these Serbian subjects of Austria desired more than ever to be a part of the Slav kingdom; this desire was shared by the leading factions in Serbia itself; the doctrine of "Greater Serbia" demanded that the aims of the desire be materialized. Besides, the "natural boundaries" of Serbia seemed to take in the greater part, if not all, of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for they stretched along the eastern shores of the Adriatic and shut Serbia and Montenegro off from that sea.

Propaganda began to spread throughout Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, reminding the Serbs in all three places that they must work to bring themselves under one government, and that government their own; they were urged to keep up their efforts to standardize their religion, their speech, their traditions; they were called upon, by this same propaganda, to substitute Austria for Turkey as the object of national Serbian hate.

But Austria, too, had the disease of Nationalism, and she had been engaged since 1908 in "ironing out" the Serbs within her borders. Thus great friction was engendered, and when, on

June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the crown prince and his morganatic wife visited the Bosnian city of Sarajevo, they and the officials of the city and province knew that the lives of the pair were in danger from Serbian intrigue.

The archduke had gone to Bosnia on his first visit to take charge of military maneuvers there, and before he left the Austrian capital the Serbian minister had expressed doubt as to the wisdom of the visit, telling the court that the Serbian population in Bosnia might make unfavorable demonstrations. The fears of the Serbian minister proved to be well founded; Sarajevo displayed many Serbian flags on the day of his arrival. The archduke's party, in automobiles, proceeded to the Town Hall after leaving the railway station, passing through crowded streets. The city officials were gathered at the Town Hall to give him an official welcome. A bomb, hurled from a roof, fell into the archduke's car; he caught it and threw it to the pavement, where it exploded, doing no damage to either him or his wife, but injuring two adjutants in the car following. One Gabrinovics, a Serbian from Trebinje, was arrested as the assailant.

The archduke proceeded to the Town Hall, and after berating the city officials listened to the speeches of welcome. As he and his wife were departing a Serbian student, named Prinzip, who was later arrested, rushed out from the crowd and fired point-blank at the couple with a revolver. Both were hit a number of times and died some hours later from their wounds.

Great excitement immediately prevailed in Sofia and Vienna, and in Berlin and St. Petersburg to a lesser degree. What retribution would Austria demand? The Austrian press openly avowed that the plot on the archduke's life had been hatched in official circles in Serbia, and the Austrian Government made no attempt to suppress these statements. One hour after the tragedy had taken place it had assumed an official and international complexion.

A punitive war against Serbia was immediately urged in Vienna. On June 29, 1914, anti-Serbian riots broke out in Bosnia, Sarajevo was put under martial law, and the bodies of the assassinated couple began the mournful journey to Vienna.

On July 2, 1914, Prinzip confessed that he had apprised the Pan-Serbian Union of his attempt to kill the archduke, and on the same day the first intimation came that the matter was considered a serious one in Germany—the kaiser became "diplomatically ill." Then, for twenty days there was an outward calm in the capitals of Europe, but behind the scenes the diplomats were at work; the great question was how far Russia would go in defending her Slavic sister state against the impending demands of Austria.

These demands were made public in a note which Austria sent to Serbia on July 23, 1914. Serbia was given till 6 p. m., July 25, 1914, to comply with the ultimatum, which read as follows:

"On March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Serbian Government, made the following statements to the Imperial and Royal Government:

" 'Serbia recognizes that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the powers will take in conformity with Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin. At the same time that Serbia submits to the advice of the powers she undertakes to renounce the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted since October last. She undertakes on the other hand to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter.'

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events on June 28 last, have shown the existence in Serbia of subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy. The movement which had its birth under the eyes of the Serbian Government, has had consequences on both sides of the Serbian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, apologies for the perpetrators of outrage and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agita-

tion. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all the manifestations which have incited the Serbian population to hatred of the monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Serbian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of June 28 last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of June 28 that the Sarajevo assassinations were hatched in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Serbian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Obrava, and, finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chiefs of the Serbian Frontier Service.

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade and thence propagated in the territories of the monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the monarchy.

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees itself compelled to demand from the Serbian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the monarchy and the territories belonging to it, and that the Royal Serbian Government shall no longer permit these machinations and this criminal and perverse propaganda.

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of its official journal for July 26 the following declaration:

" 'The Royal Government of Serbia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the ensemble of tendencies of which the final aim is to detach from Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

" 'The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good, neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of March 31, 1909. The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempt to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress.'

"The Royal Serbian Government further undertakes:

"1. To suppress any publications which incite to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity.

"2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna Obrava, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches which are addicted to propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form.

"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, not only as regards the teaching body, but also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

"4. To remove from the military service and from the Administration in general all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government.

"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.



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"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of June 28 who are on Serbian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto.

"7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian state employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo.

"8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, and to dismiss and punish severely officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating the passage of the frontier for them.

"9. To furnish the Austro-Hungarian Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of June 28 to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government, and finally;

"10. To notify the Austro-Hungarian Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Serbian Government at the latest by six o'clock on Saturday evening, July 26, 1914."

CHAPTER VII

SERBIA'S REPLY

BECAUSE this note was so specific in its demands it is best to give in full the Serbian reply to it, which was issued within the period set by the Austro-Hungarian note. The Serbian answer in full was as follows:

"The Royal Serbian Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, and it is persuaded that its reply will remove all misunderstanding tending to threaten or to prejudice the friendly and neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the kingdom of Serbia.

"The Royal Government is aware that the protests made both at the tribune of the National Skupshtina (the Serbian legislative body) and in the declarations and the acts of responsible representatives of the state—protests which were cut short by the declaration of the Serbian Government made on March 18—have not been renewed toward the great neighboring monarchy on any occasion and that since this time, both on the part of the Royal Governments which have followed on one another, and on the part of their organs, no attempt has been made with the purpose of changing the political and judicial state of things in this respect.

"The Imperial and Royal Government has made no representations save concerning a scholastic book regarding which the Imperial and Royal Government has received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has repeatedly given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crises, and it is thanks to Serbia and the sacrifice she made exclusively in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private nature, such as newspaper articles and the peaceful work of societies—manifestations which occur in almost all countries as a matter of course, and which, as a general rule, escape official control—all the less in that the Royal Government when solving a whole series of questions which came up between Serbia and Austria-Hungary has displayed a great readiness to treat prevenance, and in this way succeeded in settling the greater number to the advantage of the progress of the two neighboring countries.

"It is for this reason that the Royal Government has been painfully surprised by the statements according to which persons of the Kingdom of Serbia are said to have taken part in the

preparation of the outrage committed at Sarajevo. It expected that it would be invited to collaborate in the investigation of everything bearing on this crime, and it was ready to prove by its actions its entire correctness to take steps against all persons with regard to whom communications had been made to it, thus acquiescing in the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government.

"The Royal Government is disposed to hand over to the courts any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation and rank, for whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo it shall have been furnished with proofs, and especially it engages itself to have published on the front page of the official journal of July 13-26 the following announcement:

" 'The Royal Serbian Government condemns all propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all tendencies as a whole of which the ultimate object is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories which form part of it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal actions. The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and officials should, according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government, have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, thereby compromising the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government solemnly pledged itself by its declaration of March 31, 1909. The Government, which disapproves and repudiates any idea or attempt to interfere in the destinies of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary whatsoever, considers it its duty to utter a formal warning to the officers, the officials, and the whole population of the kingdom that henceforth it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who render themselves guilty of such actions, which it will use all its force to prevent and repress.'

"This announcement shall be brought to the cognizance of the Royal army by an order of the day issued in the name of his Majesty the King by H. R. H. the Crown Prince Alexander, and shall be published in the next official bulletin of the army.

"1. The Royal Government engages itself, furthermore, to lay before the next meeting of the Skupshtina an amendment to

the press law, punishing in the severest manner incitements to hate and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and also all publications of which the general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy. It undertakes at the forthcoming revision of the constitution to introduce an amendment whereby the above publications may be confiscated, which is at present forbidden by the terms of Article XXII of the constitution.

"2. The Government does not possess any proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish such, that the Society Narodna Obrana and other similar societies have up to the present committed any criminal acts of this kind through the instrumentality of one of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissove the Narodna Obrana Society and any other society which shall agitate against Austria-Hungary.

"3. The Royal Serbian Government engages itself to eliminate without delay for public instruction in Serbia everything which aids or might aid in fomenting the propaganda against Austria-Hungary when the Imperial and Royal Government furnishes facts and proofs of this propaganda.

"4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from the military service (all persons) whom the judicial inquiry proves to have been guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it expects the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate at an ulterior date the names and the deeds of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which will have to be taken.

"5. The Royal Government must confess that it is not quite clear as to the sense and object of the demands of the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia should undertake to accept on her territory the collaboration of delegates of the Imperial and Royal Government, but it declares that it will admit whatever collaboration which may be in accord with the principles of international law and criminal procedure, as well as with good neighborly relations.

"6. The Royal Government, as goes without saying, considers it to be its duty to open an inquiry against all those who are, or shall eventually prove to have been, involved in the plot of June 28, and who are in Serbian territory. As to the participation at this investigation of agents of the Austro-Hungarian authorities delegated for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept this demand, for it would be a violation of the constitution and of the law of criminal procedure. Nevertheless, in concrete cases it might be found possible to communicate the results of the investigation in question to the Austro-Hungarian representatives.

"7. On the very evening that the note was handed in the Royal Government arrested Major Voija Tankositch. As for Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and who until June 15 was employed as a beginner in the administration of the railways, it has not yet been possible to (arrest) him. In view of the ultimate inquiry the Imperial and Royal Government is requested to have the goodness to communicate in the usual form as soon as possible the presumptions of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt, against these persons which have been collected up to the present in the investigations at Sarajevo.

"8. The Serbian Government will strengthen and extend the measures taken to prevent the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that it will immediately order an investigation and will severely punish the frontier officials along the line Schabatz-Losnitza who have been lacking in their duties and who allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

"9. The Royal Government will willingly give explanations regarding the remarks made in interviews by its officials, both in Serbia and abroad, after the attempt, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government has (forwarded) it the passages in question of these remarks and as soon as it has shown that the remarks made were

really made by the officials regarding whom the Royal Government itself will see about collecting proofs.

"10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised in the preceding points, in so far as that has not already been done by the present note, as soon as such measure has been ordered and executed.

"In the event of the Imperial and Royal Government considering that it is to the common interest not to precipitate the solution of this question, it is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of The Hague International Tribunal or to the great powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on March 18-31, 1909."

CHAPTER VIII

DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES

THIS reply from Serbia was not deemed satisfactory by Austria-Hungary and relations with Serbia were immediately broken off. On the following day, July 26, 1914, "diplomatic conversations," the object of which was to smooth over the differences between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, took place in Berlin, St. Petersburg and Vienna between representatives of the three nations whose capitals these were.

Austria-Hungary sent to the various governments the following "circular note" on July 27, 1914:

"The object of the Serbian note is to create the false impression that the Serbian Government is prepared in great measure to comply with our demands.

"As a matter of fact, however, Serbia's note is filled with the spirit of dishonesty, which clearly lets it be seen that the Serbian Government is not seriously determined to put an end to the culpable tolerance it hitherto has extended to intrigues against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

"The Serbian note contains such far-reaching reservations and limitations not only regarding the general principles of our action, but also in regard to the individual claims we have put forward, that the concessions actually made by Serbia become insignificant.

"In particular, our demand for the participation of the Austro-Hungarian authorities in investigations to detect accomplices in the conspiracy on Serbian territory has been rejected, while our request that measures be taken against that section of the Serbian press hostile to Austria-Hungary has been declined, and our wish that the Serbian Government take the necessary measures to prevent the dissolved Austrophobe associations continuing their activity under another name and under another form has not even been considered.

"Since the claims in the Austro-Hungarian note of July 23, regard being had to the attitude hitherto adopted by Serbia, represent the minimum of what is necessary for the establishment of permanent peace with the southeastern monarchy, the Serbian answer must be regarded as unsatisfactory.

"That the Serbian Government itself is conscious that its note is not acceptable to us is proved by the circumstances that it proposes at the end of the note to submit the dispute to arbitration —an invitation which is thrown into its proper light by the fact that three hours before handing in the note, a few minutes before the expiration of the time limit, the mobilization of the Serbian army took place."

The Great powers were not willing to go to war without first trying mediation between the two kingdoms in southeastern Europe, and even Russia, which was known to be a potential ally of Serbia, showed a disposition to use diplomacy before force. When the demands made by Austria-Hungary in her note of July 25, 1914, became known in the Russian capital, the following note was immediately telegraphed to Vienna:

"The communication [the circular note quoted above] made by Austria-Hungary to the powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any

steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Serbian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Serbian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations."

A copy of this note was at the same time sent to London with the addenda: "M. Sazonoff (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) hopes that his Britannic Majesty's Government will share the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna."

But on the same day, July 25, 1914, the Government at Vienna informed the powers that the note to Serbia was not an ultimatum; it was merely a démarche, and in it Austria had threatened to start military preparations, not operations. The requested delay, therefore, was not granted. That day was eventful in London, too, for the Foreign Office was notified by the German Ambassador that though Germany had not been apprised beforehand of the contents of Austria's note to Serbia, the German nation would nevertheless stand by its ally. "The German Ambassador read to me," said Sir Edward Grey in a telegram to the British Ambassador at Vienna, "a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other powers to

do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Serbia, but that once she had launched the note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky (German Ambassador at London) said, however, that "if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it." He expressed himself as personally favorable to this suggestion.

"I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.

"I impressed upon the ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic peace. Alone we could do nothing. The German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it."

On July 26, 1914, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin informed the German Government that he was instructed to state that any annexation by Austria-Hungary of Serbian territory would not be looked upon by Russia with indifference. The German Emperor, who had been away from Berlin, returned hastily to the capital. As the crisis approached the British Government once more attempted to have the matters in dispute settled by mediation. The following telegram was dispatched from Downing Street to the British Ambassadors at Paris and Rome: "London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. Would Minister of Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestions to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives of Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of the conference."

But this move had come too late. The British Ambassador to Berlin reported by telegraph to his Government on July 27, 1914, that the Imperial German Government considered that the proposed conference amounted practically to a court of arbitration and could not be called except at the behest of Austria-Hungary and Russia. The German Government therefore turned down the British proposal. But Germany was not for provoking a war; the German Ambassador at London informed the British Foreign Office that his Government was willing to accept in principle the mediation of the powers between Austria and Russia.

The question of whether the alliances between the various nations would hold under a strain now became pointed. The Russian Government informed the British Government on July 27, 1914, that the impression prevailed in Berlin and Vienna that England would stand aloof under any circumstances, differences between Russia and Austria notwithstanding. But on the same day Sir Edward Grey, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, dispelled these impressions in a telegram to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. "The impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet," it read in part, "which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for maneuver leave." On July 28, 1914, the British Government was informed that France and Russia were agreeable to having a conference called in London; the Italian Government had already reported that it agreed to this plan, but the refusal of Germany, mentioned above, rendered these communications useless.

On July 28, 1914, the British Government was informed by telegram from its Ambassador at Vienna that "Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike proceedings against Serbia, and would have to decline any suggestions of negotiations on basis of Serbian reply.

"Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict." This telegram, be it noted, made use of the term "military proceedings" instead of "military preparations" and therefore had the effect of changing Austria-Hun-

gary's note to Serbia into an ultimatum. Russia, on July 28, 1914, began to mobilize troops near Odessa, Moscow, Kieff and Kazan, and on the following day this fact was communicated officially to the Government at Berlin.

As Austria-Hungary and Russia were about to come to grips Germany made it plain that she would stand by her ally, Austria-Hungary. In times of peace there may have been doubt throughout Europe as to the strength of the bonds of the Triple Entente, but the German Government was not disposed to rely on these doubts when the critical moment came. The British Ambassador at Berlin was asked to visit the German Chancellor and as a result of this visit the former sent the following telegram to the British Foreign Office:

"Berlin, July 29, 1914. I was asked to call upon the chancellor to-night. His excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

"He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

"I questioned his excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war

was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

"His excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce would enable him to look forward to a realization of his desire.

"In reply to his excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty."

Here for the first time the matter of Belgian neutrality entered into the diplomatic discussions; the danger of a Pan-European conflict was apparent, for the diplomats from then on were less concerned with the Austro-Hungarian dispute with Serbia than with the possibilities that a war in western Europe might entail. On the same day, July 29, 1914, the German Ambassador at London was officially informed that if the European crisis involved nothing more than disputes between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and the military operations of Austria in Serbia on the other, England would keep out of the trouble, but if Germany went to war with Russia, or if France went to war, England could not stand quietly aside. News had come that day that Austria had declared war on Serbia the day before. The declaration read as follows:

"The Royal Government of Serbia, not having replied in a satisfactory manner to the note remitted to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to proceed to safeguard its rights and interests and to have recourse for this purpose to force of arms.

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"Austria-Hungary considers itself, therefore, from this moment in a state of war with Serbia."

At the same time the Government at Vienna issued this note to the foreign ambassadors there with the request that they forward it to their respective governments:

"In order to bring to an end the subversive intrigues originating from Belgrade and aimed at the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Imperial and Royal Government has delivered to the Royal Serbian Government a note in which a series of demands were formulated, for the acceptance of which a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Serbian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interest, and with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.

"Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Serbia a formal declaration, in conformity with Article I of the convention of October 18, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers itself in a state of war with Serbia.

"In bringing the above notice to the powers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the Conventions of the Hague of October 18, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of February 28, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Serbia."

The great question as to what Russia would do was answered by a note issued at St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914, which stated that Russia wished, above all, to maintain peace. But the moments during which words alone would be availing were fast passing. Austria-Hungary was mobilizing her armies, and not all of the mobilization was on her southern frontier; some corps were gathered at points from which a blow from Russia might be warded off, or offensive move against Russia made.

On July 30, 1914, the German Government sent a short note to St. Petersburg, in which three questions were asked. These were: the reason for the Russian mobilization, which Berlin

knew to be in progress; whether it was directed against Austria; and on what terms Russia might be induced to demobilize.

The Czar, on July 31, 1914, sent a note to the German Emperor in which he said in part: " . . . . It is technically impossible to discontinue our military operations, which have been rendered necessary by Austrian mobilization. We are far from wishing for war, and so long as negotiations with Austria regarding Serbia continue, my troops will not undertake any provocative actions." This was an admission that Russian general mobilization was in progress.

CHAPTER IX

PREPARATION FOR WAR

AS a matter of fact, during the last days of July, 1914, all the Governments in Europe had their military departments busy on the problem of preparing for the first blows in war; these included not only the six leading powers, but also the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, all the Balkan kingdoms, and Belgium and Holland. The diplomatic exchanges that were meanwhile taking place were known to all experienced statesmen to be hardly more than masks.

On August 1, 1914, the kaiser declared Germany to be "in a state of war." This did not carry with it a declaration of war against any power, but had the effect of putting the entire German Empire under martial law, everything being in readiness to cope with an enemy. On the same day the kaiser made an important speech in which he said, "A fateful hour has fallen for Germany. Envious peoples everywhere are compelling us to our just defense. The sword has been forced into our hands.

"I hope that if my efforts at the last hour do not succeed in inducing our opponents to see eye to eye with us and in maintaining peace, we shall, with God's help, so wield the sword that we shall restore it to its sheath again with honor." The last efforts of which he so hopefully spoke proved fruitless—at five o'clock

that evening he signed an order mobilizing the German army, and Russia and Germany went to war two hours later. A demand made upon the French Government by the German Government, asking the intentions of France in case Russia went to war with Germany, received an unsatisfactory reply on August 2, 1914, and France on the same day mobilized its army, though it declared war on no power. On August 3, 1914, German troops entered French territory, for Germany did not wish to be delayed in a campaign in the west by waiting for diplomatic exchanges to take place; war between Germany and France began at the moment the foreign soldiers crossed into France.

It was, in theory at least, over the matter of Belgian neutrality that England and Germany went to war. As soon the British Government saw that hopes for peace were no longer possible Sir Edward Grey sent to its ambassadors in Germany and France the following telegram; "London, July 31, 1914; I still trust situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French [and German] Government is prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to the German [and French] Government. It is important to have an early answer."

To this telegram the French Government, on August 1, 1914, answered that it stood ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided no other power threatened or violated it. Germany hesitated to give a definite reply immediately for fear of disclosing the plans of campaign she had against France.

On August 3, 1914, German troops moved into Luxemburg, en route for France, and it was then known that a German invasion of Belgium would be inevitable. But before taking this step Germany tendered certain proposals to the Belgian Government, assuring it that if peaceful passage were given to German troops Belgium would be given a subsidy. But the Belgian Government turned down these proposals and the king sent this telegram to the British monarch: "Remembering the numerous proofs of your majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor,

FIGHTING SHIPS

FROM THE

NAVIES OF SEA-POWERS AT WAR

SAILORS · SQUADRON · BATTLE FLEET · OST-FRIESLAND
LE COURBET · KONGO · CAIO-DUILIO · QUEEN ELIZABETH



Sailors on a German battleship. Events prove that they have such efficiency and hardihood as is displayed on the warships of nations with long traditions of the sea

Copyright, Medem Photo Service

The French battleship "Courbet," completed in 1913. She mounts twelve 12-inch guns and is a sister-ship of the "Jean Bart," the "Paris," and the "France"

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Great Britain's main fleet in home waters, while the scouts of the service are represented by a British dirigible and a seaplane overhead



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A squadron of German fighting ships in battle formation. These vessels are of the older or predreadnought types

, The New York World

The "Ost-Friesland," German battleship completed in 1911, a sister-ship of the "Oldenburg," the "Thuringen," and the "Helgoland." Each of them carries twelve 12-inch guns

Copyright, The New York World

The Japanese Battleship "Kongo," a sister-ship of the "Hiei," the "Haruna" and the "Kirishima." Each of this division carries eight 14-inch guns

Copyright, Press Illustrating Co.

The "Caio-Duilio," an Italian battleship completed in 1915, of the same type as the "Andrea Doria". She carries thirteen 12-inch guns

Copyright, International News Service

The Queen Elizabeth, British battle cruiser. Vessels of this type are armed with 15-inch guns, equal dreadnoughts in tonnage, and greatly surpass them in speed

of the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of the friendship which she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

Italy and England were now the only two important powers in Europe which were not embroiled in war, but the moment was rapidly approaching when the former could no longer keep out of it, if for no other reason than to see that the balance of power in Europe was not upset. On August 4, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said in the British House of Commons, "The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern coasts of France are defenseless. If a foreign fleet engaged in war against France should come down and battle against those defenseless coasts, we could not stand aside. We felt strongly that France was entitled to know at once whether, in the event of attack on her unprotected coasts, she could rely on our support. I gave the engagement to the French Ambassador last night that if the German fleet goes into the English Channel or into the North Sea to attack French shipping, or the French coast, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. That answer is subject to the approval of Parliament. It is not a declaration of war. I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coasts of France. That is far too narrow an engagement." Germany had thrown down the gauntlet in showing she intended to invade Belgium; Great Britain here threw down the gauntlet. It could be but a question of hours before Germany and England went to war.

Meanwhile, because war was already on between Germany and France, the latter did not go to the trouble of issuing a declaration of war. And on August 4, 1914, the Italian Government announced that "The Italian Cabinet has decided that while some of the European powers are at war Italy is at peace with all the belligerents. Consequently the citizens and subjects of the Kingdom of Italy are obliged to observe the duty of neutrality." This declaration of neutrality severed the bonds that held Italy to the Triple Alliance. On the same afternoon,

August 4, 1914, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin was handed his passports and departed; simultaneously this official statement was given to the German press: "In consequence of a Russian attack on German territory Germany is in a state of war with Russia.

"The French reply to Germany's note has been received in the meantime, and is of an unsatisfactory character. In addition France has ordered the mobilization of her army so that the outbreak of war between Germany and France must be awaited at any moment." The moment came that same evening when this additional statement was given to the German press: "On the morning of August 2 French airmen flew over Nuremberg and threw bombs, while during the night of August 1 French aeroplanes flew over the province of the Rhine.

"During the forenoon of August 2 a number of French officers dressed in German uniforms crossed the German frontier from Holland, while on the same day French troops crossed the German border in Upper Alsace near Belfort.

"We consider ourselves as having been attacked by France before diplomatic relations were broken off."

In so far as the history of the war itself is concerned these statements were of no value, nor were those by which France proved provocation to go to war. But in the history of diplomacy and international law they are of importance, for they showed that superior intelligence which governments obtained by means of telegraph and telephone rendered the actions of ambassadors, as well as the formal declarations of war, posthumous. Man's inventive genius, instead of making war more remote, brought it on him more readily.

On August 4, 1914, the last chance for averting war between England and Germany went by. On that date the British Foreign Office had telegraphed to its Envoy at Brussels: "You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Govern-

ment in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years."

Germany, through its Intelligence Department, was aware that this note had been sent, but the invasion of Belgium began, nevertheless. Then came an ultimatum from England. As soon as the British Foreign Office had learned that German troops had crossed the border and that the fortifications at Liege had been summoned to surrender to the German army, this telegram was sent to the British Ambassador at Berlin:

"London Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

"We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

"In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning [which said that England was bound to protest against violation of Belgian neutrality] be received here by twelve o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports and to say that his Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a part as ourselves."

Midnight of August 4, 1914, came and the German Government had not yet made a reply to this note; fifteen minutes of grace were allowed, and then the British Government formally declared war.

The next move of a world power, toward belligerency, came in the Far East. In 1911 Japan and England had entered an

offensive and defensive alliance, which bound each to come to the other's aid should that other become involved in war with more than one nation. Japan readily agreed to live up to its part, and on August 16, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Germany which read:

"Tokyo, August 16, 1914. We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbances of the peace in the Far East, and to safeguard the general interests as contemplated by the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain.

"In order to secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aid of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty to give the advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

"First. To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

"Second. To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.

"The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that in the event of its not receiving by noon on August 23, 1914, an answer from the Imperial German Government, signifying its unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as she may deem necessary to meet the situation."

The time limit set for the German reply came and passed with no official communication with Berlin. Consequently the Japanese Government declared war in the following proclamation:

"Issued at Tokyo, August 23, 1914, at 6 p. m.

"We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:

"We hereby declare war against Germany, and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that empire

with all strength, and we also command our competent authorities to make every effort, in pursuance of their respective duties, to attain the national aim by all means within the limits of the law of nations.

"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which we view with grave concern, we on our part have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-chau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed vessels cruising the seas of eastern Asia are threatening our commerce and that of our ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

"Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty, after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance, and we on our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commanded our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the Imperial German Government. But on the last day appointed for the purpose, however, our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of our reign, and while we are still in mourning for our lamented mother.

"It is our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of our faithful subjects peace may soon be restored and the glory of the empire be enhanced."

Germany made no reply to the Japanese declaration. On August 19, 1914, the emperor had sent word to the garrison at Kiao-chau that it was to defend itself against all attacks made by the Japanese, and when the commander there heard of the Japanese declaration he issued a statement in which he invited the Japanese, if they wanted the place, to come and fight for it.

PART III—RESOURCES AND ARMAMENT OF THE NATIONS AND MOBILIZATION OF THE FORCES

CHAPTER X

TERRITORIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL COMPARISONS

THE fundamental factor in war is territory. Whether war be viewed from the point of its relation to the racial characteristics of the nations who are opposed, or to national rivalries, or to imperial ambitions, the solid fact remains that war is of peoples who live upon a certain land domain, who possess frontiers that may be attacked and must be defended, and whose patriotism coheres with geographical boundaries. The riches of a country depend upon territory and the density of population. Consequently the proportion of men able to bear arms depends upon territory, and the power of self-maintenance under times of stress—such as a blockade—is again a territorial question.

First of all, then, in order to be able to make a comparison of the forces opposed to each other at the outbreak of the war, their respective territorial powers must be contrasted and their geographical locations each to the other must be taken into account. Mere size does not tell all the tale, nor even acreages of cultivated land, nor yet even land subordinated in some way or other to the processes of manufacturing. On the other hand, geographical isolation may be a matter of feet instead of leagues, as for example, the natural barrier between East Prussia and Petrograd is a marshy country scores of square miles in extent,

while the geographical boundary between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is but a river, the opposite banks of which may easily be raked by modern artillery.

The Germanic nations, known as the Central Powers, which were allied at the opening of the war were the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The area of the German Empire (exclusive of colonial possessions) in 1914 was 208,-825.2 square miles. The area of the Austrian Empire was 115,831.9, and of the Kingdom of Hungary was 125,641.2. In addition to these, the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 19,767.9, making the total area of the territories of the Central Powers the sum of 470,093.2 square miles, or a little over one-sixth the size of the United States, not including Alaska.

The nations known as the "Allies" in popular speech, consisted, at the opening of the war, of the British Empire, the French Republic, and the Russian Empire. Using the same basis of comparison, the area of the British Isles was 121,633 square miles; the area of the Republic of France was 207,129 square miles, and the area of European Russia, including Finland and Poland, and excluding territory within the Arctic circle, was approximately 2,500,000 square miles. Serbia had an area of 34,000 square miles. Belgium, although in no way responsible for the outbreak of the war—no matter from what point of view it may be considered—because the nation to suffer most at first and in the very earliest days of the war was on the side of the Allies. Her area, exclusive of over-sea possessions, was 11,373 square miles. This makes a total of 2,874,135 square miles for the Allies, a preponderance of territory which seems extraordinarily disproportionate until it is realized that the British Isles, France, Belgium, and Serbia together were far smaller than the combined territories of the Central Powers, and that only a small proportion of European Russia was liable to become a part of the actual field of conflict.

Passing on to larger figures, that is to say to the total area of all the possessions of the nations involved, it will be seen that the preponderance on the part of the Allies is even greater.

Thus the German Empire, inclusive of colonial possessions in Africa, in Asia, and in the Pacific, contained 1,236,600 square miles. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, as previously stated, was 261,239 square miles, there being no over-sea colonies. This makes a total of 1,497,839 square miles as the total territory of the Central Powers.

Balanced against this come the enormous figures of the three great allied empires. The area of the British Empire was approximately 13,158,712 square miles, the Republic of France and her colonies 4,983,086 square miles, and the Russian Empire 8,394,018 square miles. The three empires combined thus made a total of 26,535,816 square miles, or but very little less than one-half of the total land area of the earth. These figures are compiled from the latest sources before the opening of the war, but it is to be remembered that some of the figures are approximate. For example the French possessions in Africa, of enormous extent, have not been surveyed, and there are vast stretches of Arctic Siberia and Arctic Canada which are but half explored. The small territories of Belgium and Serbia may be added to the total of the three great allied empires, and thus practically one-half of the earth on this globe was opposed to the million and a half square miles of the Central Powers.

Owing to Bulgaria's position in the Balkan Peninsula, and also owing to aggrievement following the results of former Balkan wars, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers later in the war. Turkey, also, fearing the loss of Constantinople to the Russians as a result of the coalition of the Allies, threw her forces on the side of Germany. The area of Bulgaria was only 43,000 square miles, but the Ottoman or Turkish Empire was territorially very large, containing 1,420,448 square miles, or almost as much as Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria combined. In round numbers, and for easy remembrance, it may be said that the territory of the Central Powers engaged in the war was about three million square miles.

For a long time Italy maintained neutrality, but the onrush of conditions forced her into the war, also on the side of the Allies. The territory of European Italy was 110,623 square miles, and

inclusive of her African possessions the territory under the Italian flag was 706,623 square miles.

The territory of the Japanese Empire, also, needs to be taken into consideration, for the reason that Japan, while not entering the European theatre of war, declared herself on the side of the Allies by the capture of Kiao-chau, a district leased from China by Germany, and the very next month declared to be a German protectorate. The territorial extent of the Japanese Empire was 254,266 square miles, inclusive of Korea. These are the principal factors to be taken into consideration in the mere question of the territorial extent of the opposing forces.

The geographical position of the belligerent countries, with their corresponding advantages and disadvantages, is the next factor to be considered. The geographical position of the Central Powers is best expressed by the fact that they are central. They have all the advantages of being in a united whole. When, later in the war, Serbia was conquered, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and Turkey was swung into line, the same condition held true. Germany and her allies were a homogeneous unit, geographically considered. From the point of view of land defense very little of Germany's frontiers bordered upon enemy territory. The small section that confronted France on the west and the larger section facing Russia on the east were her only open points of attack. Her sea front, except for the small section near the mouth of the Rhine, was on the Baltic, and secure from naval attack except by the Russian fleet, and Russia has never been a naval power. Her Mediterranean outlet, near Trieste and Fiume, menaced by the Mediterranean fleets of the allied powers, was comparatively safe, for the Austrian fleet was an efficient fighting unit, especially so for defense.

As opposed to this was the openness of England, France, and Russia to naval attack. England has but a small proportion of land to seacoast, and France is open to the sea on three sides. Russia, fronting the Baltic, possessed an infinitely inferior fleet, to which the Allies could send no reenforcement as long as the Skager Rack and Cattegat Straits were the only way into the Baltic; moreover, by the Kiel Canal, connecting the North Sea

and the Baltic, the remodeling of which was completed in a few months before the declarations of war, a German naval fleet would possess an enormous advantage over an allied fleet, endeavoring to force entrance into the Baltic. In addition to this, while the Central Powers could work together on both fronts with great ease, thanks to the excellent system of German railways, Great Britain and France had no means of direct communication with their great ally in the east of Europe. Thus, in a measure, the Central Powers were not attacking the Allies at any one time, though it might truly be said that they were being attacked by the Allies. In the event of any lack of synchronization between the plans of Russia and those of the western allies, German and Austrian troops could be massed first on one side of the field of operations and then on the other. Such action was impossible to the Allies. At the time of the great German advance on Paris, Russia could give no aid. At the time of the German advance on Riga, Britain and France could give no aid. Both German advances were checked and the invaders driven back, not by the armies of the Allies, but by two noninterlocking parts of the armies of the Allies. At the same time, the susceptibility to attack on both sides prevented the Central Powers from deflecting all their men to either front, and thus by the mere existence of passive menace, prevented the Central Powers from using their geographic advantage to the full.

Their disadvantage, in the military sense of the recognition of geographical conditions, was that the Central Powers had constantly to bear in mind the necessity of fighting upon two fronts. Russian activity, while important to Britain and France, was a matter with which their policy had nothing to do; the coordination of movements on the west front was a matter entirely outside the scope of the operations of the Russian commanders. The German military staff, on the other hand, had the task of constantly coordinating two separate campaigns, to determine where the greatest number of men should be, to avoid weakening the one side or the other at the wrong moment, and to conduct a dispartite series of campaigns.

The advantages, again considered geographically, greatly outweigh the disadvantages. The first of these was the homogeneity of the Central Powers. A general could attend a war council in Berlin in the evening, and one in Vienna the next morning. The influence of Germany was an understood thing, moreover, and in Vienna there was a readiness to accept and carry out the policies of the German military staff. There was also a geographical homogeneity, due to modern facility of communication. Not only in mobilization, but in the entire conduct of the war, the geographic nearness of points in Germany and Austria was brought about by an excellent east and west railway system. This disadvantage of fighting on two fronts was partly compensated by the fact that within three days enormous masses of men could be moved from Galicia to the Rhine, or from the Belgian frontier to the wastes of East Prussia. In all Europe there is no stretch of land so well suited by nature for this task of fighting upon two fronts as the area of the combined Austrian and German Empires. This is emphasized by the topography of the Baltic Plain, the Rhine and Danube valleys. One might say, in a measure, that this stretch of territory has not wasted any of its natural mountain defenses by flinging them athwart the territory. Thus the Vosges defend against France, the Alps against Italy, the Transylvanian Alps against Rumania—in the event of that nation entering the war with Russia—the Carpathians behind Galicia against Russia's southern attacks, and the marshy country east of East Prussia against Russian northern attack. Yet it is to be added that these very advantages of defense were also disadvantages of attack. The march through Belgium would not have been necessitated if, for example, the portion of Central Powers territory that confronted France had been of the same character as that which confronted Russia. The mountainous character of that frontier was a determining factor in the invasion of Belgium. The invasion of Belgium was a determining factor in the relation which Germany sustained in the war to the allied powers, and especially to the neutral nations. The relation of the neutral nations, in modern warfare, which requires such immense supplies, is a factor of great importance

for success in the field. Therefore, to close the syllogism, the mountainous character of the Vosges country was the primary factor in determining the relation of all other countries to the Central Powers, a factor constantly arising at every point in the Great War. On such geographical factors does the strategy of huge campaigns depend. One more example may be given. In the battles of the Marne it became evident that France's strongest defense was the Argonne Forest, in the battle of the Aisne it became clear that the geological formation of a river bank made the German position almost impregnable.

The topographical position of the allied powers is the next factor to be considered. Germany's geographical resources have been touched upon, and to them may be added the fact that, if invaded, she had, at the Rhine, a marvelous line to fall back upon. The first factor to be considered in France is its openness to attack. Thanks to the Vosges and the Argonne, a line of great strength could be established (it was so established and was so held in the teeth of determined attack) from Belfort to Verdun. But north of Verdun the earth-making forces have not been kind to France, in a military sense. From Verdun to the North Sea is, geographically speaking, open country. This is not the place to discuss the availability of forts in open country, it is sufficient to point out that there is no geographical defense. Between the German border and Paris there is no topographical barrier to an invading army. The Germans found this out in the Franco-Prussian War, and it had not been forgotten.

The next great factor in the topography of northern France is partly artificial, namely, the railroads. Everything in France centers in Paris. All the railroads and all the waterways go to the nation's capital. This is a strength politically, but a weakness geographically, for, it is to be remembered, in a geographical sense, difficulty of access is strength, ease of access is weakness. German railways move troops to the frontier. French railways move troops to and from Paris. This topography explains all the earlier part of the war. It explains why Belfort to Verdun was held, and held stubbornly, in order to prevent the enemy reaching central France, because central France is a plain. It ex-

plains why the retreat to the Marne was made, and also why it was made with such stubborn resistance, for the nearer to Paris the nearer to the source of supply, and the very factor which makes Paris dangerous to the whole country, if seized, makes it, at the same time, an extraordinary source of supply. France's problem, then, geographically speaking, was to establish an artificial line of defense between the natural barrier of the Belfort-Verdun line and the railroad barrier at Paris. The line from Verdun to Paris was the line of the battle of the Marne. Being held, it stopped the German drive and drove the invader back.

The geographical position of Britain lies in a word. She is an island. Defended by a powerful navy, she was safe from easy invasion. On the other hand, her territory is so fully occupied, every inch of ground is so valuable, that she could not deplete her garrisons too greatly. As long as France was facing Germany, and England was bottling up the German fleet, France could leave almost her whole country without defense. There was no need for troops to the center, west, or south. The sea frontier needed not to be defended, the Spanish frontier was at peace, and the Italian border was that of a power, first a neutral and then an ally. Besides, should there have been any invasion of France at the Bay of Biscay or the Mediterranean, Paris, where all matters center, is far away. Far otherwise was it with Britain. Even to help France the actual territory of Great Britain might not be left unguarded. Accordingly, France could only count upon a small army support in the form of an expeditionary force, the assistance of Britain to the Allies being mainly naval, industrial, and financial, as well as moral. Yet, even so, the expeditionary force proved a deciding factor in the German drive on Paris. Geographically, however, the isolation of England as an island precluded the ability suddenly to mobilize all her forces and throw them at a definite point in the manner that the Central Powers were able to do.

Viewing matters still in their geographical aspect, Russia held a peculiar place. Her immense extent coupled to her flatness and the entire absence of natural geographical boundaries,

made small invasions easy and crippling invasion difficult. An army invading Russia could be led on mile after mile into the interior, until, at last, in order to supply a few army corps, a vast horde of men would be required to maintain the line of communication. And, even then, Russia would scarcely have felt the wound. The French policy is a retreat to a definite point, and then a firm stand. The Russian policy is a continuing retreat, each advance of the enemy making his position more dangerous. Her lack of ports, while a geographical question, rather belongs to matters of blockade, which will be dealt with later. Russia had nothing but her size as a geographical advantage, and her isolation from her allies rendered it necessary for her to face every issue alone.

CHAPTER XI

POPULATION AND RACIAL CHARACTERISTICS

WITH the areas of the respective territories thus compared, and the geographical positions touched upon in so far as their larger factors bear upon the war, it follows naturally that the next matter to be compared is the population of the several opposing nations and the density of that population to the territory involved. If to this consideration of population be added the consideration of the cultivated land adjacent to the theatres of war, the second great problem of invasion, known as "living off the enemy's country," will be brought into view. This is the second great resource of nations, their people and the food supply.

Beginning, again, with the Central Powers, the population of the German Empire, according to the census of 1910, was 64,925,993, of which over 40,000,000 were in Prussia. The population of Austria, according to census taken in the same year, was 28,571,934, and of the Kingdom of Hungary, 20,886,487, while Bosnia and Herzegovina added 1,931,802 to the amount, making

for the Dual Monarchy a total of 51,390,223. In round figures 116,000,000 may be taken as the combined population of this central group. Adding thereto nations which entered the theatre of war later, Bulgaria with 4,337,513, and Turkey in Europe with 1,891,000 inhabitants, the total reaches, in round figures, 123,000,000 inhabitants, exclusive of possessions outside of Europe.

The powers forming the group of the Allies: Britain, France, and Russia, largely owing to the huge population of the latter, show a still larger number of inhabitants. Thus, despite the small territory of the British Isles, the population in the census of 1911 was 45,370,530. The population of France, with a far larger territory in 1911 was 39,601,509. The population of Belgium, a small but intensive manufacturing country, in 1911 census was 7,490,411. The population of Serbia, as per the census of 1910, was 2,911,701. The population of European Russia, in the census of 1911, was 148,207,700, inclusive of Poland and Finland. This makes a total of 243,581,851 inhabitants, in round figures 243,000,000, or not quite twice as many as the populations of the Central Powers.

The disproportion is far from being as great as it seems, mainly because of questions of conscription and military preparedness, matters which will be discussed when dealing with the armaments of the nations. Yet, even by mere figures of population, it will readily be seen that the relation of population to area alters the respective apparent strength. In round figures the 243,000,000 people of the Allies are spread out over 3,000,000 square miles of area. The 123,000,000 of the Central Powers, including Bulgaria and Turkey in Europe, are only spread over 518,175 square miles, or, in round figures, half a million square miles of area. In very rough figures, then, it may be said, that the Allies had twice as large a population settled upon six times as large a territory.

There remains yet in the population question the matter of race. Here the Germans began with an immense advantage. Berlin and Vienna were friends, and their chancelleries worked in unison. England, France, and Russia had long been national



WEALTH AND POPULATION OF THE WARRING NATIONS

enemies. It is not so long since Waterloo, it is but a very short time since the Crimean War, and the passes north of India are defensively guarded, not against warlike tribes, but against the feared aggressions of the Russian bear. One organized rule dominated the policies of the Central Powers, three governed those of the Allies. One organized intention governed the Central Powers, three different thoughts and intentions ruled among the Allies. To what extent Serbia or Russia or Germany were responsible for the war is not so much a matter of history as of interpretation of history, and is dealt with elsewhere in this volume.

In this regard one cannot do better than cite figures instead of mere opinions. Thus it would be fair to compare the Teutonic group of the Central Powers with the Teutonic group; the Celtic group, the Italic group, and the Slavic group among the Allies to determine whether numerically, at least, this insistence on superiority is upheld.

The facts in the case are as follows: The census of 1910 showed a foreign population in the German Empire of 1,259,873, and the population of Alsace-Lorraine (three-fourths Celtic) was 1,874,014. Over 1,000,000 Jews are listed, over 600,000 professing Judaism. Thus nearly 3,000,000, in round figures, are to be subtracted from the German population as non-Teutonic. It will be noted that these figures assume all other persons residing in Germany to be Teutons, a position admissible only for purposes of comparison, since other countries will be assumed to be a single ethnic stock. Germany, thus, may claim 61,000,000 Teutons. But when attention is turned to Austria-Hungary the German claim is far different. According to the census for 1910 the proportion of Germans (all Teuton stocks) in Austria was but 35.58 per cent of the population, in Hungary it was only 10.40 per cent. If, then, ethnic numerical superiority is to be considered as a factor, Germany has no rightful influence in Vienna at all. In exact figures, the census of 1910 gave 9,950,266 Germans in Austria and 1,903,357 Germans in Hungary, in round figures about 12,000,000 together. Neither Bulgaria nor Turkey are Teuton, and therefore need not enter into

the calculation. As a grand total, then, the Teutons in the Central Powers group number 73,000,000.

England, regarded as a Teuton country, possesses a population of 34,045,290, the difference from the total of the British Isles, consisting of Celtic Ireland, Celtic Wales, Celtic Isle of Man, and partly Celtic Scotland, being over 11,000,000.

If to the (roughly) 40,000,000 of France be added the 11,000,000 of Celts from the British Isles, then, as against the 73,000,000 Teutons, there are 51,000,000 Celts. Of course, as is well known, there is a very large admixture of Italic stock in the French, particularly in the south, but this will not alter the totals.

Owing to the fact that only one Italic nation is engaged in the war, viz., Italy, the figures of this branch of the race are not so great. Yet, even so, of this racial stock alone, there are, in round numbers, 35,000,000 to be considered. The Celtic and Italic stocks opposed to the Teutons of Germany, therefore, present a larger numerical proportion.

Now let the Slavic stock be taken into account. It appears that in the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire there are 37,000,000 Slavs, or, to put it another way, there are more Slavs under the flags of the Central Powers than the population of England. In addition to this there are over 4,000,000 Slavs in Bulgaria who came under the flags of the Central Powers. This makes the Slav population of the Central Powers larger than the population of France. When, therefore, the statement is made that "millions of German-speaking people" are under the autocracy of Russia, the fact that over 41,000,000 Slavs are under the imperial control of the houses of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg is to be taken into account.

In European Russia over 148,000,000 are enumerated, exclusive of Finland, in which possession 87 per cent are Finnish, which is a Mongolian stock. Of this it is estimated, according to the census of 1910, that 110,000,000 are Slavs, this including the Caucasus, where only a little over 30 per cent are Slav. The figures of the entire empire may be of service. For this, according to the census, the Slavs form 71.7 per cent, the Turco-Tartars 10.6 per cent, the Finns 4.5 per cent, the Jews 3.9

per cent (mainly in Poland), the Lithuanians 2.4 per cent, the Germanic group 1.6 per cent, the Cartvelians 1.1 per cent, and all other races less than 1 per cent. The last detailed ethnographical census was taken in 1897, and since that time there has been a certain change, but not enough to disturb the proportions greatly, except in the case of Jews. In that census there were found 200,000 representatives of the Germanic race divided, according to official figures, as follows: Germans, 180,000; Swedes, 14,000 (mainly in Finland); Norsemen and Danes, 1,600.

To condense the figures of Slav and Teuton comparison into a phrase, it may be pointed out that the Central Powers hold rule over 41,000,000 Slavs of a different ethnic stock; and that Russia holds rule over a quarter of a million Teutons. The figures are somewhat startling. They show the chancelleries of Berlin and Vienna dealing with a nonhomogeneous group of ethnic stocks, and they show England, France, and Russia, respectively, far more homogeneous, each within its own borders.

Since the point under consideration is merely that of ethnic factors, the political questions involved in the management of these different races must be deferred. But the direct ethnic offsets hold a different place. Again viewing the Central Powers first, it is clear that, except for Alsace-Lorraine, the German Empire is a homogeneous ethnic unit of a Teutonic stock. Bulgaria is a homogeneous ethnic unit of Slav-Mongol stock. But it is far otherwise with the Dual Monarchy. The figures are revelative. In Austria the percentages are as follows: German (Teutonic) 35.58 per cent; Bohemian, Moravian, and Slovak (Slav) 23.02; Polish (Slav) 17.77; Ruthenian (Slav) 12.58; Slovenian (Slav) 4.48; Italian and Latin, 2.75; Serbo-Croatian (Slav) 2.80. In Hungary the percentages show a far smaller proportion of Teutonic stock, and a far greater diversity of ethnic variability. The figures are: Magyar (Finno-Tartar) 54.50 per cent; Rumanian (Italo-Slavic) 16.10; German (Teutonic) 10.40; Slovak (Slav) 10.70; Serbo-Croatian 3.60; Ruthenian (Slav) 2.50. These figures are exclusive of Serbia. It thus appears that Hungary has a majority that is neither Teuton nor

Slav, but Finno-Tartar, in other words, a branch of the Mongolian. They are not Aryans, and do not belong to the Indo-European race, but more closely resemble the Chinese in their ethnic origin. The Central Powers, then, ethnically speaking, embrace Teuton, Slav, and Finno-Tartar stocks, with at least eight different languages (not dialects).

The ethnic variability of the opposing nations may next be presented. Of these France is the most homogeneous. Strongly Italic in the south, almost purely Celtic in the northwest, the people of France are Italo-Celts. Their language is the same throughout the entire republic, and there are no internecine race rivalries.

The British Isles is less united. Once inhabited solely by Celts, successive Teutonic invasions of Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Normans, partly engulfed the Celts and partly drove them to the westward. Thus the south and east of England is largely Teutono-Celtic while the counties of Cornwall and Devon, Wales, and all the English counties bordering thereon, the Highlands of Scotland, all of Ireland save the province of Ulster, and the Isle of Man are Celtic. Ireland, especially, isolated by the sea, has retained her Celtic fervor, and does not abide happily under English rule. Here political discussion is deferred, but, as an ethnic fact, these Celtic countries are a discordance to British Teutonism, even though that Teutonism has been much diluted by the ancient British stock, which, as has been said, was Celtic. The Italic invasion of the Romans gave little Italic infusion. In the war the Finno-Tartaric Magyars of Hungary supported Teuton Germany, and in the same manner the Celtic Irish of Ireland supported semi-Teutonic England, but their ethnic dissimilarities remain.

The third of the great empires opposing the Central Powers has ethnic problems of its own, but with one exception the stocks are not so divergent. Finland is inhabited by a Finno-Tartaric stock, not greatly dissimilar in ethnic origin from the Magyars of Hungary. They speak their own language, and, indeed, to a very great extent have home rule. In 1910, however, the bonds holding Finland to Russia were a little more closely drawn. In

Russia the ethnic difference lies not so much in the intrusion of alien races (except the Semitic Jew) as in the division of the Slav races. Of these there are four: Great Russian, the eastern group, the political ruling stock; Little Russia, the southern group, including Little Russian and Ruthenian; Serbo-Croatian or the southwestern group, including Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian; and Czech or the western group, including Polish, Bohemian, and related languages. Of these, Little Russia, Poland, and Bohemia were once great kingdoms, and have never lost their desire for independence. The Tartar and other Mongolian admixture in European Russia is not large, is quite indeterminate, and is in no way organized as an ethnic unit, as, for example, by a common tongue. Its influence, therefore, is negligible.

But in the case of the Jews Russia has found an ethnic problem. This she solved (speaking in geographical terms) by confining them to a region known as "The Pale," which includes one-fifth of European Russia. Heavy fines precluded the Jews from leaving this section, which is very large. In the census of 1897 the total number of Jews in Russia was given at 5,215,805. Of this number 93.9 lived within the Pale. The United States Immigration Commission in 1910 estimated the number of Jews in Russia at 4,000,000, and an unofficial estimate at the opening of the war placed the number at less than 3,000,000. There are no Great Russians in America, no Ukrainian (Russian) Little Russians, but a vast number of Russian Jews. It is estimated that there are more Jews in the United States now than in Russia. The fact is notable in the consideration of the ethnic forces opposed in the war, since so much has been said and written about the Jews in Russia that it is overlooked that they are a negligible number.

The fourth of the empires opposing the Central Powers, that of Italy, is almost a homogeneous unit, certainly politically. Yet between the North Italian and the South Italian group there is a wide difference. The North Italian has a strong Celtic and a slight Teutonic (Lombard) infusion. The South Italian is Italic, and in Calabria and Sicily there is a strong strain from

an African stock closely related to the present Berbers. From the point of view of language, Italian is everywhere spoken, but with such strong dialectic differences that these seem almost like separate tongues.

Here, then, are the geographical resources of the countries opposed in the war, their topographical relations and the advantages and disadvantages superincumbent on these. Here, also, are the peoples opposed in the war, or to speak more accurately, the populations inhabiting the territories politically opposed in the war, showing the ethnic stocks involved, with the advantages and disadvantages. It will be seen that Teuton England is opposing Teuton Germany. It will be noted that 41,000,000 Slavs under the German flag are arrayed against the Slavic Empire of Russia. It will be noted that the Finno-Tartar inhabitants of Finland have a place in the czar's army, and the Finno-Tartars of Hungary form the flower of the kaiser's cavalry. Whatever political developments may have been, whatever may be considered the most advanced form of civilization, English, French, German, Italian, or Russian, strict ethnography declares that this is not a war of peoples, it is not based upon mutual ethnic antagonisms, and brother race is fighting against brother race on the battle fields of the east and west.

CHAPTER XII

FINANCIAL RESOURCES—GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

MODERN warfare, however, depends to a very great extent on a third factor of resource. This is the factor of finance. In the wars of a thousand years ago if a soldier was armed with sword and shield, his munitions of war were complete. If the horseman had spear and shield he needed no more. An archer's fighting equipment consisted of his bow, a sheaf of arrows and an extra bowstring. The armies were not large and they lived off

the country. If such was not rich enough to support the foraging of a small army, it was not worth the winning. Mere numbers played a great part in such wars and moral strength played a still more important part. Roman drill and Roman self-confidence made Rome the mistress of the world. Modern war knows nothing of this. A storm of shrapnel will destroy a regiment of the Death's Head Hussars, the Coldstream Guards or the Chasseurs d'Afrique as quickly as it will the rawest assemblage of recruits, and mere men, no matter how heroic and unflinching, cannot stem the tide of modern war. Leonidas held back the whole Persian army at the Pass of Thermopylæ, but Belgium could not hold back Germany. War is with men, but it is with money, too.

Finances are even more complex than questions of race. For example, the wealth of the United States is estimated at $150,000,000,000, that of the German Empire at $80,000,000,000, yet it would be absurd to deduce therefrom that the United States was twice as well able economically to finance a war as Germany. On the other hand, the wealth of Russia is estimated at $40,000,000,000, and that of Italy at $20,000,000,000, yet Russia is financially able to stand the strain of a long war at least ten times as well as Italy, and Italy is able to sustain the shock of the opening of war far better than Russia. With these safeguards, the following approximations of comparative wealth may be of value: German Empire, $80,000,000,000; Austria-Hungary, $25,000,000,000; Bulgaria, $2,000,000,000, and Turkey, $9,000,000,000, or $116,000,000,000 for the Central Powers. The wealth of the nations forming the group of the Allies is as follows: Great Britain and Ireland (not the empire), $85,000,000,000; France, $50,000,000,000; Russia, $40,000,000,000; Italy, $20,000,000,000, and Belgium, $9,000,000,000, or $204,000,000,000, for the Allies. In this war, too, the over-sea wealth must be estimated, since wealth can be transported in some measure, while geographical territory cannot. The over-sea wealth of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires needs not to be taken into account, since they afforded no financial aid at the opening of the war and rapidly fell into the hands of the

Allies. On the other hand the vast colonial possessions of the British Empire, in India, Canada, Australia and South Africa; the huge slice of Africa and Cochin China owned by the French Republic, the Belgian Congo, and the Italian colonies on the south shore of the Mediterranean bring the combined wealth of the Allies to close upon $600,000,000,000, or more than five times as much as that of the Central Powers. As, however, the convertibility of the wealth of the Allies is only about one-third of that of the Central Powers, it follows that the difference in estimated wealth gives the Allies about twice as much as the Central Powers.

Immediately after gross wealth comes the question of financial stability. There are many means of determining this, but one of the simplest is that of revenue. The combined revenues of all the nations in the world, according to the statistics of the United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, is, in round figures, $12,000,000,000. Of this amount Germany has over $2,000,000,000, Austria-Hungary over $1,000,000,000; Turkey and Bulgaria together less than a quarter of a billion, or three and a half billion dollars for the annual revenue of the allied powers. As against this, the Allies' strength in this regard may be summarized as follows: British Empire over $2,000,000,000; France, over $1,000,000,000; Italy half a billion; Russia less than $2,000,000,000; Belgium, $150,000,000. This totals to five and a half billion dollars for the annual revenue of the allied powers.

If one were comparing solely the financial strength and stability of the contrasted nations, it might be well to proceed from this point to a comparison of the exports and imports of each, determining the character of each and the preponderance of the former over the latter in value in order to express the earning value of each nation. But the subject under view is not this contrast of nations solely as economic units, but of nations at war. It is obvious that if two nations—Great Britain and Germany, for example—have revenues approximately the same, $2,000,000,000, and one spends twenty per cent on military and naval preparedness while the other spends ten per

cent, the former will be better equipped than the latter, though their revenues were equal. In other words, it is the expenditure for military and naval equipment that tells the tale, as well as the holding well in hand of a sufficient store of ready money to use in the case of quick mobilization. Military budgets are an unsafe guide, taken by themselves. To use the same nations as an example, if Germany voted $300,000,000 (as she did for the year ending March, 1914), and Great Britain $350,000,000 (as she did for the year ending December, 1913), it does not follow that Great Britain thereby increased in military strength proportionately to Germany. On the contrary, the necessity of keeping up the huge military and naval establishment demanded by the vastly larger territory of the British Empire forced Great Britain to an upkeep expenditure considerably larger than that of Germany. Each of these factors is to be taken into account when measuring financial strength.

Again taking the Central Powers first, it may be well to see how Germany financed the war at the outset. Using the valuation of twenty-five cents for a mark, it will be recalled that Germany planted $31,600,000 in gold from the French indemnity in the famous war chest at Spandau, shortly after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. In June, 1913, eleven months before the outbreak of the Great European War, the Reichstag voted to double this amount in gold, the addition to be known as the Spandau Tower Reserve, but not to be placed in the tower. This was deposited in the Reichsbank, yet not to be counted as among the bank's holdings. In the vaults of that bank were normally $300,000,000 in specie, chiefly gold, and during the last couple of months before the war this had been brought up to near $400,000,000.

The concentration of finances shows that Germany had been making ready against war in financial matters as well as in military affairs, as have all the other European powers. Germany was mobilized against France in 1905, but the Algeciras Conference, which patched up the agreement, was a matter largely arranged by the financial interests. In other words, the armies were ready, but the resource of money was not. Modern war

cannot be run without huge expenditures. The moneybags were not ready for mobilization.

Then came the dramatic year of 1911. The Morocco incident aroused France, the *Panther* incident added to the friction between England and Germany, and European bankers began withdrawing their support from Germany. It is, perhaps, not an extreme estimate to say that Germany was conducting from 72 to 74 per cent of her commercial affairs on borrowed money. Paris and London began to call their loans. New York followed suit. German financial circles suffered a shock. They tried to raise money in the United States, borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, and offered large interest. To some extent they were successful, but the lenders stipulated that the money should be used for "legitimate" purposes, in other words, that it should not be used in a hostile sense against the nations who were the lenders. It was at this time that the German bankers were asked if they were in a position to be able to meet the expense of war and replied in a decided negative. The kaiser's reply has become historic.

"Gentlemen," he said, "when I next call on you, I shall expect you to be ready."

The German bankers continued their preparations, as directed. Two years later, in 1913, that year marked by startling military preparations on every hand, with government securities in every part lower than they had been for a generation, a huge Prussian loan was unsuccessfully precipitated. Its failure was due to the fact that there was no way of disguising that the proceeds of the loan were to meet the cost of the new military program that had been promulgated.

Subsequent to this fiasco, for it was nothing less, came Germany's drastic action of putting a tax on capital, a recourse never resorted to, save under urgent conditions. Moreover, the tax was so burdensome, that nothing but the realization that national safety was at stake could have justified it. It laid an impost on incomes of both sexes as low as $250 per annum, and on all fortunes from $2,500 upwards. Kings and princes were taxed in the same ratio as professional men and small trades-

men. On his personal fortune of $35,000,000 the kaiser had to pay a tax of $500,000 and on his income of $3,500,000 per year, the 8 per cent tax netted $280,000. The kaiser's personal contribution to the war, therefore, was nearly a million dollars. Another half million was secured by taxes from members of the emperor's family. The big industries were forced to yield up, and the tax upon the Krupps alone was over $2,500,000.

At this point a serious complication occurred, which had an important effect upon Germany's financial resources at the opening of the war. This was the fact that when the war actually broke out, this tax had not been collected, although the assessments had been made. Accordingly it was impossible for Germany to have recourse to a moratorium, since the Government could not suspend the heavy taxation on which it was relying as a second reserve, immediately upon the emptying of the war chest at Spandau, and it could not collect the taxes if the people could not collect their debts.

The condition of the Reichsbank, in spite of this situation, had remained good during the spring of 1914. On April 23, for example, the Imperial Bank return showed increases over the preceding week of more than $10,000,000 in gold and more than $5,000,000 in silver, while the note circulation had been reduced by $30,000,000 and the total note circulation was $22,593,000 below the tax-free maximum. June told another story. On June 30 the bank returns displayed a reduction of $16,000,000 and a reduction of $50,000,000 in the bank deposits (counting all its 489 branches), while the note circulation increased by a trifle over $150,000,000. In July, matters strengthened, and on July 23, the day before the publication of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, there was an increase in gold and deposits and a fair decrease in note circulation. Between July 23 and August 1, the day of the declaration of war with Russia, the stock of gold dropped $25,000,000, and the note circulation jumped $300,000,000.

Then came war and war measures. The first of these was the authorization of an extraordinary expenditure to the extent of $1,250,000,000. The Reichsbank was officially put in charge

of the money she had in her vaults at the Spandau Tower Reserve, and also of the funds in the Spandau war chest. The tax on notes for which there was no bullion to redeem, was removed, all paper money was made legal tender and the bank was relieved of its obligation to give gold for paper when such was demanded. Special loan institutions were established in connection with the Reichsbank and special loan paper was issued on almost any basis, even for the smallest sums, this loan paper being given a semiofficial status. Through this means the Government was able to secure the taxes, by enabling the public to borrow on almost all its existing investments. By these policies Germany was able to open the war with a large store of gold and silver, without a moratorium and with a large amount of money coming in from the direct tax ready to back up the stores already in hand.

Germany is the banker of the Central Powers, and for that reason much space has been given to her financial resources immediately prior to and at the opening of the war. Austria-Hungary, from the financial point of view, was a source of weakness rather than strength to the Central Powers, immediately before the outbreak of the war, though immediately afterward, under the stimulus of national need, energetic measures did much to put Austria-Hungary on an independent war footing. Austria's "war chest" was small and surrounded with so much secrecy that it was often declared to be nonexistent. Yet the Austrian army and navy was kept up to a high standard, the budget for 1913 being over $100,000,000 for military and naval purposes alone. This sum is large, when it is remembered that Austria has no colonies to defend, and that a large part of her border is that of Germany, a friendly neighbor.

Passing directly to the question of Austro-Hungary's financial preparedness, or, in other words, to her financial resources at the time of the outbreak of the war, one comes suddenly face to face with the great weakness of the Dual Monarchy, the ethnic conflict, the clash of opposing races. "In the Reichsrat," says an authority, writing of the fall and winter of 1913, following upon the extension of army and navy programs, "parlia-

mentary activities were made practically impossible by the disorderly and obstructionist tactics of the opposition. At the end of December, 1913, the Ruthenians, who had been most troublesome, consented for a time to abandon their obstruction in order that a few important bills might be passed. The month was not allowed to pass without a renewal of obstruction in the Lower House, this time by the Czech minority. The quarrels between Germans and Czechs in 1913 had led to the dissolution of the Bohemian Provincial Diet. On March 5, the Reichsrat had been called together again, for the purpose of voting military and financial measures; but as the Czechs were clearly bent on resuming their obstructionist tactics, the Reichsrat was prorogued on March 16. Neither budget nor army bill had been voted."

In the meantime scenes of even worse disorder and violence had been proceeding in the Hungarian Parliament. The guards were called in to expel members of the opposition on several occasions, and it was on one of these occasions, when the entire opposition members of Parliament had been expelled by force, that the Army Bill was passed. A loan bill, authorizing a 4½ per cent loan of approximately $100,000,000, also failed of passage until after members had been expelled from the chamber. The budget debate in the Hungarian Parliament finally ended on May 6, when a loan of $80,000,000 was ordered as Hungary's share in the extraordinary joint naval and military expenditures of the Dual Monarchy. In Austria, owing to the parliamentary entanglement, the Government issued Treasury bills to provide for current expenses and on June 3 called for a loan, for military purposes, of about $45,000,000. To follow out the workings of these loans, and the share borne in them by Germany, would avail little in showing the financial resources of Austria, by reason of the financial coalition which practically occurred between the Central Powers soon after the opening of the war.

CHAPTER XIII

ASSEMBLING OF THE GERMAN ARMIES

"THE German mobilization was the greatest movement of people that the world has ever seen. Nearly four million people had to be transported from every part of the empire to her borders. The manner in which the population is distributed made the task extremely difficult. Berlin, Rhenish Westphalia, Upper Silesia, and Saxony, especially had to send their contingents in every direction, since the eastern provinces are more thinly settled and had to have a stronger guard for the borders immediately. The result was a hurrying to and fro of thousands and hundreds of thousands of soldiers, besides a flood of civilians who had to reach their homes as soon as possible. Countries where the population is more regularly distributed have an easier task than Germany, with its predominating urban population.

"The difficulties of the gigantic undertaking were also increased by the necessity for transporting war materials of every sort. In the west are chiefly industrial undertakings, in the east mainly agricultural. Horse raising is mostly confined to the provinces on the North Sea and the Baltic, but chiefly to East Prussia, and this province, the farthest away from France, had to send its best horses to the western border, as did also Schleswig-Holstein and Hanover. Coal for our warships had to go in the other direction. From the Rhenish mines it went to the North Sea, from Upper Silesia to the Baltic. Ammunition and heavy projectiles were transported from the central part of the empire to its borders. And everywhere these operations had to be carried on with haste. . . .

"And how was it carried on? No one could have wondered if there had been hundreds of unforeseen incidents, if military trains had arrived at their stations with great delays, if there had resulted in many places a wild hugger-mugger from the tremendous problems on hand. But there was not a trace of this. . . . All moved with the regularity of clockwork. Regiments



THE ARMIES OF THE CONTESTING NATIONS

that had been ordered to mobilize in the forenoon left in the evening for the field, fully equipped. . . .

"A thing that raised the national enthusiasm still higher was the appearance of the troops in brand-new uniforms, complete from head to feet. The first sight of these new uniforms of modest, field gray, faultlessly made, evoked everywhere the question: Where did they come from? On the first day of mobilization dozens of cloth manufacturers appeared at the War Ministry with offers of new material. 'We don't want any' was the astonishing reply. Equal amazement was caused by the faultless boots and shoes of the new troops, especially in view of the recent famous 'boot speech' of the French Senator Humbert.

"Small arms, cannon, and ammunition are so plentiful, that they have merely to be unpacked. In view of all this, it is no wonder that the regiments marching in were everywhere greeted with jubilation, and that those marching out took leave of their garrisons with joyful songs. No one thinks of death and destruction, every one of happy victory and joyful reunion. German discipline, once so slandered, now celebrates its triumph.

"There was still another matter in which the troops gave their countrymen cause for rejoicing. Not one drunken man was seen during these earnest days on the city streets. The General Staff had, moreover, wisely ordered that during the mobilization, when every one had money in his pockets, alcoholic drinks were not to be sold at the railroad stations. . . .

"The army is increased to many times its ordinary strength by the mobilization. It draws from everywhere millions of soldiers, workmen, horses, wagons, and other materials. The entire railway service it at its disposal. . . . Not only is our great army mobilized, but the whole folk is mobilized, and the distribution of labor, the food question, and the care of the sick and wounded are all being provided for. The whole German folk has become a gigantic war camp, all are mobilized to protect kaiser, folk, and fatherland, as the closing report of the Reichstag put it."

From this German statement of German mobilization by a German committee of men of the utmost standing in the empire

certain things stand out very clearly. Of this the first one is that, with a peace strength of less than a million, on the very first flush of mobilization, every possible contingency for the mobilization of four million men was at hand. German mobilization, therefore, was not the devising of plans to carry out a project, but it was rather the putting into action of a vast interacting series of preparation that had long been made and carefully conceived for an attack upon the powers to the westward. From every point of view, looking at the mobilization at the opening of the war, Germany's was the most rapid and the most complete, and, as the "Truth about Germany" states, it was perhaps the most marvelous piece of military mobilization that the world has ever seen.

As mobilization finally results in army corps, and is designed to fit into a frame, the component parts of an army corps may be set forth to show the way in which all the various units have to be drawn together to their places on a battle front. A complete army corps of the German scheme consists of 56,000 combatants and 12,000 men in the supply train. Of this, 63.81 per cent are infantry, 11.56 per cent cavalry, 10.99 field artillery, 4.21 per cent light artillery, 4.21 engineer corps, etc., hospital corps 1.04, and miscellaneous 2.02 per cent. There are 4 brigades with 24 battalions, there are 24 batteries of field artillery with 144 guns, there are 8 squadrons of cavalry, 4 howitzer batteries with 16 heavy howitzers, a machine-gun section, a battalion of rifles, a battalion of engineers, a telegraph section, a bridge train, 6 provision columns, 7 wagon-park columns, a stretcher-bearer column, a horse depot, a field bakery, 12 field hospitals, and 8 ammunition columns.

One has but to think of the various places from which these men and stores must come, of the thousands of horses and hundreds of wagons, of the millions of rounds of ammunition, speeding from different points over different railroads, and when disembarked by roads, by lanes, even by small bypaths to the appointed place on the battle front, to realize what a marvelous feat is mobilization of a modern army at the time of an outbreak of war.

An insight into the manner in which this can be carried out, and incidentally, an insight into the preparedness of Germany for the war, is seen in an analysis of the extraordinary and otherwise inexplicable network of railways recently erected by Germany to tap the frontiers of Belgium and Luxemburg.

"In the southwest corner of Prussia," says Walter Littlefield, writing on this subject, "is a rectangular piece of territory, the western and eastern sides of which are formed respectively by the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers and the River Rhine. . . . Five years ago, this little corner of Prussia had about 15.10 miles of railway to every hundred square miles of territory. At the opening of the war this had increased to 28.30. In five years, without any apparent industrial and commercial demand for it, this traction has been increased to nearly twice its length. Villages of less than 1,300 inhabitants have been linked up with double-track lines. For example, Pelm is 2¾ miles from Gerolstein, a town principally of comic-opera fame, and yet over this short distance, between the two villages, there are laid down six parallel lines of rail, besides numerous additional sidings. . . . Few of these lines, it is to be noted, cross the frontier. Three of them, as late as last May (this was written in the fall of 1914), led to blind terminals within a day's march of it—the double line from Cologne via Stolberg to Weiwertz, the double line from Cologne via Junkerath and Weiwertz to St. With and the double line from Remagen via Hillesheim and Pelm to Pronsfeld."

"Another point that is noticeable," says another observer, quoted in the same article, "is that provision exists everywhere at these new junctions and extensions for avoiding an upline crossing a down line on the level, the upline is carried over the down line by a bridge, involving long embankments on both sides (so new that as yet nothing has had time to grow on them) at great expense, but enormously simplifying traffic problems, when it comes to a question of full troop trains pushing through at the rate of one every quarter of an hour, and the empty cars returning eastward at the same rate.

"The detraining stations are of sufficient length to accommodate the longest troop train (ten cars) easily, and they gener-

ally have at least four sidings apart from the through up and down lines. Moreover, at almost every station there are two lines of sidings long enough for troop trains, so that they can be used to some extent as detraining stations, and so that a couple of troop trains can be held up at any time while traffic continues uninterrupted."

Such facts of railway preparedness explain, in a great measure, the means whereby Germany was able to launch upon the Belgian, Luxemburg, and French frontiers such a vast array of fully equipped troops almost at the moment of the outbreak of the war. It must be left to the reader to determine whether there is any connection between this activity of railroad building in a district industrially inactive on a frontier that was always held inviolate, and the violation of that territory by means of these very railroads. Facts remain facts, however, and the absolutely admitted facts declare that German mobilization was directed, not at the French frontier, but at the frontier of Luxemburg and Belgium, especially at the great Belgian plain, commanded and dominated by the great fortress of Liege. In the story of that siege will be shown its topographic position. As bearing upon the subject of mobilization, however, it is to be remembered that at this point, Belgium, and not at France, was directed the main first mobilization of the German army.

CHAPTER XIV

FRENCH MOBILIZATION

FRENCH mobilization was smooth, but slow. France's great disadvantage, making her mobilization slow, was that her regiments were not territorially recruited, whereas the German army was entirely based on territorial recruitment. Where it would take a French regiment to receive its reserve men and be completed on war footing in about four days, the German regiment could be completed on war footing within four to five days.



THE NAVIES OF THE CONTESTING NATIONS

France in recognition of this weakness had on her eastern borders special troops stationed called "troops de couverture." Moreover, as has been pointed out, all the French railways center in Paris, and the nearness of the capital to the frontier is a gain as well as a source of danger. Therefore, from the railways running to the frontier from Paris, and from the strong garrison at the great Verdun to Belfort chain of forts, France was able to bring into effect at once enough men to present a strong face to the foe.

Here Germany's reason for invading Belgium appeared. French mobilization assumed the integrity of Belgium and Luxemburg. Her mobilization was directed to the German frontier. Had Germany been able to go through Belgium without an hour's delay the situation would have been serious for France, for she mobilized on the wrong front. Germany had correctly assumed that France would expect her to abide by the treaties, and consequently by disavowing these obligations had outguessed her Gallic neighbor. The speedy mobilization of Belgium, and the heroic defense of that little land by its gallant citizens, did much to alter the possible destinies of the war, not because there was at any time any expectation that Belgium would be able entirely to resist the passage of the armies of the kaiser, but because the delay which her defense caused gave the French troops time to mobilize in the direction whither the blow was designed.

The first movement against Germany was when M. Eyschen, a member of the cabinet of the Duchy of Luxemburg, drove in his motor car across the great Adolf Bridge, which had been seized by Germany and confronted the leading officer of the German advance guard with a copy of the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the state. The reigning Grand Duchess Marie Adelaide blocked the way with her motor car, she was ordered to return at once, and when General Vandyck, commandant of Luxemburg, arrived, he was confronted with a revolver.

At the end of July, when there was evidence that the storm which had been brewing ever since Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, 1914, thirteen classes of Belgian recruits were called to the colors; but even so, at its full war strength on

August 1, 1914, the entire army numbered only 160,000 men. Owing to the small size of the Belgian army and the small territory of that country, and also owing to the fact that it is one of the most thoroughly equipped countries of the world so far as railroads are concerned, Belgian mobilization presented few difficulties for the concentration of the few available troops.

But Belgium was in the midst of reorganization of its national defenses and its army, and so was *de facto* unprepared to use to the utmost the advantages of great fortresses of Liege, Namur, and Amsterdam, which could have been made almost impregnable if the necessary field army and artillery material had existed. The fortresses of Liege and Namur demanded a garrison of about 250,000 men and artillery, and there were only about 30,000 men disponible. If the organization of the national defense of Belgium had been completed, the Belgian army would have been probably of a strength of over 600,000 men, well trained, instead of the poorly trained army of about 160,000 combatants equipped only for parade, and the story of that part of the Great War would have been another.

The German cavalry entered Belgium and pushed on ahead, and a few stray shots were fired, but the first Belgian town of Limburg, on the road to Liege, was occupied without attack. At Verviers a weak Belgian force was driven out by the strong advance guard of the German cavalry. This was the "peaceful invasion of Belgian territory" spoken of in the earliest telegrams sent to the kaiser from the advancing army. Then the German troops suddenly found themselves confronted by the destruction of the Trois Ponts tunnels, and by the wrecked bridges across the Meuse. The attack upon Vise, which had been figured by the Germans to be a matter of form, and not requiring a body of troops of any size, was stopped by blown-up bridges, and a detachment of German engineers, undertaking to build a new pontoon bridge, was shot to pieces. Belgium, having thus thrown down the gauntlet, concentrated its troops, a little over 100,000, on a line back of the forts of Liege and Namur. King Albert himself was at the front, and not only directed, but also led the defense.

This gallant action on the part of Belgium formed a screen behind which the French troops could mobilize in full order and with a clear knowledge of the intention of the enemy. Already the skies were filled with scouting aircraft and wireless messages buzzed incessantly from the overhead scouts of the movements of the hostile troops rushing from Berlin, from Cologne, from every point of the German Empire to the three frontiers of Luxemburg, Belgium, and France. And, all the while, the band of devoted heroes at Liege held to their ideal of independence, and Belgium grew to be a bigger thing in the eyes of the world, as her territory grew hourly smaller by the encroachment of the German invaders.

French mobilization, in spite of the prompt action in sending the first half million to the front, became disorganized under the discovery of the plans of Germany. It will be remembered that the French railroad systems all center in Paris. Therefore, in order to divert the troops to what was seen to be the point of attack, brigades had to be brought back from the Verdun-Belfort district and transshipped to the north. This, in a word, was the answer to the question why France did not rush to the aid of Belgium and hurl her forces at the Germans at the gates of Liege. For that mobilization they were not ready. The neutrality of Belgium had been considered as a true military barrier.

A glance at the railroad map of France shows how thoroughly (and unwisely) France had trusted to this treaty, the treaty that became famous when it was declared by Germany to be merely a "scrap of paper," for while there are good transport facilities to the Franco-German frontier, there were few to the Franco-Belgian frontier. The motor busses practically saved the day, and nearly all the French troops went to the northern front by this means of transport. Still more difficult was the question of munitions. The German railways brought troops at forty miles an hour, the French lines carried munitions at forty miles per day. For her German frontier she was ready. For this new contingency she was unprepared.

For this unpreparedness France paid dearly. Some of her richest provinces were invaded and held all through the early

part of the war by Germany, almost solely because her transportation of troops to the crucial point was not effective. The mere presence of the Germans over so large a section of French territory was due solely to the rapidity of the German mobilization, which was the result of long years of preparation. Even behind the Belgian screen France did not move rapidly enough to save herself, only barely rapidly enough to save Paris. The plan of General Joffre, which entailed a gradual retreat to let the Germans expand far from their base, while the French concentrated between the border and Paris, was a move determined, not by any special theory of war, nor yet by special configuration of the country, but by the slowness of mobilization. The initial success of Germany was a victory of thorough preparedness, the initial defeats of the French army were the results of military preparedness hampered by politics.

As the campaign developed, the mobilization of the Germans on the west front was seen to have a double purpose. The armies of Von Kluck were to hold Belgium and the north of France, while the armies of the crown prince were to march through Luxemburg and batter down the Verdun-Belfort line. It has been shown how the rapid mobilization and gallant defense of Liege by the Belgians delayed the former. Without aircraft it was more than possible that, behind the screen of the forests of Luxemburg, France might not have known what forces were being concentrated on that frontier, and might have weakened the line to rush troops against Von Kluck. But the French aviators, who are the best in the world, were able to fly over the territory of Germany and Luxemburg where troops were mobilizing, and the information they sent down was sufficiently alarming to keep France from weakening the Franco-German fortress-defended line too seriously. This, again, handicapped France from being able to go to the support of Belgium. The dramatic plan of the crown prince's hammering march to Paris failed absolutely and completely by the successful defense of Verdun.



THE FORTRESSES ON THE GERMAN-FRENCH FRONTIER

CHAPTER XV

BRITAIN—RUSSIA—AUSTRIA

THE initial mobilization of Great Britain was a matter as well managed as that of Germany. For precision there was nothing to choose as between them. Yet, comparing the German and British mobilizations, one thing stands out clearly, viz., that Germany was ready and Britain unready, while, on the other hand, Germany had to move 4,000,000 men and England only 100,000. To offset this, Britain had to mobilize stores and supplies, not only for her own 100,000 expeditionary force, but for a large part of the armies of France and for all the armies of Belgium. Even the very motor busses that carried French troops from Paris to the Belgian frontier were largely English, two cargoes of 100 vehicles each being rushed across the English Channel on the same day.

The food question for the Belgian army and for the French armies on the Belgian frontier was acute at the opening of the war. France was ready and prepared to handle any eventuality in the way of supplies that might be needed on the Belfort-Verdun line, but she was not prepared for the conditions in the rear of the Belgian frontier. Britain came to the support of France and Belgium without a day's delay. She rushed food and munitions to the front, and on one occasion Kitchener fed two French army corps, or 80,000 troops, for eleven days without the slightest hitch. A moment's thought will show that this means not only the ability to send food, but also to organize the entire mechanism of the preparing and handling of that food.

This was made possible largely by what was known in Britain as the motor-lorry system, unlike that of any other army, introduced in 1911. Horse transport was relegated solely to the work of distributing, the conveyance of supplies to the areas occupied being performed wholly by motor transport. As the daily run of a motor lorry may be put at 100 miles, it follows that an army could advance fifty miles from its railhead and still be easily

served with food and ammunition. Thus, for the first time in the history of war, the British army had devised a system whereby fresh meat and bread could be supplied daily to a distant army. If, as the Germans declared, the British soldier thought more of his food than fight, this desire at least had the effect of keeping the supply system to the topmost notch. The same principle was used for ammunition columns, in no case any of the men from the front being detailed in the work of looking after munitions or supplies. Thus, while British mobilization of men consisted mainly of the expeditionary force of 100,000, the British mobilization of auxiliary columns for aiding the supply system of the Belgian and French army was of a size large enough to look after several corps. By this means, recruits could be constantly forwarded to the field of war, secure in the knowledge that no matter how rapidly men were rushed to the front, the question of supplies was already considered and the requisites were in place awaiting the use of the new troops.

England's mobilization, especially when it is remembered that after the first 150,000 it was all volunteers, was a marvelous thing. How many men were sent no one could tell but Kitchener, and if ever a man was born with a gift for telling nothing, that man is Kitchener. How steadily recruits poured over no one knew. Officially, only enough men were sent to fill up the losses in the 150,000, but before the end of the year England's trained forces were immense. The details of the mobilization of that first 100,000 men (the first group of the expeditionary force) were marvelous. The railroads running to the southeast were put into Government hands, trains were scheduled at twelve minutes' distance apart, to run day and night, every troop train was on schedule, and every one was unloaded and out of the depot in time for the next train to pull in, every transport was at the dock waiting, with another ready to take her place, and the expeditionary force was in Boulogne in less than forty-eight hours after the first mobilization order had been sent out. It is not to be forgotten that Britain commandeered every ship she needed from her huge mercantile marine, and thus had transports not only for troops but also for supplies.

For a moment one may glance at a side issue, but an important one in the mobilization, namely the mobilization of horses. The French bought horses by the thousand in Texas. Yet English farriers inspected them, paid for them, put them in charge of their own men on their own ships, landed them in England or Bordeaux, fed them into prime condition at England's own expense, and then delivered them to the French battle line ready for service. In the first week of the war the total output of the English rifle factories was 10,000 rifles a week (a rifle will shoot well for only 4,000 rounds), by the seventh week of the war there were eleven factories with a weekly output of 40,000 rifles each, and more being built on every hand. In addition to this, between August and December, 1914, English money mobilized —it is the word—rifle orders in the United States to the extent of $650,000,000. It is a matter of knowledge that many of the Russian munition orders were either financed or indorsed by British capital. In a word, while England's military mobilization of her regular troops was rapid and efficient, and while her recruiting of volunteers was the greatest support of the principles of a volunteer army that could ever be imagined, the chief importance and the chief wonder of Britain's mobilization was her mobilization of commerce and of trade. She made it possible for French soldiers to be used at their full power, and France's perennial weakness—supply organization—was supplemented by that very thing which is the British army's chief boast.

It is time, now, to turn to the eastern theatre of war, and there the diplomatic questions underlying mobilization become excessively intertwined. All European powers watch each other like falcons above their prey, in the constant endeavor to discern the slightest sign of unusual military activity. The tornado of conflicting reports at the end of July, 1914, as to which power had begun mobilizing first, as to whether army maneuvers were a cloak for mobilization, as to whether activity in arsenals was not a threat or as to the manipulation of finances, were all due to a single thing—the knowledge that a week's advantage in mobilization might mean a huge advantage, an advantage in



GERMAN CONFEDERATION OF 1815

position so great that thousands of lives might be lost because of the two days' delay. It has been shown how the conquest of France's richest northern provinces by Germany was due to the difference in speed of mobilization. There was a great deal of misunderstanding on the part of the American public about this very importance of mobilization. "Supposing Russia did mobilize first, or Austria," people said, "what about it? No one has declared war." Mobilization is like two western desperadoes watching each other. They do not wait until the other man has drawn his gun and has them covered, but trouble begins at the slightest move toward the hip pocket. Any move toward mobilization is a move toward a nation's hip pocket.

Germany did not dare to let Russia mobilize. Had a large Russian army been concentrated in Poland, had Russia been allowed to intrench herself on the Austrian frontier, had she had the opportunity at the beginning of the war to seize the fortress of Thorn and to secure control of the Vistula River, there would have been little to stop the armies of the czar from marching into Berlin. General mobilization by one power, therefore, absolutely compels countermobilization by another power, and unless diplomatic agreements are speedily made and the mobilization checked, it is a prelude to war.

The diplomatic interpretations of the discussion over mobilization have been dealt with elsewhere, but it may be summarily said here that Austria was the first of the great powers to begin mobilization in the first part of July, in order to frighten Serbia into submission in the controversy that arose from the assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince at Sarajevo (in Bosnia, Austria) on June 28, 1914. Serbia mobilized, and it was generally believed that this action was due to Serbia's knowledge that Russia was secretly mobilizing. By about July 10, 1916, Germany believed herself satisfied that Russia was actually mobilizing, and she also began secretly to do so. France became suspicious of German military activity, and by the end of the third week and the beginning of the fourth week in July a general, but unadmitted, military preparation was in progress. Actual and admitted mobilization is more or less arbitrarily placed as of

August 1, 1914, which date is now generally regarded as the opening of the Great War.

In any consideration of Russian mobilization it will be remembered that Russia had three armies, not one, to mobilize, i. e., the armies of European Russia, of the Asiatic Russia, and of the Caucasus. It is also to be remembered that, unlike the German system in which every man has a definite place in a particular corps, the Russian system holds its reserves as reserves solely, and organizes them after they have been gathered together. Slow mobilization is therefore an evil not to be avoided. For this reason one must expect to find Russian mobilization occurring, not on the frontier, but at a point sufficiently far therefrom to be safe from hostile attack during the period of disorganization.

The line Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk was the main field selected, because of its central location between the Austro-German frontiers, and more particularly because it was well covered from attack by the intrenched fortress and camp of Warsaw. The troops and reserves from Little Russia, especially from the Kiev district, were readily available on lines converging to the Austrian city of Lemberg in Galicia, and, it was estimated, could take the front in ten days. From this district five army corps are raised. From the Odessa district to the south two more army corps could be counted upon, and these could reach the scene of operations in twelve or thirteen days. In actual speed of mobilization the Austrian army was ready first, but the Russian army protected and covered the slow mobilization and concentration of its forces by a dense curtain of cavalry masses, for which task the rapidly mobilized Cossack cavalry was especially well fitted. These cavalry engagements—for the Russians were met by the Hungarian cavalry—effectually screened the actual gathering of the armies, and led Austria into the error of supposing Russia to be quite unready. But, although Austria had been the first to begin actual mobilization, her strategic railways on the frontier were so poor that it was not until August 10, 1914, that she was ready to advance, and even then that single line of railroad running from the Bug to the Vistula was deficient in rolling stock. Austrian military organization was excellent, Hun-

garian railroad organization was utterly inadequate to cope with the sudden requirements of modern warfare.

The Austrian army advanced on Russia in force, expecting the success of the German armies to the east. From the plans as they developed, and particularly from railroad orders given to the lines crossing Germany, it was expected that before Russia could be mobilized sufficiently to do more than give a temporary check to the Austrian army, several German army corps could be released from the western front and sent to the Russian border to take the burden of Russian invasion away from Austria. But the resistance of Belgium against Von Kluck's armies, the resistance of France against the armies of the crown prince, and the resistance of England to all naval action, prevented any release of the German armies, and the mobilization orders for the transference of German troops from the western theatre to the eastern theatre of war during the first few weeks of the struggle proved to be unavailing, for the men could not be spared. Slowly but heavily the mobilization of Russian forces continued. Lacking strategic railroads, lacking the motor-lorry system of England, the heavy-footed but untiring Russian infantry marched the scores and hundreds of miles from their homes to the front. The Russian dirigibles and aeroplanes were more than a match for the Austrian aircraft, and kept them back from flying over the country to determine the number of forces opposing. Then the action of the Russian "steam roller" began, and with more men marching in every day, unwearied despite their long travel, the steam roller gathered force. But, in one regard, Russia had miscalculated. She had never contemplated the terrific wastage of ammunition that is required for modern artillery duels, gun conflicts that are necessary before troops can advance, and in the first few weeks of the war her ammunition was all shot away. Without ammunition the steam roller could not continue, and the advance of the Russians upon Austrian territory was first halted and then driven back. Here, again, then, was a campaign successfully begun because of a better mobilization of men than was expected, and lost because of a lack of mobilization of supplies.



STRATEGIC RAILROADS ON GERMAN-BELGIAN FRONTIER

A great deal has been said of the slowness of Russian mobilization, and much of it is undoubtedly true. But little has been said about the steadiness of Russian mobilization. The Russian officer, almost always a noble, and belonging to what is probably the most polished and most cultured class in Europe, an aristocrat to his finger tips, possesses the power of commanding men, and understands his Slav soldiers. He knows that no army in the world can begin to compare with the Russian for enduring hardship, and that no troops in the world can sustain so large a proportion of loss and still advance. Forced marches that would kill English troops can be handled by a Russian army without great fatigue. The principal note in the gathering of the czar's armies was that day by day, week by week, from every corner of the empire, men went to the front. It was not the sudden concentration of Germany, it was not the eager formation of France, it was not the heroic sturdiness of Belgium, it was not the accustomedness to active service of the British regulars, it was a gradual transition of an idealistic people from contemplation into action.

To the Russian, more than to any other of the peoples engaged in the war, mobilization spells advance, advance in a thousand ways. Germany, France, and England were practically unchanged in temperament and viewpoint by the mere processes of mobilization, but old Russia became new Russia almost within a month. War is the greatest unifier of racial dissension in the world, and when the first three months of war were over, the German Empire, the British Empire, the Republic of France and her colonies, and above all, the Russian Empire, were welded by the grim forces of necessity into homogeneous units. Moreover, mobilization and the conditions of war bring into high relief the powers and the characters of the several nations, and as the story of the war is told, its developments portray the changing appreciations of the national combatants for each other, and of the neutral nations for all.

PART IV — DIPLOMATIC PAPERS RELATING TO THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR, COLLATED FROM THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

REALIZING the importance of presenting its case to the neutral world, each of the warring nations published its diplomatic correspondence leading up to the outbreak of the war, at a period during hostilities when the publication seemed best calculated to serve the end in view.

THE OFFICAL DOCUMENTS

British White Papers, July 20 to September 1, 1914.
Belgian Gray Book, April 7, 1914, to September 30, 1914.
German White Book, July 23 to August 4, 1914.
French Yellow Book, March 17, 1913, to September 4, 1914.
Russian Orange Book, July 23 to August 6, 1914.
Serbian Blue Book, June 29 to August 4, 1914.
Austro-Hungarian Red Book, June 29 to August 24, 1914.
Official publications in the press by Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and Italy, July 30 to December 6, 1914.
Various speeches by officers of the Governments.

It is from these official documents, cast into one form by rearranging all letters, telegrams, proclamations, speeches, etc., in their chronological order, that the following history of the diplomatic controversy is compiled.

It will be observed that, from the necessity of the case, the books of the six principal allies against the Teutonic Powers are threefold in number the books of those powers; and that, from choice of their promulgators the books of the Teutonic Powers are also disproportionately less in total volume, owing to the

almost entire absence in them of communications between Austria-Hungary and Germany; while the correspondence between their adversaries is presented by these with a fulness which gives the neutral reader the impression that nothing of importance has been withheld—indeed, that the Allies (to use for convenience the popular designation of the anti-Teutonic powers) have laid all their cards face upward on the table. The intelligent reader will not have to be cautioned that this is a psychological, rather than logical, inference.

If any prevalent arguments on either side fail to be upheld by the evidence here given, it will be because this evidence does not appear in the official documents; the editors feel that their functions do not warrant their inclusion of pleas or testimony formed outside of the records mentioned above. The time will not come until long after the close of the war when the conflicting claims in the vast amount of propagandial literature issued by both parties can be judicially weighed by impartial historians, and presented at the bar of public opinion. In the meantime, however, we can bring before this court the case as officially presented by the contesting parties, a "perfect enumeration" of all the available. The editor acts merely in a reporting capacity. He does not discriminate between "Trojan and Tyrian," unless it be called discrimination to refuse by allotment of lesser space to inflict on the party neglecting fully to present its case a penalty beyond that which necessarily results, in adverse effect, on the mind of the reader from this omission.

In brief, the controversy is presented as a case in law. The evidence is given in the correspondence between ministers of state and the pleadings are presented in the words of responsible statesmen, who apply this evidence to the issues in question.

Since the validity of the evidence is based not only on its inherent motive but on the character and authority of those communicating it, and the force of the pleadings is even more dependent upon the character and authority of the advocates, it is necessary at the outset to state the offices held by the chief representatives of the parties to the controversy, and to present

something of their past records, especially in the case of the more responsible statesmen. This will also serve to make graphic the story of the great trial before the bar of the world; it will visualize it as a contest, man to man, in which the distance between the combatants is eliminated, and they seem to be in each other's presence, testifying and arguing in behalf of their respective causes, as in a case at law. And, when it is borne in mind that these persons are representative of the dignity of great and sovereign peoples, the exponents and conservators of their national and individual rights and aspirations, their ideas and ideals of civilization, the contest will gain rather than lose in impressiveness by the concrete form in which it is presented. The sovereigns and statesmen of the anti-Teutonic allies are listed first; of the Teutonic allies next, and a few statesmen of neutral countries who were involved in the controversy last.

LIST OF SOVEREIGNS AND DIPLOMATS

GREAT BRITAIN

George V, King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, and Sovereign of the entire British Empire.

Haldane, Richard Burdon (Viscount), Lord High Chancellor. Born 1856, studied German at Göttingen, member Parliament for Haddingtonshire 1885-1911; Secretary of State for War 1905-12; Lord High Chancellor 1912. As Secretary of State for War, Haldane, introduced into his department several innovations, the knowledge of which he had acquired during his residence at Göttingen and in his frequent visits to the Continent. He has been in public life since entering Parliament in 1885, and, despite his later removal from the office which he held at the outbreak of the war, is still recognized as one of Great Britain's most brilliant men. Previous to the war, he was looked on as an especially warm friend of Germany, and frequently went to Berlin in the interests of British amity with that country.

Grey, Sir Edward: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Born April 25, 1862, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1892-95; Secretary State for Foreign Affairs December, 1905.

Of the conduct of the British Foreign Office since 1906 Gilbert Murray in his "Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey" ("Clarendon Press," Oxford, 1915) says:

"In general, Grey is often supposed to represent the principle of continuity in foreign policy, but this is not quite exact. In certain very large issues the Liberal Government of 1906 and onward agreed entirely with the conservative policy of Lord Salisbury (Prime Minister), and Lord Lansdowne (Foreign Secretary), and therefore followed their action. On other issues it differed. For instance, it stopped indentured Chinese labor in the Transvaal, and it granted immediate self-government to South Africa. But in Europe the policy has been mostly continuous. The principles are conveniently stated in the House of Commons debate of foreign policy on November 27, 1911:

" '1. In my opinion the wise policy for this country is to expand as little as possible.' 'I say without any hesitation that we do not desire accessions of territory, and in saying that I am not speaking for one small section of the House. I believe I am speaking for the nation at large.' The first sentence comes from Sir Edward Grey, the second from Mr. Bonar Law (leader of the opposition).

"This is made a little clearer in a latter sentence of Sir Edward Grey's speech. 'If there are to be changes of territory brought about by good will and negotiation between other powers, then we are not an ambitious competing party. . . . And if it is wise policy not to go in for great schemes of expansion ourselves, then I think it would be morally and diplomatically wrong to indulge in a dog-in-the-manger policy in regard to others.' In particular, he explains, if Germany wishes, 'by friendly arrangement with other powers,' to extend her territories, we do not wish to stand in her way, or to claim 'compensations.' "

Nicholson, Sir Arthur: Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Bertie, Sir Francis: Ambassador to France. Born August 17, 1844; private secretary to Hon. R. Bourke (Under-Secretary State), 1874-80; attached to Embassy, Berlin, 1878; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1894; Ambassador to Rome, 1903; Paris, 1905.

Buchanan, Sir George: Ambassador to Russia. Born Copenhagen November 25, 1854; entered Diplomatic Service 1875; Third Secretary, Rome, 1878; Second Secretary, Tokyo, 1879; Second Secretary, Vienna, 1882; Berne, 1889; British Agent to Venezuela Arbitration Tribunal, 1898; Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1900; Berlin, 1901-3; Minister Plenipotentiary, Sofia, 1903-8; Hague, 1908-10; St. Petersburg, 1910.

Goschen, Sir Edward: Ambassador to Germany. Born July 18, 1847; entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; Attaché, Madrid, 1870; Buenos Aires, 1873; Second Secretary, Rio de Janeiro, 1877; Constantinople, 1881; Secretary Legation, Peking, 1885; Copenhagen, 1888; Lisbon, 1890; Secretary Embassy, Washington, 1893; St. Petersburg, 1894; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Belgrade, 1898-1900; Copenhagen, 1900-5; Ambassador, Vienna, 1905-8; Berlin, 1908.

Rumbold, Sir Horace: Counsellor German Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires. Born February 5, 1869; Attaché, Hague, 1888; Chargé d'Affaires, Munich, 1908; served at Cairo, Teheran, and Athens; Counsellor Embassy, Tokyo, 1909; learned in Arabic, Persian, and Japanese.

De Bunsen, Sir Maurice: Ambassador in Austria. Born January 8, 1852; entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Secretary Legation, Tokyo, 1891; Secretary Embassy, Constantinople, 1897-1902; Paris, 1902-5; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Lisbon, 1905; Ambassador, Madrid, 1906-13; Vienna, 1913.

Beaumont, Henry Dawson: Chargé d'Affaires, Turkey. Born February 4, 1867; entered Diplomatic Service, 1892; served in Copenhagen, Madrid, Rio de Janeiro, St. Petersburg, and Montenegro; Chargé d'Affaires, Turkey, 1914.

Villiers, Sir Francis: Minister to Belgium. Born August 13, 1852; entered Foreign Office, 1870; Assistant Under-Secretary

State Foreign Affairs, 1896-1905; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Portugal, 1905-11; Belgium, 1911.

Des Graz, Charles Louis: Minister to Serbia. Born March 2, 1860; entered Diplomatic Service, 1884; Constantinople, Teheran, Athens; Counsellor Embassy, Rome, 1905; Chargé d'Affaires, Cettinje, 1906; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Peru and Ecuador, 1908-13; Minister, Serbia, 1913.

Crackanthorpe, Dayrell Eardley Montague: First Secretary of Legation to Serbia. Born September 9, 1871; entered Diplomatic Service, 1896; Madrid, Washington, Brussels, Bucharest, Vienna, Belgrade, 1913.

Rodd, Sir Rennell: Ambassador to Italy. Born November 9, 1858; entered Diplomatic Service, 1883; Berlin, Athens, Rome, Paris; Secretary Embassy, Rome, 1901-4; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Sweden, 1904-8; Ambassador, Italy, 1908.

FRANCE

Poincaré, Raymond: President of the Republic.

Viviani, René: President of the Council, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Premier of the Cabinet. Had been Minister of Instruction in the Cabinet of Gaston Doumergue, which resigned June 2, 1914; Poincaré asked him at that time to form a cabinet, but Ambassador Paléologue intimated from St. Petersburg that the Czar feared a Viviani ministry would modify the three years' military service law, and therefore another was sought for this position. After the failure of the Ribot Cabinet on June 12, 1914, he was again called upon, and, no objections being made, he formed the ministry acting at the outbreak of the war. After the beginning of the hostilities he retained the position of President of the Council without portfolio.

Jonnart, Charles Celestin: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born December 27, 1857; Governor General Algiers and Minister of the Interior.

Pichon, Stephen: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born August

10, 1857 Diplomatic Service in Hayti, San Domingo, Rio de Janeiro, and at Peking during the Boxer Rebellion.

Bienvenu-Martin, Jean Baptiste: Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born July 22, 1847; Minister Instruction, 1905; in public life since 1878.

Doumergue, Gaston: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born 1863; Minister Colonies, 1902-5; Commerce, 1906-7; Premier, resigning, June 2, 1914.

Delcassé, Theophile: Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born March 1, 1852; started life as journalist; Counsellor General; Under-Secretary Colonies, 1893; Colonial Minister, 1894-5; Foreign Minister, 1898-1905; Minister Marine, 1905-13; Mediator between Spain and the United States, 1899; Ambassador, St. Petersburg, 1913; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1913. Is one of the strong men of France; in 1904 was the French negotiator of the Anglo-French Convention (the "Entene") concerning Egypt and Morocco; was sacrificed to assuage German feeling at the time of the Algeciras conference; called the "Deadly Enemy of Germany."

Berthelot: Political Director.

Cambon, Paul: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born January 20, 1843; Ambassador Madrid, Constantinople, and at London, 1898.

Fleuriau, M. De: Chargé d'Affaires, London.

De Manneville: Chargé d'Affaires, Germany. Born February 27, 1865; entered Diplomatic Service at Berlin, 1893; later at London; a Minister of the First Class in 1904.

Paléologue, Maurice: Ambassador to Russia. Born January 13, 1859; served in Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service at Rome, Berlin, Peking, Korea, and in Bulgaria.

Cambon, Jules: Ambassador to Germany. Born April 5, 1845; entered Diplomatic Service, 1874; Ambassador, Washington, 1897; Madrid, 1902; Berlin, 1907.

Allizé: Minister at Munich, Germany.

Ronssin, P.: Consul General at Frankfort, Germany.

Dumaine, Chilhaud: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

d'Apchier-le-Maugin: Consul General at Budapest.

Bompard, Maurice: Ambassador to Turkey. Born May 17, 1854; Minister, First Class, 1898; Ambassador to Russia, 1902.

Klokowski, Antony: Minister to Belgium. Born September 23, 1855; served at Yokohoma, Calcutta, and Bangkok.

Boppé, Jules: Minister to Serbia. Born June 26, 1862; entered Diplomatic Service, 1890; served at Constantinople and St. Petersburg.

Barrère, Camille: Ambassador to Italy.

Bapst, Constant: Minister to Holland.

Mollard, Armard: Minister to Luxemburg.

Chevalley: Minister to Norway.

Thiébaut, Eugene: Minister to Sweden.

Farges: Consul General at Basle, Switzerland.

RUSSIA

Nicholas II: Emperor (Czar).

Sazonof: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Suchomlinof, Vladimir Alexandrovitch: Minister for war. In 1890 at the age of forty-eight Suchomlinof was made a major general, and in 1904 became commander of Russia's most important military zone—Kiev. In 1909 he was appointed to the post which he has since relinquished, and the amazing rapidity with which Russia mobilized her army in August, 1914, can be accredited to the methods which he instituted. As a writer he is known as "Shpioa" (Spur), and is the biographer of Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, and Murat.

Benckendorff, Count A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born in Berlin, August 1, 1849; entered Diplomatic Service, 1869; served at Rome, Vienna; Minister Copenhagen, 1897-1903; Ambassador London, 1903.

Isvolsky, Alexander P.: Ambassador to France; was Russian negotiator of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 regarding Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.

Swastopoulo: Chargé d'Affaires, France.

Swereiev, S. N.: Ambassador to Germany.

Broniersky, A.: Chargé d'Affaires, Germany.

Schebeko, N.: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Koudacheff, Prince Nicholas: Chargé d'Affaires, Austria-Hungary.

Salviatti, A.: Consul General at Fiume.

Kazansky: Acting Consul General at Prague.

Strandtman: Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia.

BELGIUM

Albert: King of the Belgians.

Davignon, M. J.: Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Elst, van der, Baron: Secretary General.

Renkin, J.: Colonial Minister.

Lalaing H. de, Count: Minister to Great Britain. Entered Foreign Office, 1879; served Vienna, Bucharest, Berlin, Hague, London; Minister, Brazil, 1893; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Bucharest, 1898; Berne, 1899; London, 1903.

Guillaume, Baron: Minister to France.

Beyens, Baron: Minister to Germany.

De Dudzeele, Errembault, Count: Minister to Austria-Hungary.

De Welle, Michotte, Baron: Minister to Serbia.

Grenier, A., Baron: Minister to Spain.

Fallon, Baron: Minister to Holland.

SERBIA

Peter Karageorgevitch: King.

Pashitch, Nikola P.: Prime Minister. In 1878, at the age of thirty-two, M. Pashitch entered the Serbian Parliament, and in three years he became leader of the "Old Radicals." Always a champion of liberty, he joined the Zayenchar Mutiny of 1883, and, of twenty-two, he alone escaped execution by flight. Upon his return he was appointed Mayor of Belgrade and in 1893 Minister to Russia, where he made a lasting impression. In 1899 he was again accused of hatching a conspiracy, but Russia served him

well and intervention saved him. To him, in no slight degree, does Serbia owe Russia's friendship, and to his efforts has been attributed the Balkan Alliance.

Patchou, Dr. Laza: Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Boschkovitch: Minister to Great Britain.

Vesnitch, M. R.: Minister to France.

Spalaikovitch, Dr. M.: Minister to Russia.

Yovanovitch, Dr. M.: Chargé d'Affaires in Germany.

Yovanovitch, Yov. M.: Minister to Austria-Hungary.

Georgevitch, M.: Chargé d'Affaires in Turkey.

Michailovitch, Ljub: Minister to Italy.

ITALY

Victor Emmanuel (Vittorio Emanuele) III.: King.

San Giuliano, Antonio di, Marquis: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born Catania, December 10, 1852; Mayor Catania, 1879; member Chamber Deputies, 1882-1904; Senate, 1904; Under-Secretary for Industry and Commerce, 1892-3; Minister Posts and Telegraph, 1899-1900; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1905-6; Ambassador, London, 1906-10; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1910. His opposition to war with Austria precipitated his downfall. Said to be the repository of more European secrets than any European statesman since Bismarck.

D'Avarna, Duke: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.

Salandra: Premier. Appointed November 5, 1914.

Sonnino, Baron Sidney: Minister Foreign Affairs. Born March 11, 1847; entered Diplomatic Service, 1867; Parliament, 1880; Minister Finance, 1893-4; Treasury, 1894-96; Interior, 1906 and 1909-10; Foreign Affairs, November 5, 1914.

JAPAN

Yoshihito: Emperor.

Shigenobu Okuma, Count: Prime Minister.

Takaaki Kato, Baron: Minister Foreign Affairs.

GERMANY

William (Wilhelm) II.: Kaiser of Germany, King of Prussia.

Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. Theobald von: Imperial Chancellor. Born November 29, 1856, at Hohenfinow, Brandenburg; entered Civil Service, 1879; Prussian Minister Interior, 1905; Imperial Secretary of State and Vice President of Prussian Council, 1907; Imperial Chancellor, 1909; member of Reichstag since 1890. His actions before the present war seemed to indicate an earnest desire for the peace of Europe; he appeared to oppose the military party and align himself with the moderates. His manner is frank to the point of bluffness.

Jagow, Gottlieb von: Secretary of State. Born June 26, 1863; entered Diplomatic Service, 1895, at Rome; Minister to Rome, 1907; Ambassador, 1908; Minister Foreign Affairs, 1913; credited with postponing the inevitable conflict between Italy and Austria while at Rome.

Zimmerman, von: Under-Secretary of State. Appointed 1911; previously Vice Consul Shanghai; Consul at Tientsin and in Diplomatic Corps.

Lichnowsky, Prince Karl Maximilian: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born 1860; Attaché, London, 1885; Counsellor Embassy, Vienna; Foreign Office, Berlin; Ambassador to London, 1912. Member Roman Catholic party. Did all he could to prevent rupture between Great Britain and Germany. Was very popular in England.

Schoen, Baron Wilhelm von: Ambassador to France. Born June 3, 1851; entered Diplomatic Service, 1877; Madrid, Hague, Athens, Berne, Paris, Copenhagen, St. Petersburg; Ambassador, Paris, 1910.

Pourtalès, Count Frederic: Ambassador to Russia. Born October 24, 1853; appointed St. Petersburg, 1908.

Tschirschky, Heinrich von: Ambassador to Austria-Hungary. Born August 15, 1858; entered Diplomatic Service, 1873; Constantinople, Vienna, St. Petersburg; Ambassador to Vienna, 1907.

Below Saleske, Konrad von: Minister to Belgium. Born April 18, 1866; Secretary Legation, Athens; Ambassador, Constantinople, 1907.

Storck, von: Secretary Legation in Serbia.

Flotow, Hans von: Ambassador to Italy. Born September 10, 1862; entered Diplomatic Service, 1893; Second Secretary Legation, Washington, Hague, Paris.

Buch, von: Minister to Luxemburg.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Francis Joseph (Franz Josef): Emperor.

Berchtold, Count Leopold: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Born April 18, 1863; saw Diplomatic Service in Paris, London; Ambassador to St. Petersburg, 1906; appointed Secretary of State, 1914; emulated his predecessor, Count d'Herenthal, the annexor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in strong foreign policy.

Macchio, Dr. K., Baron: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Forgach, Count: Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Service in Belgrade and Dresden.

Tisza, Count Stephen: President of the Ministry of Hungary. Born April 22, 1861; served as President Ministry, 1903-06.

Mensdorff, A.: Ambassador to Great Britain. Born September 5, 1861; Diplomatic Service in Paris, London, St. Petersburg; Secretary Ambassador, London, 1896-1904; Minister Plenipotentiary, 1903-04; Ambassador, 1904.

Szécsen, Count Nicolaus: Ambassador to France.

Szápáry, Count Josef: Ambassador to Russia.

Czernin, Count Jaromir: Chargé d'Affaires, Russia.

Szögyény, Count Ladislaus: Ambassador to Germany.

Zehlitschka: Consul General in Turkey.

Clary, S., Count: Minister to Belgium.

Giesl von Gieslingen, Baron: Minister to Serbia.

Hoflehner: Consular Agent at Nish, Serbia.

TURKEY

Mohammed V: Sultan.
Said Halim Pasha, Prince: Grand Vizier.
Tewfik Pasha: Ambassador to Great Britain.

NEUTRAL NATIONS

Loudon: Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Eyschen, Dr.: Minister of State and President of the Government of Luxemburg.
Gerard, James Watson: American Ambassador to Germany.
Penfield, Frederic Courtland: American Ambassador to Austria-Hungary.
Whitlock, Brand: American Minister to Belgium.

It will be convenient for the reader, before entering into the diplomatic history of the war, to have before him the dates of the war marking diplomatic crises.

IMPORTANT DATES PRECEDING THE WAR

June 28, 1914. Assassination of Austrian hereditary Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Bosnia.

July 23, 1914. Austria-Hungary hands note to Serbia.

July 24, 1914. Russia proposes extension of time limit in note; decides on mobilization in South Bosnia; and seeks unconditional support of Great Britain in conflict with Austria-Hungary. Great Britain proposes four-power intervention.

July 25, 1914. Austria-Hungary sends memorandum to powers containing *dossier* of evidence discovered at Sarajevo trial, and declares dispute lies wholly between her and Serbia. Serbia replies to note, having previously ordered mobilization. Austro-Hungarian Legation leaves Belgrade. Germany refuses to enter mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, wish-

ing to "localize" the conflict, and proposes mediation of powers between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Russia mobilizes fourteen army corps on Austro-Hungarian frontier. Great Britain asks Austria-Hungary to extend time limit and suspend hostilities pending four-power conference.

July 26, 1914. Russia proposes direct conversations to Austria-Hungary. France and Italy accept four-power conference in London.

July 27, 1914. William II returns from Norway cruise to Potsdam. Austria-Hungary informs Russia she will respect Serbian integrity and independence. Russia agrees to four-power conference if direct negotiations with Austria-Hungary fail.

July 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary breaks off direct negotiations with Russia; refuses four-power mediation; declares war on Serbia, and mobilizes eight army corps. Russia begins partial mobilization. Great Britain asks Germany her plan of mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

July 29, 1914. Germany attempts to secure neutrality of Great Britain in case of Austro-Hungarian and Russian war. Great Britain warns Germany that if France is involved in war she will support her.

July 30, 1914. Austria-Hungary, advised by Germany, agrees to resume negotiations with Russia, but not on basis of Serbian reply. Germany asks Russia's explanation of her mobilization. Russia agrees to stop mobilization if Austria-Hungary respects Serbian sovereignty. After negotiations with Austria-Hungary, Russia orders general mobilization of army and navy. France reminds Great Britain of her naval agreement. Great Britain refuses Germany's proposal that she remain neutral if French territory in Europe is respected, and proposes that Germany occupy Belgrade and force mediation by the powers.

July 31, 1914. Austria-Hungary accepts Anglo-German proposal for four-power mediation on basis of temporary prosecution of military measures against Serbia. Russia agrees to take no military action pending negotiations. Germany refuses to press Austria-Hungary so long as Russia mobilizes; sends ultimatum to Russia and France, and refuses to answer about re-

THE MACHINES

AND THE

METHODS USED IN BATTLE

GUN LAYER · AVIATOR · CHARGE · DESTROYER
FIRST AID · PERISCOPE · ZEPPELIN · THE DEAD

A British gun-layer sighting his gun. Modern gunfire adds to the skill of the gunners and the precise mechanism, expert directions of range finders and corrections of spotters

Copyright, George Grantham Bain

A German aviator and his pilot receiving instructions from an officer before setting out in their biplane. With the progress of the war new and larger types of aeroplanes were developed

Copyrignt Underwood & Underwood

A night raid on London in October, 1915. The great Zeppelin is marked by searchlights but the shells are bursting far below it

Copyright, Medem Photo Service

French squadron with the torpedo-boat destroyer "Faux" in the foreground. Destroyers have largely superseded the small torpedo boats in modern naval warfare



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Interior of a British submarine, showing the officer in command looking into the periscope where a view from the surface of the sea is reflected

Copyright, Medem Photo Service

The bodies of French soldiers between the trenches, after a successful French charge in the Argonne. The photograph was taken by an officer as a memento of their heroism

Copyright, Press Illustrating Co.

Red Cross doctors and officers of the Italian Bersaglieri attending to the needs of a wounded comrade

Copyright, New York Herald

Drawn by G. Clark

The wonderful charge of British Indian troops, who swept forward and into the German lines like a whirlwind at the word of command

specting neutrality of Belgium. France agrees to respect this neutrality.

August 1, 1914. Austria orders general mobilization, but continues discussion with Russia, and gives way on only point remaining at issue. Germany orders general mobilization and declares war on Russia. France orders general mobilization. Great Britain refuses Germany's request to secure French neutrality in Russo-German war, and to remain neutral herself if Germany respect Belgian neutrality. Belgium declares she will uphold neutrality. Italy decides to remain neutral.

August 2, 1914. Great Britain agrees to give naval aid to France in event of German attack. Germany sends ultimatum to Belgium about passage of troops. German troops enter Luxemburg.

August 3, 1914. Germany declares war on France and bids for British neutrality by offering not to attack northern French coast nor use Belgium and Dutch ports as bases. Great Britain refuses offer. Belgium refuses Germany's ultimatum.

August 4, 1914. Germany sends second ultimatum to Belgium, threatening force, and offers Great Britain not to annex Belgian territory. Great Britain demands that Germany respect Belgian neutrality, and in default of reply declares war on Germany.

August 5, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.

August 6, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 9, 1914. Serbia declares war on Germany.

August 10, 1914. France declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12, 1914. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.

August 12, 1914. Montenegro declares war on Germany.

August 23, 1914. Japan declares war on Germany.

August 27, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Japan.

August 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium.

November 3, 1914. Russia declares war on Turkey.

November 5, 1914. France and Great Britain declare war on Turkey.

May 23, 1915. Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary.
June 3, 1915. San Marino declares war on Austria-Hungary.
August 20, 1915. Italy declares war on Turkey.
October 14, 1915. Bulgaria declares war on Serbia.
October 15, 1915. Great Britain declares war on Bulgaria.
October 19, 1915. Russia and Italy declare war on Bulgaria.

WARNINGS OF HOSTILE INTENTIONS

The first evidence presented before the court of nations was that of France, in regard to the hostile intentions of Germany. To this Germany has made no official answer in the form of documentary evidence, and any inference as to the hostile intentions of France against Germany, if there were any, must be inferred by the reader without any help from cross-examination by the official advocates of Germany. The value of the French evidence must be judged by later events. Have they, or have they not, corroborated the anticipations of France, held for a year before the war, as to an attack upon her by Germany?

On March 17, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, transmitting reports by French military and naval attachés in Berlin to their respective French departments on German military affairs, and called his attention to the importance of the documents. Delay, he said, in the publication of the reports was due to lack of funds wherewith to provide for these military measures. The rich classes objected to a forced levy in times of peace, and the Federal states to the Imperial Government adopting direct taxation which had heretofore been reserved to them.

"However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis.

"The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the [French] Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply

to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative.

"The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago. . . . It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.

"Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave."

The first inclosure in M. Cambon's letter was the report of Lieutenant Colonel Serret. He speaks of a "virulent" article in the "Kölnische Zeitung" ("Cologne Gazette") on the menace of France, which, though immediately disavowed by the Government, cannot be disregarded, since its sentiments have been approved by other prominent newspapers, and it appears to express a "real feeling" among the people, a "latent anger." It throws light on the present German armaments.

"For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say: 'It is a provocation; we will not allow it.' More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her 40,000,000 inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.

"To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realizing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely.

"To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. . . .

"At the moment when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said: 'her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection.' The disgust of Germany can well be understood.

"Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the 'Slav Peril.' As far as I can see, however, public opinion

really seems indifferent to this 'Peril,' and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws. . . .

"To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the 'Kölnische Zeitung,' we are in fact, and shall long remain the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our 40,000,000 of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

"Germans wish for peace—so they keep on proclaiming, and the emperor more than anyone—but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favorable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

"It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

"The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France."

The second inclosure in M. Cambon's letter is the report of M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché. He says that there will be no increase in the German fleet this year, and that the whole military effort will be directed against France.

By October 1, 1914, the imperial army will be increased from 720,000 to 860,000 men, and proposed legislation will place the army corps near the French frontier most nearly on a war footing, in order on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations. . .

"William II cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of twenty-five, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from twenty to twenty-five, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists.

"It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade

them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result. . . .

"And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the empire that we find in all the plans worked out by the general staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France.

"In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. . . .

"In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate court circles.

"Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donnersmarck spoke as follows:

" 'French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbor evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves.' "

The prince, a veteran of the French war, expressed the opinion that Germany would again conquer France in event of another war.

"Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfillment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be. And Prince Donnersmarck added: 'An exactitude which played so great a rôle forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous.'

"In this way the old prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organization."

The attaché then discusses German finances.

He mentions particularly the large loans raised by the empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on January 29, 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on March 7, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses.

"The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures.

"According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the 'non-recurring' expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the 'permanent' annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

"It seems certain that the 'nonrecurring' expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect."

The attaché then discusses a subject already mentioned—the persuasion of the rich and bourgeois classes by the Government to submit to the increased taxation by "noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence" in order to convince them of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

"If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of installment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before July 1, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard."

On April 2, 1913, M. Etienne, French Minister of War, wrote to M. Jonnart, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, enclosing a German official secret report concerning strengthening of the army. This report is interesting in that it mentions knowledge that, as a result of her entente with France and Russia, Great Britain was prepared to send an expeditionary force of 100,000 to the Continent, and confesses that Germany refrained from declaring war on France at the time of the Agadir incident because of "the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, and the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns."

"Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honorable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end. . . .

"Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschtum* (German influence) all the world over.

"The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of black men in the

theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

"Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defense as well as for offense. *We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.* We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

"We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognize these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

"Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan world.

"However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration

of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavorable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defense to any offensive measures from this quarter.

"In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

"As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganization, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the West, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guaranty for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.

"The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short-time limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

"Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her."

REPORT OF M. CAMBON IN 1913

On May 6, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, giving an account of an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, concerning the conference of ambassadors in London on May 5th, and the results there obtained. It was agreed by Cambon and Von Jagow that the immediate crisis was over. Cambon submitted proofs of the anxiety of the German Government over the crisis.

"1. Von Jagow had questioned a colleague of Cambon about Russia's situation in the Far East, whether there was cause for Russia to fear difficulties in that quarter which would cause her to retain troops there. The ambassador answered him that he knew of absolutely no trouble in the Far East, and that Russia had her hands free for Europe.

"2. The mobilization of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to 'attention,' and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day. . . .

"The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. 'We must put on one side,' said General von Moltke, 'all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favor. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilize, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly,' added the general, 'we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance.'

"This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy. . . .

"From these events the following conclusions may be drawn . . . these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. *They wish to be always ready.*

"As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the [French] Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defenses of the country."

On July 30, 1913, M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, made an official report on the state of German public opinion, as derived from French diplomatic and consular agents. It said that:

"1. The treaty of November 4, 1912, is considered a disappointment for Germany.

"2. France—a new France—undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911, is considered . . . to want war.

"Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists [and of all classes of the people] are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:

"The treaty of November 4 is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma. . . .

"And the attitude of France, her calmness, her reborn spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion. . . .

"German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war.

"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain.

"The forces consist of the following elements:

The bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace loving by instinct.

"Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the *grands seigneurs* of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at court who are sufficiently enlightened to realize the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful.

"Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital.

"Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein—conquered, but not assimilated and suddenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

"Finally, the governments and the governing classes in the large southern states—Saxony, Bavaria, Württemburg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden—are divided by these two opinions: an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would profit only Prussia and Prussianization, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy.

"These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive, and defenseless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.

"An example will make this idea clear: The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favor of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.

"Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guaranty of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favor war. . . .

"On the other hand there is a war party with leaders and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.

"Those in favor of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire.

"Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is *inevitable*. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.

"Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on overpopulation, overproduction, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, i. e., to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses.

"Others, uneasy for the safety of the empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible.

"Others are bellicose from 'Bismarckism,' as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France,

at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the *Wehrvereine* [defense leagues] and other associations of Young Germany.

"Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others, finally, from a feeling of rancor. These last the people who heap up pretexts for war.

"Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows: The country squires, represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party, want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session which has just closed the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand, this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the Year Book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill a Conservative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favor. Finally this social class, which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Center, 7 to the Left, and 1 sits among the Socialists.

"The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

"The higher bourgeoisie is nó less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratization of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag; in 1874, 55; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading rôle in Parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown.

"Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the

coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity—all these regard war as good business.

"Among the 'Bismarckians' must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial party. This is the party of the 'pensioned,' whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the 'Post.' They find disciples and political sympathizers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities.

"The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations: it checks improvement in the lot of the masses and assists the growth of Socialism. France, by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge, opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced for a century to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

"Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other apologists of German *Kultur* wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which, according to the clearest thinkers, is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the *Kriegsvereine* [war leagues], *Wehrvereine*, and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4 has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies.

"We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancor and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. . . .

"During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed: 'Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms.'

"In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the emperor. But when the moment comes she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

"Must war, then, be considered as inevitable?

"It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk if France can make it clear to the world that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make

themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.

"As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her cooperation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

"People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany."

On November 22, 1913, M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, an account of a recent conversation between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians in the presence of General von Moltke, Chief of the General German Staff, which gravely impressed King Albert. It showed that German enmity against France was increasing, and that the Kaiser had ceased to be the friend of peace. The Kaiser had come to believe that war with France was inevitable; and, when it did come, that German success was certain. General von Moltke strengthened his sovereign in these opinions:

"This time the matter must be settled, and your majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes.

"The king of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.

"The emperor and his chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view.

"During the course of this conversation the emperor seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans and who does not regard the position occupied by the empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the Germany army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go much further.

"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The emperor and his chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the king of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. . . .

"The Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him. . . .

"If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, 'we must keep our powder dry.'"

[See also letter of M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, of July 10, 1914, in pages following.]

The next evidence presented before the court of the world is that by Serbia and her witnesses, the nations thus far, to all appearances, interested solely in maintaining the peace of Europe, as to Serbia's nonresponsibility for the assassination of the hereditary Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, and as to her sincere desire to do all she could, short of impairing her sovereignty and suffering national humiliation; and that by Austria-Hungary and the same witnesses that were brought forward by Serbia as to Serbia's complicity in the assassination, and to Austria-Hungary's right to fix this, and to exact guaranties that Serbia should not in the future prosecute her evil designs against Austria-Hungary.

THE ASSASSINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN ARCHDUKE

On June 28, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. René Viviani, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, the assassination that day of the hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo, Bosnia.

On June 29, 1914, Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, telegraphed to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, that the Vienna press asserted that magisterial inquiry had already shown that the Sarajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade; that the whole

conspiracy in its wider issues was organized there among youths inspired with the great Serbian idea; and that the Belgrade press was exciting public opinion by articles about the intolerable conditions in Bosnia, papers containing which were being smuggled in large quantities into Bosnia.

On the same day, June 29, 1914, Ritter von Storck, Secretary of the German Legation at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen being absent from his post on leave, reported to Count Berchtold, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, the following facts:

"Yesterday the anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld was celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were celebrations in honor of the Serbian patriot, Milos Obilic, who in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious Murad.

"Among all Serbians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been nourished under the aegis of the royal Government and the agitation which for many years has been carried on in the press.

"A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young criminals of Sarajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic, and the third person still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an innocent woman and may, therefore, think that they have surpassed their model.

"For many years hatred against the [Dual] Monarchy has been sown in Serbia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder.

"The news arrived at about five o'clock; the Serbian Government at about ten o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in delight, and remarks were heard such as: 'It serves them right; we have been expecting this for a long time,' or 'This is revenge for the annexation [of Bosnia].'"

On the following day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, warned M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, by telegraph, that the tendency in Vienna was becoming more and more apparent to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the assassination as the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia.

The idea was to use this as a political weapon against Serbia. Great attention should therefore be paid to the tone of the Serbian press.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, in two telegrams informed M. Pashitch that the Berlin press was misleading German public opinion on the outrage; that German hostility toward Serbia was growing, being fostered by false reports from Vienna and Budapest, which were diligently spread in spite of contradictions by some newspapers and news agencies.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a conversation he had held, in the absence of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with Baron Macchia, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Department. In this the Serbian Minister adopted the following line of argument:

"The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the Sarajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot in the event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal Serbian Government, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, etc.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for our good neighborly relations. You know that in this direction something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to continue to work for this object, convinced that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Sarajevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work."

M. Yovanovitch said that he had communicated the substance of this conversation to the French and Russian Ambassadors.

On the same day (June 30, 1914), the Serbian Prime Minister received from M. Georgevitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople, the information that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador there had told him that, in recent conversations, Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had expressed himself as satisfied with the attitude of the Serbian Government, and desired friendly relations with it.

On the same day (June 30, 1914, Herr von Storck, Secretary of the German Legation at Belgrade, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that he had asked Herr Gruic, General Secretary of the Serbian Foreign Office, what measures the Royal Serbian police had taken, or proposed to take, to follow up clues to the crime which notoriously were partly to be found in Serbia, and that the reply was that the matter had not yet engaged the attention of the police.

On July 1, 1914, M. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister was informed by telegraph from the Serbian Minister in London, M. S. Boschkovitch, that, basing their conclusion on Austrian reports, the English press attributed the Sarajevo outrages to Serbian revolutionaries. He was informed by telegraph on the same day, by M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, of popular hostile demonstrations in front of the Serbian Legation, which were quelled by the police. A Serbian flag was said to have been burned.

"Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone. . . . It is expected that decision as to the attitude to be adopted toward Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral [of the archduke]."

Thereupon, on the same day (July 1, 1914), M. Pashitch warned all the Serbian legations at foreign courts of the evident purpose of the Austrian and Hungarian press to take political advantage of the act of a "young and ill-balanced fanatic." All ranks of Serbian society, official and unofficial, he said, condemned the act, recognizing that it would be most prejudicial not only to good relations with Austria-Hungary, but to their coreligionists in that country:

"At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her relations with the neighboring monarchy it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her bor-

ders will take the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to mislead European public opinion and lay the heavy responsibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can suffer only harm from such acts. . . .

"Please . . . use all available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European press."

On the same day (July 1, 1914), Herr Jehlitschka, Austrian Consul General to Turkey, wrote from Uskub, in European Turkey, to Count Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of the actions at Prestina on the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), for the first time officially celebrated as the "Festival of the Liberation" of the Serbian nation, and carefully prepared to make it an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of Serbian nationality.

"The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary; those who took part in it received free passes on the Serbian state railways; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public bodies, etc., were promised. . . .

"The various speeches . . . dealt . . . with the well-known theme of the union of all Serbia and the 'liberation of our brethren in bondage' beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia and Dalmatia.

"When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible crime of which Sarajevo had been the scene was circulated, the feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in whom I have absolute confidence, one that I can only characterize as inhuman.

"In view of this attitude of the population, which was also displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Serbian press to divest Serbia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received by a representative gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction collapse miserably."

On July 2, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister in Paris, the resentment against Serbia in Austrian military circles and by those persons opposed to Serbia's maintenance of the position she had acquired in the Balkans. If the Serbian Government refused as intolerable to its dignity the demand of Austria-Hungary that the Serbian Government investigate into the origin of the archduke's assassination, he feared that this would furnish Austria-Hungary a ground for resort to military measures.

On the same day (July 2, 1914), Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the French Government advised Serbia to remain calm, in official circles as well as in public opinion.

On July 3, 1914, M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, sent two reports to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, the first containing an account of a mob which gathered before the Serbian Legation on July 2, on account of his having hoisted the national flag at half-mast as a sign of mourning; the bodies of the victims of the Sarajevo tragedy having been brought that day to the Austrian capital. The police dispersed the mob. The papers of July 3, under the heading of "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," falsely described the incident. The minister mentioned by name leading instigators of attacks in the Austrian and German press on Serbia as haranguing the crowd. In the second letter he reported a conversation he had had with Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in which the Baron severely censured the Belgrade press for its antimonarchical propaganda, and, implicitly, the Serbian Government for not controlling the press. The Serbian Minister had replied that the press was free, and that there was no means of curbing it except by going to law; and, in rejoinder, he censured the Austro-Hungarian Government, which could control the press of its empire, for permitting it shamefully to attack Serbia by accusing the whole nation of being an accomplice in the Sarajevo crime. Baron Macchio had replied: "We accuse only those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme, and work for the realization of its object." Yovanovitch had rejoined that, till the assassination, Bosnia Serbs had been uniformly called "Bosniaks," yet the assassin was now described as "a Serb," and no mention was made that he was a Bosnian and an Austrian subject. This was evidently to cast odium upon Serbia.

On July 4, 1914, Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a recent conversation with M. Viviani, the new French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Sarajevo incident.

"I described to him briefly the causes which had led to the outrage and which were to be found, in the first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in the whole policy of the monarchy toward anything orthodox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.

"After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has quieted down to such an extent that the minister-president himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the expressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the subject in the Senate."

On the same day (July 4, 1914), Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd,* telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, had expressed his opinion that the outrages upon the Serbs in Bosnia would increase the sympathy of Europe for Serbia; that the accusations made in Vienna would not obtain credence and that therefore Serbia should remain calm.

On the same day (July 4, 1914), Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, that, in officially thanking M. Poincaré for his sympathy over the Sarajevo tragedy, the President had excused the hostile demonstrations against Serbia by citing those against all Italians in France after the assassination of President Carnot.

"I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the present case it must be admitted that for years past there has been an agitation in Serbia against the [Dual] Monarchy fomented by every means, legitimate and illegitimate.

"In conclusion, M. Poincaré expressed his conviction that the Serbian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices. No state could divest itself of this duty."

On the same day (July 4, 1914), M. de Manneville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, reported to M. Viviani, President of the Council in Paris, a conversation with Herr von Zimmermann, German Under-Secretary of State, in which von Zimmermann had expressed the hope that Serbia would satisfy Austria's

*Although the name St. Petersburg was not changed officially to Petrograd until after the outbreak of the war, the latter name is used uniformly in the Serbian Blue Book and Russian Orange Book.

demands with regard to the investigation and prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Sarajevo. Otherwise she would be condemned by the whole civilized world.

"The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so."

Two days later (July 6, 1914), M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, a recent interview which M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had had with Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires at the request of the latter. The Count intimated that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Sarajevo on Serbian soil. M. Sazonof interjected:

"No country has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."

On the same day (July 6, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the excitement in military and government circles against Serbia was growing, owing to the tone of the press, which was diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. On the same date he informed the Prime Minister in detail of the press agitation against Serbia. By headlines the people were led to infer, on the date of the crime of Sarajevo, that the two perpetrators were Serbs from Serbia proper. In later reports there was a marked tendency to connect the crime with Serbia. Belgrade was indicated as the place of its origin by the visit to that capital of the assassins, and by the bombs originating there, which facts had been elucidated at the trial of the assassins in Sarajevo. The Hungarian press claimed that there was evidence to show:

"1. That the perpetrators while in Belgrade associated with the *comitadji* [revolutionist] Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the organizer and instigator of the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch. . . .

"Further . . . the latest announcement which the Hungarian *Korrespondenzbureau* made to the newspapers stated:

" 'The inquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetrators, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been employed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and revolvers.' [This item was later recalled.]

"At the same time the Vienna *Korrespondenzbureau* published the following official statement:

" 'We learn from authoritative quarters that the inquiries relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press should be accepted with reserve.'

"Nevertheless the Budapest newspapers continued to publish alleged reports on the inquiry. In the last 'report' of the Budapest newspaper 'A Nap,' which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasized. According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage"

On the same day Herr Hoflehner, Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent at Nish, Serbia, wrote to Count Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of the satisfaction and even joy expressed, especially in the leading circles, over the crime at Sarajevo.

On the next day (July 7, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, wrote to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that, though Emperor Francis Joseph had appealed to the Prime Ministers of Austria (Count Berchtold) and of Hungary (Count Tisza), and to the Minister of Finance (Herr Bilinski) for calmness, it was impossible to tell what attitude toward Serbia the Government would take.

"For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the inquiry at Sarajevo has brought to light. . . .

"Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses: either to regard the Sarajevo outrage as a national misfortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's cooperation . . . will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty; or, to treat the Sarajevo out-

rage as a Pan-Serbian, South-Slav, and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are many indications that influential circles are being urged to adopt the latter course: it is, therefore, advisable to be ready for defense. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect."

On July 9, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed to all the foreign Serbian Legations that the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Alexander was receiving daily threatening letters from Austro-Hungarians, and that they should make use of this information with other foreign ministers and journalists.

On July 10, 1914, M. Allizé, French Minister in Munich, wrote to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, that the Bavarians were asking the object of the new German armaments.

"Recognizing that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success."

Nevertheless, public opinion will support the Imperial Government in any enterprise in which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of conflict.

"The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the political and economic difficulties which will continue to increase."

On July 11, 1914, M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin, French Consul General at Budapest, reported to M. Vivian, Prime Minister at Paris, that Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, had refused to make to the Hungarian Chamber any disclosures on the Sarajevo incident until the judicial inquiry was closed. The chamber approved.

"He did not give any indication whether the project of a *démarche* [proceeding] at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up."

The virulence of the Hungarian press has diminished, and the papers are unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous.

"The semiofficial press especially would desire that for the word '*démarche*,' with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted

the expression '*pourparlers*' [conversations], which appears to them more friendly.

"The general public, however, fears war. It is said that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities toward the frontier. . . . The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is *preparing a coup*, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. . . . Their optimism to order is, in fact, without an echo; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this; without exception, stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level."

On July 14, 1914, Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had told him that Austria-Hungary, as a great power, could not tolerate the provocative attitude of the Serbian press.

On the same day M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, wrote M. Pashitch that the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, which supplied the press with material and set its tone, was exciting opinion against Serbia. Official German circles in Vienna were especially ill disposed toward Serbia. The "Neue Freie Presse," under instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, summarized the feeling:

"We have to settle matters with Serbia by war; it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now.

"The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in prices in Vienna for a long time."

On the same day, July 14, 1914, M. Pashitch sent two letters to all the foreign Serbian Legations.

In the first letter he gave specific illustrations of misinformation by the Austro-Hungarian press such as that Austro-Hungarian subjects were maltreated in Belgrade, and were now panic-stricken, and that there had been a demonstration against the Austrian Minister at the funeral of Dr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister. There was no foundation whatever for these statements.

In the second letter he notified the Legations that the Austro-Hungarian news bureaus, the channel of Serbian news to the world, misrepresented, through garbling extracts, the tone of the

Belgrade press, and that all Serbian papers were forbidden entry into Austria-Hungary.

"With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be confiscated only for *lèse-majesté* or for revolutionary propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of newspapers."

Accordingly the Serbian foreign ministers were instructed to give out information that the Serbian Government lacked the power to control the newspapers, and further to spread knowledge of the fact that it was Austro-Hungarian papers which originated all the controversies, while the Serbian ones only replied. There was no desire in Serbia to provoke Austria-Hungary.

On July 15, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy had been consulting about the Sarajevo incident, and that it appeared nothing was decided. Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had gone to Ischl, where Emperor Francis Joseph was recovering from the shock of the assassination, to report to him. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, had replied evasively to interpellations made in the Hungarian Parliament by the Opposition. Owing to the absence on leave from his post of the War Minister and his chief of staff, the Bourse had recovered.

"One thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo is completed and the matter submitted to the court."

In a second letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch reported to M. Pashitch that it was thought that the inquiry had not produced sufficient evidence to justify officially accusing Serbia more than for tolerating in her borders certain revolutionary elements. Austro-Hungarian methods were criticized in diplomatic circles and the Serbian attitude was commended as in accord with the dignity of a nation.

"In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a policy."

In a third letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch informed the Prime Minister that it appeared that Austria-Hungary would not invite the Serbian Government to assist her in discovering and punishing the culprits of the Sarajevo crime, but would make it a case against Serbia and the Serbians, or even against the Jugo-Slavs (on her own border), looking in this for the approval of Europe, which would prepare the way for the sharp reactionary measures she contemplated to take internally to suppress the great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav idea. The Government must take some action for the sake of its prestige at home as well as abroad. . . .

The accusation against Serbia will extend from April, 1909, to the present. Austria-Hungary will claim to the powers that the facts developed therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, and demand that Serbia in future act as a loyal neighbor. Austria-Hungary will ask Serbia to accept unconditionally her demands.

On the same day, July 15, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, that certain press organs in Vienna, specifically the "Militärische Rundschau," represented France and Russia as incapable of holding their own in European affairs, and that Austria-Hungary, with the support of Germany, could therefore subject Serbia to any treatment she pleased. The "Rundschau" argued that now was the most propitious time for the war in which Austria-Hungary would have to engage in two or three years at the latest.

"At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a great power, our honor, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned. . . .

"Surpassing itself, the 'Neue Freie Presse' of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said: 'Our relations with Serbia require, however, to be made clear.' These words rouse its indignation. For it tranquillity and security can result only from a *war to the knife* against Pan-Serbism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Serbian race."

On July 16, 1914, Dr. Yovanovitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade,

that Secretary of State Von Jagow had informed him that reports of the German Minister at Belgrade pointed to the existence of a great Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the Serbian Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary.

On July 17 M. Boschkovitch, Serbian Minister at London, telegraphed to M. Pashitch that the Austrian Embassy there was endeavoring to favor the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. Despite peaceable official statements by Austria-Hungary the way was preparing for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia which might develop into an armed attack.

On the same day, July 17, M. Ljub Michailovitch, Serbian Minister at Rome, telegraphed to M. Pashitch that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister of Italy, had stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador:

"Any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to take into account international considerations would meet with the disapproval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government desire to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained."

On July 19, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed a long notice to the foreign Serbian legations, telling of the accusation of the Austrian press from the time of the Sarajevo outrage that the crime was the direct result of the great Serbian idea, propagated by various associations such as the Narodna Odbrana, which were tolerated by the Serbian Government. The notice detailed the attitude of the Serbian Government toward the Serbian press, presented in the preceding correspondence. In regard to its attitude toward Austria-Hungary it said:

"The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have played a part in the Sarajevo outrage. The Serbian Government further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be submitted to the Skupshtina [Serbian Parliament], as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those good neighborly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her position as a European state.

"From the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian Government

for their assistance in the matter. They did not demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an inquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information; this was as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary and had crossed over to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on this point was supplied."

The notice related the anti-Serbian propaganda conducted by the Austro-Hungarian press, the interpellations in the Hungarian Parliament, etc., and the probable intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to demand a categorical reply from Serbia, which, if not satisfactory, would be followed by war.

That Austria-Hungary was picking a quarrel had been evidenced by her use of an exploded rumor of a contemplated attack on the Austrian Legation in Belgrade to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia, and to what lengths she was ready to go.

"There is reason for apprehension that some step is being prepared againt us [in the evident intention] that the inquiry which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea. . . .

"On the other hand the Serbian Government have given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view the Serbian Government proceeded to settle the question of the Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople, Sofia, Saloniki, and Athens.

"The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to make a *démarche* which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a state, and to put forward demands which could not be accepted.

"I have the honor, therefore, to request you to impress upon the Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every attempt directed against the peace and public safety of the neighboring monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to subject to trial in our independent courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in Serbia—should such, of course, exist.

"But we can never comply with demands which may be directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be inacceptable to any country which respects and maintains its independence.

"Actuated by the desire that good neighborly relations may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise."

ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION

With Serbia's case now fully before the courts of Europe, there began a movement among the powers desiring to keep the peace of the continent for mediation between the disputants. This was begun by Germany and Great Britain.

On July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, recounting a conversation with the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. The prince said that Austria was certainly going to take some step in the Serbian matter; that the situation was uncomfortable, and that it would be desirable if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Russia. Sir Edward Grey presumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Serbia, founded upon what they had discovered at the trial of the Sarajevo assassins. This would make it easier for other powers, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. The more reasonable the demands of Austria, the easier it would be to smooth things over.

"I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable.

"The ambassador agreed whole-heartedly in this sentiment."

On the same day, July 20, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the word had been passed round in Vienna to maintain absolute secrecy about what was being done in the Serbian matter. There was no room for the optimism reported to exist in Belgrade. It was highly probable Austria-Hungary was preparing for war against Serbia.

"The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is believed that the two oppor-

tunities previously missed—the annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan War—have been extremely injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the conviction is steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would, in fact, merely mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene.

"The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasized by the military preparations which are being made, especially in the vicinity of the Serbian frontier."

On the same day, July 20, 1914, a French consular report was made from Vienna to the Government at Paris, which referred to the diplomatic situation.

"Much will be demanded of Serbia; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in cooperation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for a government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly insure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin.

"There is here, and equally in Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions; in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organization to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localized operations against Serbia. But everything must be regarded as possible."

The report commented on the departure from usage by the Austro-Hungarian press in prominently reporting the remarks of the most obscure Serbian newspapers,

"which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favorable to war. The fact is significant."

On July 21 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, that M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister to Germany, had declared to the German Government that Serbia was willing to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the Sarajevo outrage, provided that she asked only for

"judicial cooperation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Serbia.

"M. Browniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State. Von Jagow said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Serbian difficulties would be localized. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect.

"I have also been assured that from now on the preliminary notices for mobilization, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of 'attention' attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilization, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant."

On the same day, July 21, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the French Legations at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome that the Berlin Bourse was extremely weak on the 20th, probably on account of anxiety over the Serbian question, and that M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, had grave reason that Germany would support Austria-Hungary in her contemplated *démarche* at Belgrade without seeking to play the part of mediator.

On the same day, July 21, 1914, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, wrote a long letter to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, reviewing the situation. Most of his statements have been given in more moderate language in the preceding correspondence. He describes how the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary have been "poisoned" by Serbian national aspirations, due to the great Serbian propaganda (carried on in Austria-Hungary as well as in Serbia), and to Serbian success in the Balkan wars. This chauvinism has increased to a paroxysm, bordering on insanity. The policy is to separate from Austria-Hungary the southern Slav provinces, and so abolish the Dual

Monarchy as a great power. Bosnia and Herzegovina are expected to revolt, and the Slav regiments in the Austro-Hungarian army to mutiny. Out of the ruins will be builded the great Serbian Empire, and that in the immediate future.

Serbian newspapers without fear of reprimand discuss the decreptitude of the Dual Monarchy and insult her officials, and even "the exalted person of our ruler." The press is the educator of the Serbian people; it promoted the great Serbian propaganda, from which sprang the crime of Sarajevo. Political parties and governmental policy are wholly subservient to it. Its accusations that the sudden death of the Russian Minister, Dr. Hartwig, was due to poison are on the verge of insanity—the London "Times" called them ravings. The people, in gratitude for the past, and in anxiety for the future, outbid one another in servility to Russia. They despise Austria-Hungary as powerless, for internal and external reasons. The serious words of our statesmen are regarded as "bluff."

"This picture leads up to the conclusion that a reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the [Dual] Monarchy as a great power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided.

"If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavorable situation in any future war which must, however, sooner or later be carried through. . . .

"Should we therefore . . . put forward far-reaching requirements joined to effective control—for this alone could clear the Augean stable of great Serbian intrigues—then all possible consequences must be considered, and from the beginning there must be a strong and firm determination to carry through the matter to the end.

"Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long discussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be the hardest blow which could be directed against Austria-Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her position in Europe."

On July 22, 1914, Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs at London, that he had had an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, who insisted that the question at issue between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was for these alone to settle, without interference from outside, and said that it was inadvisable for the German Government to approach the Austro-Hungarian Government on the matter.

The German Secretary had frequently emphasized to the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, M. Yovanovitch, that Austro-Serbian relations should be put on a proper footing. He thought that Austria had acted toward Serbia with great forbearance.

On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the foreign French legations of the information in M. Cambon's report of the 21st, and said that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister at Rome, was interceding with Austria-Hungary that nothing impracticable be demanded of Serbia; thus, that the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana be required, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Sarajevo. Evidently the Cabinet at Vienna, under pressure of the press and military party, is trying to intimidate Serbia by extreme demands, expecting German support in this policy.

"I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna [M. Dumaine] to use all his influence with Count Berchtold [the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs] and to represent to him in a friendly conversation how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Serbia."

On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Dumaine reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Count Berchtold was still at Ischl evidently waiting for the decision of Kaiser Francis Joseph on the Serbian question.

"The intention of proceeding against Serbia with the greatest severity . . . of 'treating her like another Poland,' is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza [Hungarian Prime Minister], who is very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

"In any case it is believed that the *démarche* will be made at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Serbians; M. Yovanovitch [Serbian Minister at Vienna] believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch [Serbian Prime Minister] wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Serbian army; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the [Dual] Monarchy to paralyze the effort directed against his country.

"Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognized here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro-Hun-

garian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

"Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancellery would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador [M. Schebeko], who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed toward the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Serbian national feeling."

On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had told him that Prince Lichnowsky, had stated that a *démarche* of Austria-Hungary against Serbia was expected at Berlin, and that the German Government was endeavoring to hold back the Austro-Hungarians, but thus far had been unsuccessful. Sir Edward Grey had answered that he would like to believe that Austria-Hungary, before intervening at Belgrade, were assured that the Serbian Government had been cognizant of the conspiracy resulting in the crime of Sarajevo, and had not done all in their power to prevent the crime.

"For if it could not be proved that the Serbian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe."

The Italian Ambassador and Serbian Minister, M. Boschkovitch, share Sir Edward Grey's apprehensions. M. Boschkovitch fears that demands will be made on the Serbian Government which their dignity and public opinion may not allow them to accept without protest.

"Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Serbia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation.

"Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador [Count Mensdorff], asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Serbia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far."

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERBIA

The expected blow now fell on Serbia. On the same day, July 22, 1914, Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople, the contents of the note which was to be presented on the morrow to the Serbian Government.

A justification of the demands in it were given. All of the complaints here made against Serbia have already been given, except the charge that

"individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia had come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

"The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia, was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Serbian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude toward the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandizement of Serbia possible."

This benevolence, however, was repaid by the Serbian Government tolerating the propaganda which ended in the crime of Sarajevo.

"In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade."

The ambassadors were instructed each to submit a copy of the note to the Government to which he was accredited, together with a *dossier*

"elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th of June."

On the following day, Thursday, July 23, 1914, Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, that, as Great Britain of all the powers might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment on the action taken, in presenting the copy of the note, he should point out that Serbia might have rendered less acute the serious steps she must expect from Austria-Hungary by spontaneously investigating the conspiracy tending to the crime of Sarajevo, and that on the contrary she had endeavored to wipe out all its traces, for example, in the case of the Serbian civil servant Ciganovic, who was compromised by the independent testimony of both of the assassins, and who was in Belgrade on the day of the crime, yet whom the director of the Serbian press declared to be completely unknown in that city.

"The short time limit attached to our demand must be attributed to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Serbia.

"The requirements which we demand that Serbia should fulfill, and which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter of course in the intercourse between states which are to live in peace and friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and compromise; and, having regard to our economic interests, we cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it would be open to Serbia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which has arisen."

Later in the day Count Mensdorff had an interview with Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the substance of which Sir Edward communicated on the same date to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Count Mensdorff intimated the general nature of the note. Sir Edward regretted the time limit set as akin to an ultimatum, and so likely to inflame opinion in Russia, and render difficult securing a satisfactory reply from Serbia. If it later developed that proceedings were unduly protracted, a time limit could then be set. By that time Russian opinion would be less excited, and, if the case appeared strong against Serbia, the Russian Govern-

ment would be in a position to influence Serbia to reply satisfactorily to the demands of the note. A time limit was generally a thing used only as a last resort, when all other means had failed.

Count Mensdorff instanced the bad faith of Serbia in not fulfilling her promise of 1909 to live on neighborly terms with Austria-Hungary, and said that, on the contrary, she had conducted an agitation to disintegrate that country, which made it absolute for Austria to protect herself. On this Sir Edward did not comment. He said that the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, and the Russian, Count Benckendorff, and others were agreed that those who had influence at St. Petersburg should exert it on behalf of patience and moderation.

"I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great powers of Europe—let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial states, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

"Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia.

"I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say ordinarily that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other.

"Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in Petrograd had not been very favorable recently."

On the same day, July 23, 1914, before the copy of the note had been presented to him, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome, that it was reported by M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, that the intention of Austria-Hungary was to proceed with the greatest severity

against Serbia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

Nevertheless Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had assured M. Dumaine that the tone and demands of the note were such as to allow us to count on a peaceful result.

"In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancellery, I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances. . . .

"The Serbian Minister [M. Vesnitch] holds that as M. Pashitch [Serbian Prime Minister] wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guaranties for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

"In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador [Von Tschirschky] is in favor of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that the Imperial Chancellery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian Ambassador [Schebeko], trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Serbia."

On the same day, July 23, 1914, M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the Bavarian press were optimistic over a peaceful solution of the Serbian question, but that official circles were pessimistic.

The note was presented at 6 p. m., Thursday, July 23, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, to the Serbian Minister of Finance, M. Laza Patchou, in the absence of M. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, who was away electioneering. The time limit for acceptance of its demands was forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, if the demands were not accepted within that period, the Austro-Hungarian Legation would leave Belgrade on the morrow, Friday, at 10 a. m. This information was telegraphed that evening to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Petrograd, M. Sazonof, by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade, M. Strandtman. Through him M. Patchou solicited the help of Russia, declaring that no Serbian Government could accept the demands of Austria-Hungary. M. Patchou at the same time telegraphed to the

foreign Serbian Legations the news of the delivery of the note, and informed them that he was in a position to state that no Serbian Government could accept its demands in their entirety.

TEXT OF THE NOTE

The following are the contents of the note:

"On March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister to the court of Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government:

" 'Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in reference to Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the powers, Serbia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies toward Austria-Hungary, and in the future to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations.' "

Here follow the charges with which the reader is already familiar: That there is in Serbia a movement to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which, developed under the eyes of the Government of Serbia, has found expression beyond that kingdom in a series of acts of terrorism and assassination.

The Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress the movement, its violent propaganda in public education and the press, or the participation in its intrigues by public officials.

"It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28 that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Serbian frontier officials.

"These results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy.

"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is forced to demand official assurance from the Serbian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the

monarchy which belong to it, and that Serbia binds herself to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.

"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26, 1914, the following declaration:

" 'The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.

" 'The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

" 'The Royal Government, which disapproves and rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will henceforward proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort.'

"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance of the royal army through an order of his majesty the king, and it is to be published in the official organ of the army.

"The Royal Serbian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows:

" '1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity.

" '2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under another name or in another form.

" 'Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors as well as the means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

" '4. To remove from military service and the administration in general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the Royal Government.

" '5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and Royal Government cooperate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

"'6. To commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the conspiracy of June 28, who are on Serbian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government, will participate in the examinations.

"'7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Serbian state officials, who have been compromised through the result of the investigation.

"'8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of the Serbian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier, and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier.

"'9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28.

"'10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal Government, at the latest by Saturday, 25th inst., at 6 p. m. A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they concern points 7 and 8, is inclosed with this note.'"

INCLOSURE

"The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in the court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28, has so far yielded the following results:

"'1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.

"'2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the criminals were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.

"'3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the Serbian army in Kragujevac.

"'4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in a forest near the target practice field of Topshider (outside Belgrade).

"'5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom-house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other persons.'"

On the same day that the note was presented to Serbia, July 23, 1914, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor,

wrote a circular letter to the German Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, embodying and enforcing the Austro-Hungarian arguments justifying the note. These the ambassadors were instructed to present to the Foreign Offices of the countries to which they were accredited. The chancellor commended the self-restraint of Austria-Hungary in thus far avoiding war with Serbia. Now, however, he feared that Serbia would not comply with the just demands of the country she had injured, but would adopt "a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary."

"Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great power, but to press its demands with the Serbian Government, and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with it."

The ambassadors were charged to give special emphasis to the view

"that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers to insure. We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict because every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences."

The ambassadors were instructed by the chancellor to send him telegraphic reports of their interviews.

CONTROVERSY OVER THE TIME LIMIT

The diplomatic correspondence of the two following days is occupied chiefly with the attempt of Serbia and the powers not party to the dispute to have the time limit of the Austro-Hungarian note extended. In order to save repetition the correspondence hereafter will be given under the heads of the dates when letters, telegrams, etc., were sent, and the subheads of the countries in whose official reports they are found.

CHRONOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENT OF DATES

FRIDAY, JULY 24, 1914

Serbia. M. Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Petrograd, that Pashitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, had returned to the capital, and would give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time, showing the points which are acceptable or unacceptable.

"To-day an appeal will be addressed to the powers to defend the independence of Serbia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable, we will make war."

Great Britain. Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that M. Pashitch had told him that the Austrian demands were considered unacceptable by the Serbian Government, and that it trusted to Great Britain to induce Austria to moderate them. M. Pashitch was dejected and anxious.

Russia. The Crown Prince Alexander, Prince Regent of Serbia, telegraphed to Czar Nicholas II of Russia that the Serbian Government had been willing from the first to open an inquiry in Serbia as to complicity of Serbian subjects in the crime of Sarajevo.

"The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent state. . . .

"We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent state, as well as those to which your majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, which would need time. . . . We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves, and we beg your majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much-appreciated good will which your majesty has so often shown toward us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded. . . ."

Russia. M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, that the Berlin press in the main warmly welcomed the uncompromising attitude of Austria-Hungary.

"The semiofficial 'Lokal-Anzeiger' is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Serbia may make to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the Balkan Peninsula is to be cleared up at last."

Serbia. Dr. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to M. Pashitch a report of a chance interview with Count Pourtalès, the German Ambassador. The Count had said that peace with Austria-Hungary depended on Serbia alone, since the matter lay entirely between the two disputants.

"In reply I told Count Pourtalès that he was under a misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European question."

Austria-Hungary. Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, that he had handed a copy of the note to Serbia to Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

"At the fifth heading he asked what it meant; to introduce officials of our Government in Serbia would be equivalent to the end of Serbian political independence. I answered that cooperation of, e. g., police officials, in no way affected the sovereignty of the state.

"He regretted the time limit, as in this way we should be deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of excitement and bringing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to send an ultimatum if answer was not satisfactory.

"I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defense against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the territory of the [Dual] Monarchy, protection of our most vital interests, complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we had hitherto often shown to Serbia, who had had more than three weeks to set on foot of her own accord investigations as to accomplices in outrage, etc.)

"The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the crime of Sarajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was justified.

"He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia. He is, however, very 'apprehensive' that several great powers might be involved in a war. Speaking of Russia,

Germany, and France, he observed that the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance.

"I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for ourselves some sort of guaranties, as hitherto Serbian promises have never been kept. I understood that in the first place he considered the question only as it influences the position of Europe. He must, however, in order to be fair to our point of view, put himself in our situation.

"He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this subject, said he must have time to study the note more carefully. He was to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must first of all exchange ideas with the powers who are allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, but have themselves no direct interest in Serbia."

Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, on his presentation of the copy of the note to Serbia to M. Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, point five in the note had seemed to make a special impression on the secretary, since he had asked that it be reread.

"I took the opportunity to impress on him that the question was one which must be brought to an issue directly between Serbia and us, but that it was in the general interests of Europe that the trouble which for years past had been kept up by Serbian intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear situation.

"All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Serbia to change completely her attitude and to satisfy our just demands.

"The minister said that it was the duty of Serbia to proceed energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of Sarajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While laying special stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the good relations which existed between our two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would be brought to an end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes.

"The minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in any way the attitude of Serbia."

In a second telegram Count Szécsen reported that Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris, had officially informed M. Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, that, in the view of the Berlin Cabinet, the Serbian controversy concerned only the two parties to it, and, in case that third states should wish to intervene, Germany would be on the side of her ally. M. Bienvenu-Martin replied that his Govern-

ment agreed that the controversy concerned Belgrade and Vienna alone, and he hoped for a peaceful solution.

Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, on presenting the copy of the note to Serbia to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the minister had questioned the fact of the outrages complained of arising in Serbia, and declared that the note was a pretext for war on Serbia.

"I said to him that no one among us was attacking the integrity of Serbia or the dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which Serbia would never undertake. The participation of imperial and royal officials in the suppression of the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on the part of the minister. Serbia then will no longer be master in her own house. 'You will always be wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead Europe!' I answered that if Serbia shows good will it will be a quieter life than hitherto.

"The commentary added to the communication of the note was listened to by the minister with fair composure; at the passage that our feelings were shared by those of all civilized nations, he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would be if we could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question, in which everything which is most sacred to us was at stake, and, whatever the minister might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The minister attempted to minimize the monarchical side of the question.

"With regard to the *dossier* which was put at the disposal of the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered the ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire an impartial examination of the matter. I said to him that the results which had been attained by our own investigations were quite sufficient for our procedure in this matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that we were only ready to give the powers further information if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret.

"M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we only wanted to make war with Serbia whatever happened. I answered that we were the most peace-loving power in the world, but what we wanted was security for our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from bombs. . . .

"In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the minister was throughout unaccommodating and hostile."

The Russian "Official Gazette" announced that the Government were closely and anxiously following the Serbian controversy, to which Russia could not remain indifferent.

Count Szápáry telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, after a council of ministers which had lasted five hours, M. Sazonof had received the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés.

M. Sazonof took the position that the Serbian question was a European affair, the settlement of 1909 having been made under the auspices of all the powers. He pointed out

"that Austria-Hungary had offered a *dossier* for investigation when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would require an international investigation of the *dossier*, which had been put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in her difference with Serbia, and that Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a great power.

"In the further course of the conversation the minister explained that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary 'to devour Serbia.' Count Pourtalès answered that he did not accept any such intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special interest of the monarchy. The only object of Austria-Hungary was 'to inflict on Serbia justly deserved chastisement.' M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria-Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this even if explanations on this point had been made.

"The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Germany should work with Russia for the maintenance of peace. The German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she naturally fully represented the interests of her ally."

Count Pourtalès telegraphed his Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg that M. Sazonof was very much agitated.

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, to explain to Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the action taken toward Serbia was not a formal ultimatum but "merely a *démarche* with a time limit," which if not acceded to, would be followed only by Austria's breaking off diplomatic relations and beginning military preparations.

"If Serbia were to give way only under the pressure of our military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she should make good the expenses which we had incurred; as is well known, we have already had twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilize because of Serbia."

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a report of his interview

with Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna. The prince had stated that St. Petersburg was apprehensive that the *démarche* might take the form of humiliating Serbia, and this would have an echo in Russia.

"I explained . . . the danger, not only to the integrity of the [Dual] Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the great Serbian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and not least the Russian, would apparently be threatened if the idea took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national weapon could be continued with impunity.

"I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory, but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Government."

Russia. M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, to ask Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the time limit in the note to Serbia be extended, as it left to the powers insufficient time for conciliation.

"Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

"In this case, if the powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Serbian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations."

M. Sazonof communicated this message to London, Rome, Paris, and Belgrade, with the request that in the three former cases similar instructions be given to their Ambassadors at Vienna.

Great Britain. Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, that he had said to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, that it was a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings.

"The murder of the archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one state address

to another independent state a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.

"I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

"I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation."

Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had sought an interview with him, as the Austrian step clearly meant war. At the interview M. Sazonof had said Austria's demands were provocative and immoral, some being impossible of acceptance. She would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted. He hoped Great Britain would proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France. France would fulfill the treaty obligations with Russia, besides supporting Russia in diplomatic negotiations. Sir George said, that personally he did not expect any declaration of this kind from Great Britain. Direct British interests were nil in Serbia, British public opinion would not permit Great Britain to enter war on her behalf. M. Sazonof replied that the general European question was involved, and Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

Evidently Sazonof wants Great Britain to join in warning Austria that her intervention in Serbia will not be tolerated. But suppose Austria nevertheless wars in Serbia, will Russia forthwith declare war on Austria?

A council of ministers is being held this afternoon on mobilization. At a meeting to-morrow, where the czar will preside, a decision will be come to.

Sir George said the important thing to do was to influence Austria to extend the time limit. M. Paléologue, the French

Ambassador, was either set on war or was bluffing, and whichever it was, our only chance for peace was to adopt a firm and united attitude. There was no time to carry out Sir George's suggestion. The British Ambassador then said that his Government might perhaps warn Austria that war would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and so make it hard for Great Britain to keep out of the conflict. M. Sazonof answered that Great Britain would sooner or later be dragged into war; war would be rendered more likely by Great Britain if she did not make common cause with Russia and France. President Poincaré and M. Viviani, President of the Council, being in Russia, it appears as if Austria had taken advantage of their absence from France to present their ultimatum to Serbia. Even though we do not join them it seems that France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that he was assured by M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, that Russia would not be indifferent to the humiliation of Serbia. Prince Koudacheff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had told Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the note to Serbia was unusual and peremptory, and drawn up in a form rendering its acceptance impossible. The count replied that the Austro-Hungarian Minister would leave Belgrade at the time set if Serbia did not yield. The Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake. The step taken by the Government was approved by the country. He did not think objections would be raised by the powers.

Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris of a conversation with M. Cambon, the French Ambassador at London, over an intended interview that afternoon of Sir Edward with Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador.

"I would say to the ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any power interested in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the

ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburg.

"M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Serbia, for the Serbians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for any mediation.

"I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it.

"M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other powers.

"I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Serbia.

"He replied that it was so."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed the results of the interview with Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin. Sir Edward's statements were those he had decided upon in his interview with M. Cambon. The prince replied that Austria might be expected to move unless Serbia accepted her demands *in toto*. He suggested that Serbia ought in no case to give a negative reply. A partial acceptance if sent at once might afford an excuse to Russia against immediate action. Sir Edward asked Sir Horace to submit his views to the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, to advise the Serbian Government, if it were proved that any Serbian officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murder of the archduke, to give Austria the fullest satisfaction in the way of expressing concern with regret. For the rest they must reply as they consider best

in Serbian interests. The only chance for Serbia is to reply favorably to as many points in the note as the time limit allows.

"Serbian Minister here has begged that his majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as expressed above, to Serbian Government.

"I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action."

France. M. Viviani, French Prime Minister, who had not yet seen the note to Serbia, wrote from Reval, Russia, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, to send on to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, the following information and instructions:

In M. Viviani's conversation with M. Sazonof, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, it was agreed to prevent Austrian intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia of a kind which Serbia might consider as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. This view should be communicated to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and moderation counseled him, cooperation in this should be secured from the Russian and British Ambassadors in Vienna. The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had informed M. Sazonof that his Government might join in a *démarche* (proceeding) for removing any danger to general peace, and telegraphed his Government to that effect. M. Sazonof has instructed Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to secure such cooperation. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, should be instructed to back him up. M. Bienvenu-Martin sent to M. Viviani, returning from Russia on *La France,* and to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Rome, and the French Minister at Belgrade, the contents of the Austrian note to Serbia, and an account of the circumstances of the delivery of the copy to the French Government by Count Szécsen, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. M. Berthelot, French Political Director, in obedience to M. Bienvenu-Martin's instructions, had confined himself to stating to the ambassador

that painful feeling would be aroused in French public opinion by the categorical nature of the note, and its short time limit, and its presentation to Serbia at a time when the President and Prime Minister of France were at sea, and could not exert, in cooperation with statesmen of other powers not directly interested, that soothing influence on Serbia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace.

In a letter to these ambassadors and minister, and to the French Minister at Stockholm (M. Thiébaut), M. Bienvenu-Martin said that M. Berthelot, French Political Director, had advised M. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris, that Serbia should play for delay by asking that she be allowed time to verify the evidence, presumably one sided, adduced by Austria in support of her note to Serbia, and, above all, that Serbia should declare herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

Italy had not been consulted by Austria in regard to the note, nor even informed of it. M. Bienvenu-Martin informed these same representatives at foreign courts (with exception of the Ambassador at Vienna), that M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna had reported that the chief fear of the Austro-Hungarian military party was that Serbia would accede to the demands of Austria-Hungary; and that M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna thought his Government would give way on all points save the order to the army dictated to King Peter, dismissal of officers suspected by Austria, and interference by foreign officials in Serbia. M. Yovanovitch hoped that a discussion on these points might be started which would lead to arbitration by the powers.

The feeling in Germany was warlike. The tone of the press there was intimidating, particularly toward Russia. Italy was exercising moderating influence at Vienna.

M. Bienvenu-Martin notified the French representatives at the above courts and at Vienna of the contents of the circular note of the German Government delivered him that day by Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador. Said the Acting Foreign Secretary:

"I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Sarajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia; the Serbian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution.

"I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Serbia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration; that of Serbia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guaranties for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

"I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined; if Serbia gave obvious proof of good will it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

"Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Serbia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localize the dispute.

"Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple *mise en demeure*, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views."

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin, that official German opinion supported Austria in not abating her demands on Serbia. There was pessimism in diplomatic circles. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Broniewsky, had bitterly noted the presentation of the note to Serbia during the absence from France of the French President and Prime Minister. He thought that William II, in his desire to support the monarchic principle, was becoming less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

In a second letter M. Cambon reported an interview he had just had with Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State. The secretary supported the Austrian note to Serbia. It was that country's domestic affair, and he hoped that the dispute would be localized.

"I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as

he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

"Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said: 'It is only because we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me.'

" 'Certainly,' I replied, 'but if Peter I humiliates himself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Serbia; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna?' I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active support. Finally I remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Serbia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe.

"Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement (*un peu d'émotion*) on the part of Serbia's friends, but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

" 'I have no doubt,' I then said to him, 'that Russia would endeavor to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter?'

"The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated that the difficulty must be localized. He asked me if I really thought the situation serious. 'Certainly,' I answered, 'because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off.'

"All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past has weakened the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were violent.

"An article which appeared in the 'Lokal Anzeiger' this evening shows also that at the German Chancellery there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must stand together. I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously.

"It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Serbia."

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin as follows:

"The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his ministers could not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the [French] Republic and

the president of the council have been able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation.

"Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Serbia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

"On the other hand, M. Sazonof [Russian Prime Minister] assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German powers from emphasizing their provocative attitude."

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin an interview with Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Cambon and Grey were agreed that everything must be done to avert the crisis, and that the British Cabinet should take the initiative in offering mediation by the four powers not directly interested, Great Britain, France, Russia and Germany. If Germany assented, time would be gained, and this was the essential point.

"Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lichnowsky the proposal. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague [Count Benckendorff] who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have dispatched her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

"Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumors of a naval entente between Russia and Great Britain, by the czar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavor in Germany.

"The Under-Secretary of State [Sir Arthur Nicholson] has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the dispatch of the ultimatum.

"The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events.

"However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the *démarche* upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey."

In a second letter M. Cambon reported receipt of the details of the Austrian ultimatum.

"In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.

"Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semiofficial intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack."

M. Bienvenu-Martin informed the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome, and the Ministers at Stockholm and Belgrade of M. Cambon's report, and his (Bienvenu-Martin's) willingness to cooperate in the proposed conciliatory action at Vienna.

Belgium. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg

"that the Government had under consideration an address to the powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfill the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

"The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

"In these circumstances I have proposed to the King [Albert] and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

"I inclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

"I shall inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions.

"This telegram will be dispatched when the order is given for the mobilization of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution."

The note inclosed said that Beligum had "most scrupulously" observed the obligations of neutrality imposed on her by the treaties of April 19, 1839, and would "strive unflinchingly" to fulfill them whatever the new circumstances might be.

"The friendly feelings of the powers toward her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers.

"All necessary steps to insure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobi-

lized and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defense of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defense. . . .

"These measures are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfill her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those powers."

On the following day this notification was also sent to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

SATURDAY, JULY 25, 1914

Austria-Hungary. Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed from Lembach to his Under-Secretary, Baron von Macchio, that Russia through Prince Koudacheff, its Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, was pressing for an extension of the time limit in the note to Serbia, and that he should tell the prince this would not be granted, but that, even after the severance of diplomatic relations, Serbia could have peace by complying unconditionally with Austria-Hungary's demands—in which case, however, she must pay the cost of Austro-Hungarian military measures.

Later, Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Prince Koudacheff had based his request on the powers being taken by surprise in the demands on Serbia, and therefore that Russia should have time to consider the evidence in the case as presented in Austria-Hungary's *dossier*. These grounds, said Count Berchtold, rested on a mistaken hypothesis.

"Our note to the powers was in no way intended to invite them to make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by international courtesy. . . . We regarded our action as concerning us and Serbia alone."

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, telegraphed Count Berchtold that the Serbian Cabinet on the evening of the 24th and morning of the 25th had been preparing its reply to the note, and would deliver it before the

time limit expired; preparations were being made by the Serbian Government and army for removal into the interior; foreign legations expected to have to follow; the Russian Legation was already packing up; the Austro-Hungarian Legation were ready to leave Belgrade by the 6.30 p. m. train.

Count Berchtold notified Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg, on the same day, that, in case of Russia reconsidering her position, and refusing to be swept away by the bellicose elements, he, with the support of his German colleague, Count Pourtalès, a close understanding with whom was presumed, should impress upon M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Austria-Hungary, in event of war with Russia, would not stand alone.

"That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during the last forty years, and by the historical fact that our gracious emperor has won for himself the glorious title of 'Protector of the Peace.'

"We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and national independence would prove to the advantage of our relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the dominant political interests of Russia.

"Any further toleration of Serbian intrigues would undermine our existence as a state and our position as a great power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, convinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action against Serbia, whatever form it takes, is conservative from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our position in Europe."

In a supplementary telegram Count Berchtold instructed Count Szápáry to explain that point five in the note to Serbia was interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and not to infringe on the sovereignty of Serbia.

"By 'collaboration' in point five, we are thinking of the establishment of a private 'Bureau de Sûreté' at Belgrade, which would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian establishments in Paris and in cooperation with the Serbian police and administration."

Other ambassadors were similarly instructed.

Russia. M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Sazonof reporting that he and the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had urged the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, to advise Vienna to extend the time limit in the ultimatum to Serbia. Von Jagow had telegraphed the request to Vienna, but, owing to the absence of Count Berchtold from the capital, feared that it would have no result.

"Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Serbia. I replied that a great power such as Austria could give way without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative."

M. Sevastipoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, telegraphed M. Sazonof that, at his instance, the French representative at Vienna had been instructed to request extension of the time limit in the note to Serbia.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed that the British representative at Vienna had been instructed to do the same, and also to discuss the prevention of hostilities should the request be refused.

M. Sazonof replied by telegraph that in event of hostilities, Russia counted on Great Britain siding at once and definitely with France and Russia in order to maintain the European balance of power for which Great Britain had constantly intervened in the past and which would certainly be compromised by the triumph of Austria.

Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, handed a note *verbale* to M. Sazonof, denying the press report that the action of Austria-Hungary was instigated by the German Government, and declaring that this government "had no knowledge of the text" of the note to Serbia before it was presented, and had "exercised no influence upon its contents."

"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers justified.

"Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the very beginning of the Austro-Serbian dispute, that this conflict should be localized."

The same statement was made to the French Government by Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, and to the British Government by Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador. The count asked Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that the British Government bring conciliatory pressure on Austria.

"Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long as complications existed between Austria and Serbia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilization would lead to Russian mobilization, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all the powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action."

Great Britain. Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, hoped that Serbia's reply to Austra-Hungary's demands would be sufficiently conciliatory to obviate extreme measures, but said that there would be revolution in Serbia if she were to accept the demands in their entirety.

Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szápáry, did not quite correspond with information received from German quarters, which information came too late to affect negotiations at Vienna.

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Serbia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Serbian Minister [Dr. Spalaikovitch] yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Serbian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the powers to help them. His excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the powers.

"If Serbia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

"On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace, his excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present *status quo* in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.

"I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

"I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war."

Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had instructed the German Ambassador at Vienna, Herr von Tschirscky, to present to Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grey's suggestion of an extension of the time limit for Serbia's reply, but that, owing to Berchtold's absence from the capital, the extension would probably not be granted. Von Jagow did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but admitted that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbia "could not swallow" certain of Austria-Hungary's demands.

"I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localized. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand

that the last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

"Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge."

Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that the Italian Secretary General was of opinion that Austria will only be restrained by Serbia's unconditional surrender, and that there was reliable information she intended to seize the Saloniki Railway.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that the language of the Vienna press left the impression that the surrender of Serbia was neither expected nor desired, and that Minister for Foreign Affairs Berchtold would go to Ischl to communicate Serbia's reply as soon as it was presented.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey a forecast of the Serbian reply, and said that the Serbian Government considered it would be fully satisfactory unless Austria-Hungary was determined on war at any cost. In a supplementary telegram he said that in view of his French and Russian colleagues not having received instructions from their governments and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Serbian reply, he had not offered advice to the Serbian Government. It was highly probable the Russian Government had urged the utmost moderation on Serbia.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that he could not promise to Russia more than he had done.

"I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

"The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other. In this event, the only

MONUMENTS TO VICTORY

AND

NATIONAL HEROES

PETROGRAD · BELGIUM · PARIS · BERLIN · COVETED PORTS
MEN WHO REPRESENT AMERICA IN UNQUIET CAPITALS

The Arc de Triomphe de l'Etoile, Paris, whose magnificent reliefs commemorate the victories of Napoleon I. The finest streets of the city radiate from this monument

James Watson Gerard, the American Ambassador to Berlin, who handled difficult diplomatic situations to the satisfaction of his countrymen and Germany and earned the gratitude of the Allies by his work in behalf of their countrymen in Germany

Brand Whitlock, American Minister to Belgium, who chose to remain at Brussels when the Belgian Government was removed to France. His tact has made it possible for him to aid the Belgian people greatly while working harmoniously with German officials

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The Lion of Waterloo, in the center of the battlefield where Napoleon lost his empire and his liberty in the great war of a century ago. It is about ten miles from Brussels

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The monument to Peter the Great in Petrograd. This ruler, the creator of modern Russia, won the Baltic Provinces and planned that Russia should include Constantinople

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The famous Brandenburg Gate, at the west end of the Linden in Berlin. Pedestrians pass through the colonnades at the sides. The gate is surmounted by the Quadriga of Victory

chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly cooperate.

"No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The cooperation of Germany would, therefore, be essential."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to the same effect, and also that Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, was personally favorable to the suggestion of mediation between Austria and Russia, which he thought Austria might be able with dignity to accept.

"I impressed upon the ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, the text of the Russian telegram sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna asking the Austro-Hungarian Government for extension of the time limit for the Serbian reply, and protesting that a refusal would be "against international ethics." Grey asked Bunsen to support the Russian position.

"I trust that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, an account of an interview of M. Boschkovitch, Serbian Minister at London, with Sir Arthur Nicholson, British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

"He mentioned that both the assassins of the archduke were Austrian subjects—Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Serbia, and that the Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the

latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual."

France.—M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, an interview with Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.

"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious. . . . He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's *démarche*.

"He thinks that, if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its dispatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganization.

"He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two Allies."

M. Bienvenu-Martin notified the French Legations at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Stockholm of a visit made him by Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador, to protest against an article in the *Echo de Paris* calling his *démarche* of yesterday a "German threat." M. Berthelot, French Political Director, assured him that no private information had been given out by the Foreign office of the *démarche*, and that the article merely showed that the proceeding was known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that M. Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had been unfavorably impressed by the evasive replies and recriminations of Count de Pourtalès, the German Ambassador, over the note to Serbia.

"The ministers will hold a council to-morrow with the czar presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. 'We must avoid,' he said to me, 'everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Serbia, we ought not to break off negotiations.' "

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin the interview with Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, by Sir Horace Rumbold.

"The British Chargé d'Affaires inquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was dispatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

"Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one."

Later in the day M. Cambon reported the interview between Herr von Jagow and M. Broniewski, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

"M. Broniewski, like myself, has heard the rumor that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Serbia until she had received complete satisfaction. 'One knows,' he said to me, 'what this word "satisfaction" means.' M. Broniewski's impressions of Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic."

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had sent his Government's request of an extension of the time limit for the Serbian reply to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in two telegrams, one addressed to him on his journey, and the other to Ischl, his destination. The prince does not expect any result. Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, had received "with icy coldness" the prince's expostulation that the submission by Austria-Hungary of grievances against Serbia without permitting time for their examination was not consonant with international courtesy. The baron replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

"The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Serbia: it will accept no intervention from any power until the blow has been delivered and received full in the face by Serbia."

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the request by the Russian Government

for Italy's cooperation in securing from Austria-Hungary an extension of the time limit for the Serbian reply, came too late for action thereon, owing to the absence from Rome of the Prime Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, notified M. Bienvenu-Martin that report had come from Vienna of rupture between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

"Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of 'Hurrah' for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the *Siegessaül* [column of victory], the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism. . . .

"In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

"I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only power which might be listened to at Berlin.

"Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg, and London will not succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front."

At the hour of expiration of the ultimatum to Serbia, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Prince Koudacheff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had presented alone his request for an extension of the time limit, it seeming to the representatives of the other powers useless to support him when there was no time to do so.

"At the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Serbian Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate."

SERBIA'S REPLY TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE

A few minutes before 6 p. m., July 25, 1914, the Serbian Government made its reply to the Austrian note.

This declared that no attempts had been made, or declarations uttered, by responsible representatives of Serbia, tending to subvert Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since March 31, 1909, when protests against the annexation of these

countries made in the Skupshtina (Serbian Parliament) were cut short by declarations of the Serbian Government. It drew attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary had since then made no complaint in this connection save in regard to a school book, concerning which it had received an entirely satisfactory explanation.

"Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring countries.

"For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the 'Journal officiel,' on the date of July 26, the following declaration":

[Here follows the declaration required by Austria-Hungary, with alterations intended to lessen the humiliation, which changes will be noted in a following criticism by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office.]

"This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal army in an order of the day, in the name of his majesty the king, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

"The Royal Government further undertake:

"1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupshtina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of

which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article XXII of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article XXII of the Constitution.

"2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the 'Narodna Odbrana' and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the 'Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

"3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

"4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

"5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

"6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of June 28, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigations in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

"7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to June 28 was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the inquiry at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later inqury.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

"9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile toward the [Dual] Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

"10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

"If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on March 31, 1909."

The Austro-Hungarian Minister to Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, to whom the reply was delivered, on comparing it with his instructions, declared it unsatisfactory, and informed M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister that he and his legation would leave Belgrade that evening, turning over his Government's interests in Serbia to the German Legation. Rupture in diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, he said, was a *fait accompli.* These events M. Pashitch reported on the same day to all the Serbian Legations abroad, and further announced:

"The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina to meet on July 27 at Nish, whither all the ministries with their staffs are proceeding this evening. The crown prince has issued, in the name of the king, an order for the mobilization of the army, while to-morrow or the day after a

proclamation will be made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia being attacked."

The Austrian Minister left Belgrade at 6.30 p. m. for Vienna. On the same day the Serbian Minister at Vienna, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, received his passports. On the same day the Serbian reply was presented at Vienna, where it received the following commentaries by the Foreign Office:

"The Royal Serbian Government limits itself to establishing that since the declaration of March 31, 1909, there has been no attempt on the part of the Serbian Government to alter the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

"Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.

"The assertion of the Royal Serbian Government that the expressions of the press and the activity of Serbian associations possess a private character and thus escape governmental control, stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states and even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain control of the state. This is also provided for by the Serbian institutions. The rebuke against the Serbian Government consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy.

"The assertion [that the Serbian Government was ready to proceed against all persons in regard to whom it would receive information] is incorrect. The Serbian Government was accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The Serbian Government has done nothing in this direction."

The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office objected to the alterations made by Serbia in the declaration published in the official organ. This, in the Serbian reply, began:

"The Royal Serbian Government condemns every propaganda which should be directed against Austria-Hungary.

"The Austrian demand reads: 'The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. . . .' The alteration of the

declaration as demanded by us, which has been made by the Royal Serbian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Serbian Government reserves itself the subterfuge for later occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propaganda, nor recognized the same as hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy, whence it could deduce further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the present one."

Objection was similarly made to the alteration in the Serbian apology for acts of Serbian officers. This apology began:

"The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government certain Serbian officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda.

"The formula as demanded by Austria reads: The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and functionaries . . . have participated. . . . Also with this formula and the further addition 'according to the declaration of the Imperial and Royal Government,' the Serbian Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the future.

"Austria had demanded:

"1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and contempt for the [Dual] Monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

"We wanted to bring about the obligation for Serbia to take care that such attacks of the press would cease in the future.

"Instead Serbia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means toward this end, viz:

"(*a*) A law according to which the expressions of the press hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy can be individually punished, a matter which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as the individual prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposition, therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the least guaranty for the desired success.

"(*b*) An amendment to article 22 of the constitution, which would permit confiscation, a proposal which does not satisfy us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us. For we want the *obligation* of the Government to *enforce* it and that has not been promised us.

"These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive as we are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws by the Skupshtina everything would remain as it is, except in the event of a possible resignation of the Government.

"2. The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy fills the entire public life of Serbia; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve if the Serbian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we have asked besides:

"To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another name and in another form.

"In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly silent, so that through this semiconcession there is offered us no guaranty for putting an end to the agitation of the associations hostile to the monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana.

"3. The Serbian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda hostile to the monarchy in the public instruction of Serbia while it must know that the textbooks introduced in the Serbian schools contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies.

"Furthermore the Serbian Government has not fulfilled a part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition desired by us: 'as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well as the means of instruction'—a sentence which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the monarchy is to be found in the Serbian schools.

"4. By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure, the Serbian Government limits its assent to those cases, in which these persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile to the monarchy, which is generally not punishable in Serbia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point.

5. The Serbian reply declared that Serbia was willing to permit that cooperation of officials of the [Dual] Monarchy on Serbian territory which does not run counter to international law and criminal law.

"The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Serbia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.

"6. The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable:

"1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the outrage.

"2. Participation by Imperial and Royal Government officials in the examinations ('rècherchè' in contrast with 'enquête judiciaire').

"3. It did not occur to us to let Imperial and Royal Government officials participate in the Serbian court procedure; they were to cooperate only in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for the investigation.

"If the Serbian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between 'enquête judiciaire' and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out,

highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the cooperation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great numbers) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.

"(In reference to arrest of conspirators).

"7. This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Serbian service on June 28. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his whereabout, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade.

"9. (In reference to expressions made against Austria-Hungary by Serbian officials in interviews.)

"The Royal Serbian Government must be aware of the interviews in question. If it demands of the Imperial and Royal Government that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfill the demand.

"10. (In reference to referring the dispute to arbitration of the powers.)

"The Serbian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time."

BEGINNING OF MOBILIZATION

The diplomatic issue now became that over mobilization by Russia: whether it was a threat of war against Austria-Hungary alone, or against Germany as well.

On the day of Serbia's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note, July 25, 1914, General von Chelius, German honorary aide to the Czar, sent a telegram to Kaiser William II through the German Foreign Office, which stated:

"The maneuvers of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The maneuvers have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austria are being made."

On the same day Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"Grey has told the German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] that in his opinion Austrian mobilization must lead to Russian mobilization, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only

one means of reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian mobilizations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilization, and should at once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilize. He has therefore, as a first step, made an inquiry on this point at Berlin."

On the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky:

"The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take the position that this question must be localized by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as Allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers."

SUNDAY, JULY 26, 1914

Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Szápáry, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, that Count Pourtalès the German Ambassador, upon hearing reports of measures for Russian mobilization, had called the attention of M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the fact that nowadays mobilization was a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure.

"For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control.

"M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honor that the reports on the subject were incorrect; that up to that time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, and perhaps Kazan and Moscow."

M. Suchomlinoff, Russian Minister for War, had immediately after this, summoned Major von Eggeling, German Military Attaché, and confirmed M. Sazonof's assurance in detail. As reported by the major, he said:

"For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan,

which face Austria, would be mobilized. In no circumstances will mobilization take place on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. . . . I gave the Minister for War to understand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by us, but that we should also consider mobilization against Austria to be in itself extremely threatening."

Russia. M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed the Ambassador at Rome to persuade the Italian Government to act in the interests of peace by bringing influence to bear on her ally, Austria-Hungary, and by opposing the view that the dispute with Serbia could be localized. Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to the help of Serbia. M. Kasansky, Acting Consul at Prague, telegraphed that Austro-Hungarian mobilization had been ordered. M. Sazonof reported to M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, an interview just held with Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.

"After discussing the ten demands addressed to Serbia, I drew his attention to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if the Serbian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for example, points one and two could not be carried out without recasting the Serbian press law and associations law, and to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina. As for enforcing points four and five, this might lead to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof.

"In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to the statements of Szápáry, is as much desired by Austria as by all the powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of July 23 in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Serbia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner."

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy. The Ambassador at Berlin was requested to communicate the contents of the telegram to Secre-

tary of State von Jagow, and express to him the hope that he would advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.

M. Sevastopoulo, Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, telegraphed M. Sazonof that, when M. Berthelot, French Political Director, informed Count Szécen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum, the count did not conceal his surprise that it was not accepted.

In a supplementary telegram he said M. Berthelot was convinced that Germany's aim, in her negotiations at Paris, was to intimidate France to mediate with Russia.

M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, reported noisy demonstrations there by a crowd largely composed of Austrians on news of Austrian mobilization, and anti-Russian shouting by the crowd before the Russian Embassy. No precautions were taken by the police.

Germany. Major von Eggeling telegraphed to the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, that it was certain mobilization had been ordered for Kiev and Odessa; it was doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere in Russia.

The Chancellor telegraphed to Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at Paris, after Austria-Hungary's official declaration to Russia, that she had no intention to annex the territory of Serbia or to impair her sovereignty, the responsibility for a European war rested on Russia.

"We depend upon France, with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe, that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favor of peace."

This telegram, without the final sentence, the Chancellor sent also to Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, adding in the latter case that a call was expected for the several classes of Russian reserves, which would be equivalent to mobilization, and, in this case, Germany would be forced to mobilize, much against her wish.

"We ask [Great Britain] to act on this understanding at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis."

Count Pourtalès was directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

"But mobilization means war.

"As we know the obligations of France toward Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Serbian Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Serbia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."

Great Britain. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at London, that it was the belief of the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirscky, that Russia would keep quiet during the chastisement of Serbia. Everything, said Von Tschirscky, depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily the pressure of a few newspapers; pan-Slav agitation in Russia was over; intervention in behalf of Serbia would open up Swedish, Polish, Ruthenian, Rumanian, and Persian questions; France, too, was not in a condition for war. Von Tschirscky doubted that Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia, would assert it by action; Germany knew what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary; the Serbian concessions were all a sham, as proved by the Government previously ordering mobilization and preparing to retire from Belgrade.

Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that Kaiser William was returning suddenly that night (from a sea trip to Norway) on his own initiative, and that the Foreign Office regretted it, owing to the speculation and excitement which it would cause. Herr von Zimmermann, German Under-Secretary of State, had inferred from Russia's statement that she would intervene in case of annexation of Serbian territory; that she would not do so if no territory were taken.

In a supplementary telegram Sir Horace informed Sir Edward that Von Zimmermann considered that the communication by Germany to Austria-Hungary of his (Grey's) hope for a favorable view of the Serbian reply implied that the German Government associated itself to a certain extent with Grey's hope. It did not, however, go beyond this.

Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that Austria-Hungary had informed the Italian Government that the Austro-Hungarian Minister to Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply a declaration of war.

Sir Edward telegraphed to Sir Rennell Rodd, Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, and Sir Horace Rumbold, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to ask if the ministers of foreign affairs at their courts would instruct their ambassadors at London to meet with him in conference "to discover an issue which would prevent complications," and to suggest that the ministers should instruct their representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to request a suspension of military operations pending results of the conference.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that the Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, just returned from leave of absence, thinks Austria-Hungary determined on war, and that it will be impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He and the French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, doubt whether the principle of Grey's suggestion that Russia, being an interested party, is entitled to have a say in a purely Austro-Serbian dispute, would be accepted by either Austria-Hungary or Germany.

France. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified M. Viviani, Prime Minister on board *La France*, and the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of the events at Belgrade on Saturday, July 25, ending with the order for mobilization given by the Serbian Government, which had retired to Kragoujewatz, whither it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers. At Vienna people "soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia 'will not hold firm.'"

"It must not be forgotten that Italy is bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance only if she has been consulted beforehand.

"From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof [Minister for Foreign Affairs] has advised Serbia to ask for British mediation. At the Council of Ministers on the 25th, which was held in presence of the emperor, the mobilization of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilization, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.

"In London the German *démarche* was made on the 25th, in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Serbian Minister [M. Boschkovitch]. The communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the powers will have time to intervene.

"At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State [Von Jagow] to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires [Broniewsky] is unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to associate himself with a *démarche* at Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences.

"A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us.

"At Vienna, the French Ambassador [Dumaine] has not had time to join in the *démarche* of his Russian colleague [Schebeko] for obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia; he does not regret it, this *démarche* having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it.

"A note from the British Embassy has been delivered to me: it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg [Buchanan] and M. Sazonof and M. Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four powers who are not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to England, France, Germany, and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British

Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or Allies.

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, informed M. Bienvenu-Martin that a telegram from Vienna stated that diplomatic rupture between Austria and Serbia had taken place, and Austria was proceeding to military measures. Marquis di San Giuliano, the Prime Minister, would return in two days to Rome. The president of the council had given Barrère the impression that Italy would be neutral in case of war, maintaining "an attitude of observation." M. Salandra [afterward Prime Minister] had said that:

"'We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together with the English.' M. Salandra stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment."

M. Barrère, in a second telegram, said that the greater part of Italian public opinion was hostile to Austria "in this serious business."

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed that M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had advised Serbia to ask for British mediation. M. Bienvenu-Martin thereupon telegraphed M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires, London, that France desired British mediation. M. Paléologue reported at greater length M. Sazonof's determination to secure a peaceful solution to the Serbian question.

"'Up to the last moment,' he declared to me, 'I shall show myself ready to negotiate.'

"It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to come to a 'frank and loyal explanation.' M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, making clear the insulting character of the principal clauses. 'The intention which inspired this document,' he said, 'is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Serbian anarchists; but the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible.' He concluded: 'Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result.'

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion

of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

"This friendly and semiofficial interposition of Russia between Austria and Serbia has the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to succeed."

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, had returned in haste from Russia, whither he had gone on the assurance of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the demands on Serbia would be acceptable. Other Austrian officials had taken the same attitude, which is quite usual in Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, and this procedure has greatly increased the irritation of the Russian Government.

M. Schebeko, seizing advantage of the delay of mobilization, will make a proposal calculated to test the value of the pacific declarations of Germany. This is for a conference of the British, French, Italian, and German Ambassadors, to refuse concurrence in which the German Ambassador, M. Tschirsky, will almost certainly have to plead the principle of "localizing the conflict."

"My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigor with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military action."

M. Bienvenu-Martin reported to M. Viviani on *La France* and to the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome the rupture of diplomatic relations with Serbia made by Austria-Hungary.

"According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon [at Berlin], the British Ambassador [Sir Edward Goschen] thinks that there is a slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but, as this question ceased to be localized, to intervene with England, France, and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace."

M. Bienvenu-Martin also reported that Italy, not having been consulted about the note to Serbia, felt herself relieved from all responsibility in the grave step taken by her ally. He also told of his answer to the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, who sought France's influence to keep Russia from war, that Germany

ought, on her side, to influence Austria-Hungary to avoid military operations leading to the occupation of Serbia, and the consequent intervention of Russia.

"The ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany 'that the question concerned only Austria and Serbia,' I told him that mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg would be the act of the four other powers less interested in the question.

"Herr von Schoen then intrenched himself behind his lack of instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburg alone."

After his visit to M. Bienvenu-Martin at 5 p. m. Baron von Schoen went to see M. Berthelot, the Political Director, to have an account of the interview officially published in the press. The article he proposed indicated the most amicable cooperation between France and Germany in the furtherance of European peace.

"The Political Director replied at once, 'Then, in your opinion, every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Serbian note or will enter into conversations with the powers on this matter?' The ambassador having . . . vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the terms of the suggested 'note to the press' were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident.

"To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so.

"M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a position without any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note! What responsibility was the German Government assuming and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing between Austria and the powers,

after what might be called the absolute submission of Serbia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe!

"The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilization which she was undertaking make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Serbian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St. Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note, and had approved it only after its delivery; she thought, however, that Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, represented it to be.

"He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, the 'spectre' of a conference: a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

"In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the minister if it appeared to him opportune to communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone."

M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, telegraphed to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the whole German fleet in Norway was returning to Germany. M. d'Annoville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg, telegraphed that the last four classes of [German] reservists set at liberty had been forbidden to leave their places of residence, and were ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the *Kommandutur* at any moment.

MONDAY, JULY 27, 1914

Austria-Hungary. On the following day Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of a conversation he had just had with M. Sazonof.

Mistaken impressions, he told the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, were abroad in Russia as to Austria-Hungary's intentions.

"We were credited with wishing to push forward into Balkan territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even to Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe our action merely as the starting point of a preventive war against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action was self-preservation and self-defense against hostile propaganda by word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity. It would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian interests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we were absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set before us, and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable. As, however, the action under discussion was action in self-defense, I could not conceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, of whatever kind they might be.

"M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy in its form. He had since been studying it, and if I had time, he would like to look it through once more with me. I remarked that I was at his service, but was not authorized either to discuss the text of the note with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks were of interest. The minister then took all the points of the note in order, and on this occasion found seven of the ten points admissible without very great difficulty; only the two points dealing with the collaboration of the Imperial and Royal officials in Serbia and the point dealing with the removal of officers and civil servants to be designated by us, seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form. With regard to the first two points, I was in a position to give an authentic interpretation in the sense of your excellency's telegram of the 25th instant; with regard to the third, I expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand. Moreover, matters had already been set in motion. The Serbians had mobilized on the previous day, and I did not know what had happened since then."

Count Berchtold instructed Count Szápáry by telegraph to declare to M. Sazonof that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia remained localized, the [Dual] Monarchy did not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort.

Count Szögyény, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that M. Sazonof had explained to Count Pourtalès, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that he could not guarantee that Russia had not begun mobilization, and confessed that certain necessary military measures were being taken.

"Major von Eggeling, German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg, reports that the Russian Minister for War, M. Suchomlinof, has given him his word of honor that not a man or a horse has been mobilized; however, naturally, certain military precautions have been taken; precautions which, as the German military attaché adds . . . 'are to be sure pretty far-reaching.'"

Count Berchtold informed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg of the annotations of his Government to the Serbian reply.

Germany. The Austro-Hungarian Consulate at Kovno, Russia, telegraphed to the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, that Kovno had been declared to be in a state of war.

The German Minister at Berne, Switzerland, telegraphed to the Chancellor that the French Fourteenth Corps had discontinued maneuvers.

Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to the Chancellor at Berlin:

"The Secretary of War [Suchomlinof] has given me his word of honor that no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilni, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilization against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even against Austria as very menacing."

The Chancellor telegraphed Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London:

"We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict."

This was supplemented by a telegram:

"We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sazonof for a direct parley with Vienna."

Russia. Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, to know if his views on direct discussions with the

Vienna Cabinet harmonized with Grey's scheme for mediation by the four powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany.

"Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome."

M. Sazonof replied by telegraph that the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, had asked him if the Russian Government thought it desirable for Great Britain to take the initiative in convoking a conference in London of the four powers.

"I replied that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.

"If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict.

"I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial [Russian] Cabinet."

This telegram Benckendorff communicated to Grey on the following day.

M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome that the Serbian reply exceeded expectations in its moderation and desire to afford the fullest satisfaction.

"We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Serbia."

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to M. Sazonof that the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, had confirmed his declaration of yesterday in writing, i. e.:

"1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbors no designs against the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet.

"2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

"3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia.

"Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced that these

steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France."

In a supplementary telegram M. Isvolsky stated that the telegram from Belgrade to Paris, giving the Serbian reply to the Austrian note was delayed twenty hours, and that the telegram from the French Foreign Office containing instructions to support Russia's representations, which had been sent at the special urgent rate at 11 a. m., July 25, 1914, only reached its destination at 6 p. m.

"There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraph office."

M. Isvolsky telegraphed to M. Sazonof:

"The Austrian Ambassador [Count Szécsen] has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Bienvenu-Martin] that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take 'energetic action' with the object of forcing Serbia to give the necessary guaranties. The minister having asked what form such action would take, the ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Serbian frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war."

M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed M. Sazonof:

"I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Von Jagow] to support your proposal in Vienna that Szápáry [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg] should be authorized to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with Pourtalès [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] that, as Szápáry had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way."

In a second telegram M. Broniewsky gave an account of an interview just held between Von Jagow and the French Ambassador, M. Jules Cambon:

"Cambon endeavored to induce Von Jagow to accept the British proposal for action in favor of peace to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon

suggested that these powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following terms: 'To abstain from all action which might aggravate the existing situation.' By adopting this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Serbia might be avoided. Jagow refused point blank to accept this suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the ambassador, who emphasized, as a good feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the powers, thanks to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente—a matter of which Jagow himself had often complained—was avoided."

Nicholas II telegraphed his reply to the appeal for Russian aid made by Prince Alexander of Serbia on July 25, 1914. It assured the prince of the Czar's cordial sympathy with the Serbian people.

"The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my government are using their utmost endeavor to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your highness and the Royal Serbian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Serbia.

"So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our earnest wish we are not successful, your highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia."

M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Sazonof of a conversation he had had in the absence of Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary.

"I drew his attention to the unfavorable impression produced in Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Serbia, which it was quite impossible for any independent state, however small, to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis, has counted on the probable localization of the dispute with Serbia, and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the face of such conduct has caused a great sensation here."

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed to M. Sazonof:

"Grey has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to question him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Petersburg, that such action

ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also pointed out that the Serbian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the Serbian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question.

"In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention of crushing Serbia. Looked at in this light, the question might give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all the powers would be involved.

"Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preservation of peace was in question; but, in the contrary event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action."

Great Britain. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at London, that he had consulted with his colleagues about the mediation of the four powers, and the impression was that the note to Serbia was intentionally drawn to make war inevitable, and, until Serbia had been punished, no proposals for mediation would be listened to.

"This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

"I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of his majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now."

Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Grey that France had accepted his proposal for the four-power mediation, and sent the necessary instructions to her representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

"Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so."

Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Grey:

"Secretary of State [Von Jagow] says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion,

be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] to exchange views with Count Berchtold [Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs]. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

"In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany.' He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

"Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation."

Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed Grey an account of the interview between M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in which Sazonof had pointed out that Austria's demands entailed entire revision of existing Serbian laws, and were moreover incompatible with Serbia's dignity as an independent state; and that it would be useless for Russia, being an object of suspicion in Austria, to offer her good offices.

"In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria."

Sir George told M. Sazonof that Grey could do nothing more than he had promised on the 24th inst., and that the Russian Minister was mistaken if he believed that peace would be promoted by Great Britain telling Germany it would have to deal with her as well as with Russia and France if it supported Austria by force of arms.

"Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce Germany to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that, until the issue of the imperial ukase, no effective steps toward mobilization could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it were deferred too long."

In a supplementary telegram Buchanan reported that M. Sazonof had proposed

"that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg."

Grey telegraphed to Sir Eward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador at London, had informed him that Germany accepted in principle the four-power mediation, reserving its right as ally to help Austria if attacked.

"He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

"I have replied that the Serbian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State [Von Jagow] has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Serbian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Serbian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Serbian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.

"I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Serbian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged."

Grey telegraphed Buchanan at St. Petersburg, referring him to the above, and informing him that the Russian Ambassador

at London, Count Benckendorff had told him [Grey] that the impression prevailed in German and Austrian circles that Great Britain would stand aside in event of war. This the Ambassador deplored for its adverse effect on peace.

Grey informed Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, of his interview just held with Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London.

"Mensdorff said that the Austrian Government, very reluctantly and against their wish, were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Serbia. . . . We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guaranties for the definite suppression of the Serbian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria.

"As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as self-defense. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localizing the fight, if necessary.

"Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Serbian subversive aims was a matter of self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Serbian territory or aggressive designs against Serbian territory.

"I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Serbian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

"Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Serbian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Serbians had refused the one thing—the cooperation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guaranty that in practice the Serbians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

"I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Serbian reply, they could make war upon Serbia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Serbia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the Serbian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out [as an instance of this] that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. It seemed to me that the Serbian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Serbia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative."

Grey informed Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, that the Italian Ambassador at London had stated to Sir Arthur Nicholson, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that Italy agreed to the four-power conference, and that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, would recommend to Germany the suggestion that Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia should suspend military operations pending result of the conference, and would inquire what procedure Germany proposed to be followed at Vienna.

Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, sent Grey a memorandum of M. Bienvenu-Martin's, French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, as to steps to be taken to prevent hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, has been requested to act in concert with the British Ambassador there in Grey's plan. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassador at London, has been appointed France's representative in the four-power conference. France is ready to instruct her representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce these governments to abstain from hostilities pending the results of the conference.

But M. Bienvenu-Martin considers success of the conference

depends on the action Berlin is willing to take at Vienna beforehand.

Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Grey an account of an interview just had with M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sazonof was conciliatory and optimistic.

"Sazonof said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place."

France. M. Farges, Consul General at Basle, Switzerland, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, that German officers on leave in this district had been ordered to return to Germany, and that owners of motor cars in Baden had been ordered to be ready to place them at the disposal of the Government, and secrecy enjoined as to the order under penalty of fine. People at Basle are uneasy, and banking facilities restricted.

M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the German and Austrian Ambassadors there were letting it appear that they were sure Great Britain would preserve neutrality in case of war. Sir Arthur Nicholson, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had, however, assured Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, that Great Britain was free to intervene if she judged it expedient. To make this understood in Germany, nevertheless, that Government should be made to know for certain that they will find Great Britain by the side of France and Russia.

M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed that M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was using conciliatory language to the ambassadors, and was restraining the press, particularly in recommending great moderation toward Germany.

M. Bompard, Ambassador at Constantinople, telegraphed from Therapia that the Turks were delighted at the misfortunes of Serbia, and thought that Russia will not intervene in her favor under circumstances which would extend the war beyond Serbia and Austria.

"The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects, and that she will make Serbia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance."

M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported the interview between Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador.

"The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilization of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty [Winston Churchill] took this measure quietly on Friday on his own initiative; to-night Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia."

M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported news from St. Petersburg of the willingness of Russia to stand aside if Serbia appealed to the powers. Accordingly Sir Edward Grey will proceed with his plan of a conference, on the understanding that, pending its results, Russia, Austria, and Serbia abstain from active military operations. To this the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky is favorably disposed. Later M. de Fleuriau reported that the Serbian Minister at London, M. Boschkovitch, had not yet received instructions to ask for British mediation. Possibly telegrams to that effect had been stopped on the way.

M. Bienvenu-Martin having received Sir Edward Grey's proposal for the four-power conference, authorized M. de Fleuriau to represent France in it. He repeated his conviction of failure of the conference unless Germany's influence were first exercised pacifically at Vienna.

"I have also noted, during Baron von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when the words 'mediation,' 'intervention,' 'conference' were used, and was more willing to admit 'friendly advice' and 'conversations.'"

De Fleuriau reported that Italy had accepted intervention by the powers to prevent military operations. Germany had not yet replied to Italy's request for information as to procedure to be followed with regard to Austria-Hungary.

M. Barrère, Ambassador at Rome, reported his interview with the Marquis di San Giuliano, in which that Minister for Foreign Affairs had repudiated his reported approval of the action of Austria-Hungary.

"He is convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London, and he believes that if any power can determine Berlin in favor of peaceful action, it is England.

"As for Italy she will continue to make every effort in favor of peace. It is with this end in view that he had adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the ambassadors of those powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Serbian dispute."

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported the interview of Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador, with the German Secretary of State, and said that Herr von Jagow's language confirmed that of Baron von Schoen at Paris.

M. Bienvenu-Martin then notified the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of his interview with Count Szécsen, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and the memorandum he had submitted criticizing the Serbian reply to the Austrian note.

Belgium. Baron Beyens, Minister at Berlin, reported to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels, the diplomatic situation at the German capital. Germany had not replied to the British proposal. "The decision rests with the emperor."

TUESDAY, JULY 28, 1914

Serbia. Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, this day telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister, that Serbia's reply to the Austrian note being unsatisfactory, the Austro-Hungarian Government

"was compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia."

M. Pashitch telegraphed this news from Nish to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd, gave the information officially to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"I have the honor to inform your excellency of this regrettable act, which a great power had the courage to commit against a small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity for my country to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilized world and severely punished by Russia, the protector of Serbia.

"I beg your excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from the whole Serbian nation before the throne of his majesty."

Austria-Hungary. An official communication was given to the press at Vienna summarizing the Government's criticism of the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hungarian note.

"Inasmuch as the Austro-Hungarian demands constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the reestablishment of a permanent peace in the southeast of the [Dual] Monarchy, the Serbian reply is considered to be insufficient.

"That the Serbian Government is aware of this appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due, and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobilization."

Count Szögyény, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that Germany had declined to take part in the four power-conference

"on the ground that it is impossibe for Germany to bring her ally before a European court in her settlement with Serbia."

Baron von Müller telegraphed to Count Berchtold from Tokyo, Japan, that the semiofficial Japan "Times" concludes a leading article on the Serbian question with the statement that Japan is on the best of terms with the three great powers concerned, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, while it is in no way interested in Serbia. He infers that, in case of war, Japan would, as a matter of course, maintain strict neutrality.

Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Szögyény at Berlin the report made by Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, of his interview on the 27th with Sir Edward Grey.

"I believe that I need not specially point out to your excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to our conflict with Serbia, appears, in view of the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events."

Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Mensdorff in London to explain to Sir Edward Grey in detail the *dossier* of charges against Serbia accompanying the Austrian note, and

"make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive Europe without giving any guaranty for the future.

"As the Serbian Government knew that only an unconditional acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Serbian tactics can easily be seen through: Serbia accepted a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required to fulfill her promises. In conversing with Sir Edward Grey, your excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilization of the Serbian army was ordered for the afternoon of July 25 at three o'clock, while the answer to our note was delivered just before the expiration of the time fixed—that is to say, a few minutes before six o'clock. Up to then we had made no military preparations, but by the Serbian mobilization we were compelled to do so."

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, an account of an interview with the Russian Ambassador at Vienna. Count Berchtold had informed M. Schebeko of Austria-Hungary's inability to concur in Russia's proposal to take the Serbian reply to the Austrian note as a starting point for an understanding between the disputants.

"No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more impossible because, as the ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared against Serbia.

"In reply to the explanations of the ambassador, which culminated in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike action, but that, on the contrary, we should only increase it, I gave him some insight into our present relations toward Serbia which made it necessary, quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our restless neighbor, with the necessary emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was directed against the existence of the [Dual] Monarchy. The attitude of Serbia after the receipt of our note had further not been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because Serbia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilization, and in so doing had already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this, however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were opened against us on the Hungarian frontier on the part of Serbia. By this act

we were deprived of the possibility of maintaining any longer the patience which we had shown toward Serbia. The establishment of a fundamental but peaceful amelioration of our relations toward Serbia had now been made impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Serbian provocation in the only form which in the given circumstances was consistent with the dignity of the monarchy."

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff in London of his interview with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna. Bunsen had explained Sir Edward Grey's position.

Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Szögyény at Berlin to communicate to the German Chancellor or Secretary of State the following information:

"According to mutually consistent reports, received from St. Petersburg, Kiev, Warsaw, Moscow, and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an assurance on his word of honor, as has also the Russian Minister of War, that mobilization has not up to now been ordered; the latter has, however, told the German Military Attaché that the military districts which border on Austria-Hungary—Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan—will be mobilized should our troops cross the Serbian frontier.

"Under these circumstances I would urgently ask the Cabinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilization of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most extensive military countermeasures, not only by the [Dual] Monarchy but by our ally, the German Empire.

"In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken by Germany alone; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in conjunction with Germany.

"Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all that is involved in a threatening attitude."

Russia. Consul General at Fiume telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, that a state of siege had been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and reservists of all classes called out.

M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed M. Sazonof that the local papers had not published *in extenso* the Serbian reply, evidently being well aware of the calming effect it would have on German readers.

M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed that the Austro-Hungarian order for general mobilization had been signed.

M. Sazonof telegraphed the ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome:

"In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action, and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against Serbia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Serbia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans."

Germany. The Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, confidentially reported to the Government of Germany that the evidence presented by Austria-Hungary was conclusive of the complicity in the crime of Sarajevo of members of the Serbian Government and army, and the existence of organized Serb propaganda against the Dual Monarchy. Austria-Hungary therefore was justified in her action as well as demands against Serbia.

The Chancellor telegraphed to Count Pourtalès, Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

"We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Serbia in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter."

Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, telegraphed to the German Chancellor that the British mediation proposal, "owing to the opening of hostilities by Serbia," was "belated." William II at 10.45 p. m., sent the following message to Nicholas II:

"I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians murder their own king and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless you will agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

"On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by you and your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view

of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

"Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin."

Great Britain. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, sent to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at London, the text of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia. This was followed by the statements:

"Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Serbia a formal declaration, in conformity with Article I of the convention of October 18, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.

"In bringing the above to notice of his Britannic Majesty's embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms of the conventions of the The Hague of October 18, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of February 28, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Serbia."

The French Embassy informed Sir Edward Grey that France accepted his four-power mediation proposal, and had appointed M. Paul Cambon her representative in the conference.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, communicated to Grey a telegram from M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which stated that his interviews with the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, confirmed his impression that Germany would support Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude.

"The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their ally. . . .

"This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.

"It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin."

Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed Grey that M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, realized the position of Great Britain.

"He quite appreciates the impossibility for his [British] majesty's Government to declare themselves 'solidaires' with Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not one

affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Serbian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

"The German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance."

Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed that, after conference with his French and Italian colleagues, he had found that the German Secretary of State von Jagow had, while refusing to take part in the proposed conference, said to all of them that he desired to work with their Governments for the maintenance of general peace.

"We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can be objecting only to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us."

Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed that Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared Austria-Hungary could not delay military proceedings against Serbia, and so declined the mediation proposed.

"Prestige of [Dual] Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict."

The Ambassador supplemented this in a longer telegram, giving details of his interview with Count Berchtold.

Sir Rennell Rodd, Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed an account of an interview the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister, had just had with the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires.

If explanations were given of mode in which Austrian agents would intervene under Articles V and VI of the note to Serbia, Serbia might still accept the whole note. This explanation could be imparted, without loss of dignity to Austria, through the powers, who might then advise Serbia to accept the note without conditions.

The Marquis pointed out a passage in the Austrian note which had been misinterpreted by Serbia, and so might be used as a basis for settlement, namely, that regarding cooperation of Austrian agents in Serbia; this was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, telegraphed from Nish that he was urging greatest moderation on the Serbian Government pending mediatory efforts by the powers.

"Two Serbian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Serbian merchant vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova."

This was supplemented by a telegram that war had been declared by Austria.

Grey telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, explaining the nature of his proposed four-power conference. No suggestion would be put forward that has not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia. A direct exchange of views between these countries is preferable to all other methods. This the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, is reported to have offered. If Austria accepts, the situation will become less critical. Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, reports that his Government has counseled moderation at Vienna. This is very satisfactory.

A supplementary telegram read:

"German Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress."

Grey telegraphed to Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, his satisfaction over prospect of direct exchange of views between Russia and Austria, and readiness to facilitate this if he knew what Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, proposes that the ministers at Belgrade do.

"Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to cooperate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape."

Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed report to Grey on the 28th inst. of an interview with the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor was most anxious for Germany and Great Britain to work together for European peace, as they had successfully done in last preceding crisis. He could not accept the four-power proposal, since the conference would look like an "Areopagus" of two groups of two

powers, each sitting in judgment on two other powers, but this refusal should not militate against his strong desire for effective cooperation. He was doing his best at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get both powers into friendly direct discussion, but if, as reported, Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, this would put it out of his power to continue preaching moderation at Vienna. Austria, who was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures; so, if war results, Russia will be responsible.

Goschen remarked that surely part of the responsibility rested on Austria for refusing to accept the almost wholly compliant reply of Serbia, or to admit it as a basis for discussion. The Chancellor repeated his views about the Serbian question being wholly Austria's affair, with which Russia had nothing to do.

"Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."

Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg report of interview with M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who thanked Grey for his language to Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador. Sazonof was pessimistic. Buchanan asked him if he would be satisfied with Austria's assurances to respect Serbia's integrity and independence. He replied: Not if she attacked Serbia; that he would order mobilization on the day that Austria crossed the Serbian frontier.

"I told the German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès], who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria."

Ambassador de Bunsen at Vienna telegraphed news of Austria's declaration of war against Serbia, and her declination of Russia's suggestion of direct discussion with her. Russian Ambassador Schebeko said that the London conference now offered the only prospect of European peace, and he was sure Russia would agree to it.

"So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned."

France. M. Viviani, French Prime Minister, on board *La France,* telegraphed to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, approving his course. Russia was not responsible for present situation, and Germany could not with grace refuse to counsel Austria, provoker of the crisis. He approved Grey's proposition of a four-power conference.

"The action of the four less interested powers cannot . . . be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert it also at Belgrade, which means, in fact, between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers, on the other hand, to Germany a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the *démarche* by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Serbian and without any general character."

M. Bienvenu-Martin replied to M. Viviani that Germany had taken no sincere action to hold back Austria, and was opposing Grey's plan of mediation, thus dooming it to failure. Austria will take energetic measures to-morrow, the 29th, to compel Serbia to give them the satisfaction demanded, and has begun to mobilize.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassador at London, reported interviews of Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, with Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador. The first continued to maintain that the Serbian reply was unacceptable. The second talked like Baron von Schoen at Paris; he desired Great Britain to use moderating influence at St. Petersburg. Grey replied that this would be embarrassing, as Russia had been moderate from the beginning, especially in her pacific advice to Serbia. It was at Vienna that action was necessary, and there Germany's help was indispensable. News had come from St. Petersburg of the first direct conversations between Russia and Austria, that of Prime Minister Sazonof and Ambassador Szápáry. Secretary Grey and Under-Secretary Nicholson were doubtful of its success, since M. Sazonof had not yet secured assent to a revision of the Serbian note by the two cabinets.

"In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should

be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four powers.

"The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir E. Grey has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his *démarche* for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Serbia opens a new phase of the question."

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported an interview of Herr von Jagow with M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires, in which the German Secretary of State was hopeful that Austria-Hungary's willingness to converse with Russia after the expiration of the ultimatum to Serbia might discover an issue from present difficulties. M. Cambon adds that perhaps Austria is seeking time to make her preparations.

Von Jagow told Cambon that he could not accept the kind of conference proposed by Grey, and that success depended on mediation taking another form.

"I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favorable result."

Von Jagow had made the same suggestion to the British and Italian Ambassadors.

"My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic *démarche* at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

"In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any *démarche* at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the powers to avoid war could be brought about.

"We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favor of peace compatible with our engagements toward our ally; but to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes."

M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported that M. Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had said "Austria is unwilling to converse."

M. Dumaine, Ambassador to Vienna, reported the declaration of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British Ambassador Bunsen that discussion of the Serbian reply was useless, war having been declared. M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, said that his position from the beginning had been that the question was not of localizing the war, but preventing it. The declaration of war made *pourparlers* by the four powers extremely difficult. The German formula, "Mediation between Austria and Russia," is unsuitable, since it assumes a dispute between the two empires which does not exist.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1914

Austria-Hungary. On the following day, July 29, 1914, Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, telegraphed the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and Rome, copies of a memorandum which he had handed Herr von Tschirscky that day in answer to the *démarche* made by the German Ambassador, namely that the Austro-Hungarian Govment should accept the Serbian reply either as satisfactory or as a basis for discussion. The memorandum declared that, contrary to the assumption of Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, at whose instance the proceeding was taken, the parts of the Serbian reply which were not accepted by Austria-Hungary are the most vital in it, since they contain the guarantees for Serbia's observance of the demands made on her. So, too, it is an assumption that the action taken against Serbia was directed against Russia and her influence in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary does not charge Russia with instigating the Serbian propaganda against the Dual Monarchy. Our feelings toward her are entirely friendly.

Austria-Hungary cannot adopt the desired attitude toward the Serbian reply since this has already been outstripped by events. Our declaration of war was made after vainly waiting three days for Serbia to abandon her point of view.

"If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between the great

powers, and with a view to the localization of the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Serbian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this."

Ambassador Szécsen telegraphed from Paris that France was unmistakably making military preparations.

"The German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen is commissioned to discuss these preparations with M. Viviani [French Prime Minister] to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way the two countries, although they are only striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilization, which would be dangerous.

"Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict between us and Serbia should remain localized, and that in this Germany relies on the support of France."

Ambassador Szögyény telegraphed from Berlin that as early as the 26th inst. the German Government had warned Russia that mobilization by her would cause German mobilization.

"Another telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures of mobilization Germany might be brought to mobilize."

Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was greatly excited over the alleged disinclination of Austria-Hungary to continue exchange of ideas with Russia, and over her mobilization, which is supposed to be more extensive than necessary, and therefore directed against Russia.

I visited the minister to explain matters. I agreed that you (Count Berchtold) had declined to discuss the wording of the Serbian reply, but made it clear that we had no intention, if the conflict remained localized, to annex Serbian territory or touch her sovereignty, and would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

M. Sazonof accepted the assurance in regard to territory, but on the point of sovereignty said he must continue to believe that our coercion of Serbia would result in her becoming our vassal, and that this would upset equilibrium in the Balkans, and so

involve Russian interests. Russia recognized our legitimate interest there, but its assertion must be acceptable to Serbia.

"I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Serbian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests, so that I was obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.

"I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilized eight corps for action against Serbia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavored to convince the minister that any unprejudiced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia.

"I indicated to the minister that it would be well if his Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, as it was urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a speedy end should be put to the military competition which now threatened to ensue on account of false news.

"The minister further informed me that a ukase would be signed to-day, which would give orders for a mobilization in a somewhat extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most official way that these troops were not intended to attack us. They would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make it clear that this was a measure of precaution, since we, who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilization, have now also already so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's attention to the impression which such a measure would make in our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the harmlessness (!) of this measure."

Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szögyény at Berlin that the Russian military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan were being mobilized. The ambassador should notify the German Government of this, and emphasize that if Russian mobilization were not stopped without delay, Austria-Hungary would follow with general mobilization. The representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary at St. Petersburg, and, if necessary, at Paris, will declare the same to the Government there. We will not be diverted from our course against Serbia.

Germany. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador von Schoen at Paris to protest against the military measures France was reported to be taking, and say that, in answer, Germany would have to proclaim "a threatenting state of war."

"While this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace."

Count Pourtalès, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, had an interview with M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he reported as follows:

"The secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Serbia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Serbia, *i.e.*, an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration —a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war—should therefore be permitted to attend to its affairs with Serbia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance toward the sovereignty of Serbia.

"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Serbian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the secretary the magnitude of this danger.

"It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the idea that Serbia could not now be deserted by Russia."

THE KAISER AND CZAR EXCHANGE TELEGRAMS

William II received the following telegram from Nicholas II:

"I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge you in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far."

The Kaiser replied at 6.30 p. m.:

"I have received your telegram and I share your desire for the conservation of peace. However, I cannot—as I told you in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an 'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

"According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between your Government and Vienna, an understanding which—as I have already telegraphed you—my Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which—upon your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted."

The Czar answered:

"Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented to-day by your ambassador to my minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship."

Russia. M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had told him no news had been received from Vienna as to acceptance of private discussions at St. Petersburg—that it was very difficult for him to produce any effect at Vienna, especially openly.

"He even added, in speaking to Cambon, that were pressure brought to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with a *fait accompli.*"

Von Jagow had heard from St. Petersburg that you were more inclined than previously to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. I replied that this had been your position from the outset, provided the compromise were acceptable not only to Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that Russian mobilization on the frontier, of which he had heard, would render an understanding with Austria difficult as she was making no preparations on the Russian frontier. I replied that I had information in my possession that Austria was mobilizing there, and that our mobilization was in reply to it. But our measures, I assured him, were not directed against Germany.

Alexander, Crown Prince of Serbia, telegraphed to Nicholas II his gratitude for the sympathy extended to Serbia by the Czar on the 28th inst.

"It fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Serbia is secure now that it is the object of your majesty's gracious solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment which bind Serbia to Holy Slav Russia."

M. Sazonof telegraphed Ambassador Isvolsky at Paris that Germany had decided to mobilize if Russia did not cease her military preparations.

"As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances that declaration is especially valuable to us.

"[Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.]"

Great Britain. Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, reported to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that Russia would mobilize at Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. This information had been officially sent by Russia to Berlin on the 28th inst., with assurances that there was no aggressive intention against Germany. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, was still retained at Vienna. Direct communication between Austria and Russia was, however, at an end, owing to Austria's declaration of war on Serbia. Mediation by London Cabinet to end Austria's military operations was therefore most urgent. If these continued Austria would crush Serbia while the conference was continuing.

Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Grey a report of his interview with Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.

He informed me that Austria-Hungary refused to act on your suggestion to make the Serbian reply the basis of discussion. Von Jagow had written to Vienna that, though Serbia had shown a certain desire to meet the demands made on her, nevertheless

he appreciated Austria's requirement of guaranties which were absent in the Serbian reply:

"The Chancellor then went on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guaranties, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

"He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

"As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

"From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his excellency hoped that you would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications."

Goschen reported an interview with the German Secretary of State. Von Jagow was much depressed.

"He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli*. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague [M. Jules Cambon] who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to under-Secretary of State [Herr von Zimmermann] that, when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you."

Grey replied to Goschen, stating his appreciation of the Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's language, and assuring the Chancellor that Great Britain would strain every effort for peace.

"If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his excellency for having saved the peace of Europe."

Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg telegraphed to Grey that partial mobilization had been ordered. This said M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was against Austria-Hungary

alone. Direct conversation with St. Petersburg having been refused by Vienna, he would urge Germany that a return be made to your proposal of a four-power conference.

Ambassador Bunsen reported from Vienna that there was no step to be taken at present to stop war with Serbia, to which the Austro-Hungarian Government was fully committed by the declaration of war, and Kaiser Francis Joseph's appeal to his people, published this morning. In the opinion of Duke d'Avarans, the Italian Ambassador, Russia might be quieted by Austria-Hungary making a binding engagement not to destroy Serbian independence nor seize Serbian territory, but this she would refuse to do.

Sir Rennell Rodd, Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed that the Marquis di San Giuliano would urge in Berlin an exchange of views by the powers in London, and suggest that the German Secretary of State propose a formula acceptable to his Government.

"The Secretary for Foreign Affairs remarked that it was difficult to make Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect."

Grey replied to Rodd that the London conference was now impracticable owing to the attitude of Austria-Hungary, and that Italy must now speak at Berlin and Vienna.

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin that the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, said he was endeavoring to make Austria satisfactorily explain at St. Petersburg the scope of her proceedings in Serbia, but information comes from Vienna that Austria declines to discuss the Serbian issue. Germany opposes the four-power conference. I asked her to present her plan to prevent war between Russia and Austria, France and Italy joined with my request.

"Let mediation come into operation by any method that Germany thinks possible if only Germany will 'press the button' in the interests of peace."

Goschen telegraphed back to Grey that he had had an interview with Bethmann-Hollweg who had just returned from

Potsdam. The Chancellor feared Germany's being drawn into war by Russia attacking her ally.

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

"I questioned his excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however. his excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

"His excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization of his desire.

"In reply to his excellency's inquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty."

Grey informed Ambassador Bertie at Paris of a conversation he had had with M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador.

I told Cambon that I would inform the German Ambassador Prince Lichnowsky, to-day that he must not suppose by my friendly tone that we should stand aside in event of a general war following failure of efforts to maintain peace. However, I warned Cambon that the case of Serbia was not like that of Morocco, in which we had made a special agreement with France, but one in which we did not feel called to take a hand.

"M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other

issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

"He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked."

Grey telegraphed Ambassador Goschen at Berlin of his conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, in which he had pointed out

"that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Serbia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Serbian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the powers to mediate between her and Russia."

In a following message Grey related to Goschen a second conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, in which he told the German Ambassador that, in event of a general war, the issues might be so great that it would involve all European interests, and he should not think that Great Britain would stand aside.

"He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

"I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other powers had to be. . . .

"The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation."

In still another message Grey informed Goschen that he had said to the German Ambassador, in reference to the suggestion of San Giuliano, the Italian Prime Minister of mediation between Russia and Austria, that it would not be mediation to urge

Russia to stand aside and give Austria a free hand to go any length she pleased.

Grey informed Ambassador Bunsen at Vienna that Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Mensdorff, had offered to submit him a long memorandum justifying the action of his government toward Serbia. Grey refused to discuss the Serbian question now that the peace of Europe was imperilled. The greater question settled, the powers might be free to obtain satisfaction for Austria in the lesser.

"In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence."

Bunsen reported to Grey that the news of Russian mobilization was not generally known in Vienna.

France. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, and Constantinople, and the Minister to Serbia, that the Austro-German attitude was becoming clearer.

"Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity of the crime of Sarajevo in order to punish the Serbian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guaranties which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Serbian Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and the other powers and declares that the question is a local one, namely, punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and sure guaranties for the future that the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal assurances given by Austria that she does not seek territorial aggrandizement and that she will respect the integrity of Serbia; in these circumstances the danger of war can come only from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of peace must take place at St. Petersburg alone.

"The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safeguard general peace by common action between the four powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested, and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an *entente* which might result from direct conversations, while they are taking action against Serbia.

"In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should

immediately give their adherence to the British proposal. This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide [Secretary of State] Von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic advantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on Serbia, under the elastic expression of 'guaranties' conditions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandizement was being sought, would in effect modify the status of eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in the near future."

Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Russia would acquiesce in any measures proposed by France and Great Britain to maintain peace. Minister Klobukowski reported from Brussels that the Belgian Government regarded Germany's attitude as enigmatical, and justifying every apprehension.

"It seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.

"The German Government stand 'with rounded arms' ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require; a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here.

"The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonize with the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the country."

Ambassador Dumaine reported from Vienna:

"The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilization of the Eighth Army corps, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilizing; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district.

"There is a rumor that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a general mobilization of their forces on July 30, or August 1. The Austrian Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow."

Ambassador Paléologue reported from Berlin that Austria-Hungary refused direct conversation offered by Russia.

"Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilization which has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilize will be dispatched to-night to

thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria."

Ambassador Jules Cambon reported from Berlin his interview with the German Secretary of State. Von Jagow was awaiting reply from Vienna to his request to hold direct conversation with Russia. He considered that the Serbian reply afforded a basis for negotiation.

"I said that it was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document, inexplicable.

"The Secretary of State then remarked that with eastern nations one could never obtain sufficient guaranties, and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a supervision which Serbia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Serbia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the control of a single power, but that an International Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one, for instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine among other combinations, a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply of Serbia opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture.

"I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could be exercised by the four powers by means of their ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their influence in support of direct conversations."

He gave a summary of the interview between Bethmann-Hollweg and British Ambassador Goschen.

"The attitude of the German Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Ambassador Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the German Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound."

Ambassador Dumaine reported from Vienna that he and his British, Russian, and Italian colleagues agreed that war is now certain between Austria and Serbia since all attempts to avoid it have failed. The Italian Ambassador, Duke d'Avarna, said

"it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions of the [Dual] Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the

Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict."

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informed the ambassadors at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, and Constantinople, and the minister to Serbia, of a semiofficial communication made by the German Ambassador.

Germany, said Baron von Schoen, was continuing its efforts to induce Austria-Hungary to hold direct conversations with Russia, being in no way impeded by her ally's declaration of war on Serbia. Germany did not know Austria's intentions.

A second message was sent to these French representatives abroad reporting an interview of M. Bienvenu-Martin and the Russian Ambassador at Paris.

M. Isvolsky communicated the telegram from Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Berlin, notifying Germany of Russian mobilization in the southern provinces, and the telegrams from Sazonof to London asking Great Britain to use her influence as quickly as possible with Austria to secure cessation of military operations, and stating that he believed Germany was favoring her ally's uncompromising attitude.

Ambassador Barrère at Rome reported that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had been officially informed of the above telegrams.

M. Viviani, who had now reached Paris and resumed his office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, instructed Ambassador Paul Cambon at London to request Sir Edward Grey to renew at Berlin his proposal of four-power mediation, the principle of which had been accepted by both Germany and Russia.

"I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in cooperating in the action of the four powers in favor of peace."

M. Paul Cambon reported that Grey had invited Germany to propose her own formula for peace as acceptable to Great Britain, France, and Italy.

"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said to me that Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia concerning the mobiliza-

tion of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us to realize the intentions of the German Government.

"Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution."

Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg of the notification by the German Ambassador that Russia must stop mobilization or Germany would mobilize.

"The tone in which Count Pourtalès delivered this communication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilization of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria."

Belgium. M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the ministers at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg that the Belgian Government had decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.

"This step should in no way be confused with mobilization.

"Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighboring powers."

THURSDAY, JULY 30, 1914

Austria-Hungary. On the following day Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg his answer to the ambassador's telegram of July 29:

"I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] the various points contained in our note addressed to Serbia which, however, has already been outstripped by recent events. I should also attach special importance, in accordance with the suggestion made to me through M. Schebeko [Russian Ambassador at Vienna], also, to discussing on this occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which affect directly our relations toward Russia. From this it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development in a friendly manner of our relations toward our neighbors, which is so desirable an object."

This was followed by another telegram. Count Berchtold said that he had explained to Russian Ambassador Schebeko what seemed his flat refusal to discuss matters directly with Russia,

which had so hurt the feelings of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"This must rest on a misunderstanding, as M. Schebeko and myself had discussed the practical questions two days before, a fact which the ambassador confirmed with the observation that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation.

"M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Serbia was regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg. He said that we were a great power which was proceeding against the small Serbian state, and it was not known at St. Petersburg what our intentions in the matter were; whether we desired to encroach on its sovereignty, whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or even to crush it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent toward the future fate of Serbia, which was linked to Russia by historical and other bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the trouble to use all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when the conditions afterward imposed by us could not yet be known. But even with reference to these demands they would do everything they could in order to accomplish at any rate all that was possible.

"I reminded the ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasized the fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in Serbia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we only desired to establish a condition of affairs which would offer us a guarantee against being disturbed by Serbia. To this I added a somewhat lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations with Serbia. I also gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how large an extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these circumstances, even though this result might be contrary to the wishes of the responsible authorities.

"I referred to the Russian mobilization which had then come to my knowledge. Since this was limited to the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan it had an appearance of hostility against the [Dual] Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds for this might be, as there was no dispute between us and Russia. Austria-Hungary had mobilized exclusively against Serbia; against Russia not a single man; and this would be observed from the single fact that the first, tenth, and eleventh corps had not been mobilized. In view, however, of the fact that Russia was openly mobilizing against us, we should have to extend our mobilization too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of hostility toward Russia."

Germany. Military Attaché Eggeling at St. Petersburg telegraphed to William II that Prince Troubetzki had said to him yesterday: "Thank God that a telegram from your emperor has come!"

"He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the czar but as the mobilization against Austria had already been ordered and

Sazonof [Minister for Foreign Affairs] had convinced his majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, his majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilization against Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a local war with Serbia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Serbia. Austria-Hungary mobilized against Serbia and not against Russia and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that 'she could not desert her brethren in Serbia' after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilized."

At 1 a. m. the German Kaiser telegraphed to Nicholas II:

"My ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization. I have told you the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Serbia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to your advice and that of your Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which you have intrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon your shoulders, you have to bear the responsibility for war or peace."

HENRY OF PRUSSIA AND GEORGE V

The Czar at once replied:

"I thank you from my heart for your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defense against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner your position as mediator, which I appraise very highly. We need your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us."

Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the Kaiser, telegraphed to the King of Great Britain from Berlin:

"I arrived here yesterday and have communicated what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William, who was very thankful to receive your message.

"William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilization, and that these measures were taken five days ago.

"We have also received information that France is making military preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbors continue their preparations. This would then mean a European war.

"If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, which otherwise appears inevitable.

"Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military preparations of his two neighbors may end in compelling him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenseless."

George V replied:

"I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly desire that such a misfortune as a European war—the evil of which could not be remedied—may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe."

Russia. M. Strandtman, Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, telegraphed from Nish to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, that Prince Regent Alexander had yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all the Serbian Ministers, on Austria's declaration of war against Serbia.

M. Sazonof telegraphed to the ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome:

"The German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès], who has just left me, has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give—that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia—and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action:

"'If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations.'

"Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations."

Ambassador Swerbeiev telegraphed from Berlin that the order for the mobilization of the German army and navy had just been issued. He followed this with a telegram stating that Secretary of State von Jagow had just telephoned him that the news was false:

"the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to be ready for all eventualities, and they were put on sale in the afternoon, but they have now been confiscated."

Ambassador Swerbeiev telegraphed from Berlin to M. Sazonof that he had presented the minister's telegram of July 29 to Secretary of State von Jagow, who "declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal."

Great Britain. Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed from Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs:

"Russian Ambassador [Schebeko] hopes that Russian mobilization will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Serbia will not be crushed, but she would undertsand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Serbian territory.

"The French Ambassador [Dumaine] hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna [Tschirsky] is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

"Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Serbian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity.

"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he indorses every line of it."

Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg to Grey of an interview with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"M. Sazonof said that German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès] had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Serbian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

"M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

"German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 a. m., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula.

" 'If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to stop all military preparations.'

"Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilization."

Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin to Grey:

"Secretary of State [Von Jagow] informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's [German Ambassador in London] telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilization against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilized against Serbia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.

"He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave—a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador

FORGING THE WEAPONS OF MODERN WAR

AT THE

WORKS AT ESSEN, LUBECK, CREUSOT AND SKODA,
IN GERMANY, FRANCE AND AUSTRIA



Cutting bars of steel in the Schneider works at Creusot, France. In organization and output these French munitions factories rival the famous Krupp works at Essen

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A scene in Press Works No. II, at Essen. The activity of the men and the relentless power of the mighty machines they guide typify Germany's power in war



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Cutting a great plate of steel with the monster hydraulic shears in the Krupp works, where war supplies are turned out with unceasing rapidity

Official French Photograph

Pouring molten steel into moulds in the French munitions works, which are not surpassed by their rivals in Germany and Austria

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Smelters and coke ovens at Luebeck, Germany, where iron ore from Sweden is prepared for making swords and bayonets for the German army

Official French Photograph

A fascinating picture showing sprays of molten metal in the French munitions works at Creusot, France

Official French Photograph

Finishing accurately a great plate of steel in the wonderfully organized gun works at Creusot

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Austrian artillerymen are mounting a great 30.5 centimeter (12-inch) siege gun, which they have brought up in sections. They are under actual fire from the Russian positions

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A scene in Open Hearth Works No. VI at Essen. In these great Krupp factories Germany's marvelous machines of war were made

[Jules Cambon] yesterday—Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilized they would have to mobilize on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

"His excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

"He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done."

Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris to Grey the report of Germany's request to Russia to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilization.

"The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

SIR EDWARD GREY REFUSES TERMS OF NEUTRALITY

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin in answer to his telegram of July 29:

"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

"What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

"From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power, and become subordinate to German policy.

"Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

"The chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

"Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem

to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the chancellor contemplates.

"You should speak to the chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeeded in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object his majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will.

"And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her Allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the powers than has been possible hitherto."

Grey telegraphed Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg:

"German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] informs me that German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Serbian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while powers endeavored to arrange that Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides.

"Russian Ambassador [Count Benckendorff] has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs], as quoted in your telegram of July 30, and fears it cannot be modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the powers would examine how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Serbian sovereign rights or independence.

"If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Serbian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other powers did the same.

"It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs."

Grey wrote Ambassador Bertie at Paris enclosing a copy of a letter he had written to Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, on November 22, 1912, and of the agreement of which M. Cambon had just reminded him. The letter was as follows:

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them."

Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin to Sir Edward Grey:

"The Chancellor [Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg] told me last night that he was 'pressing the button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise."

France. M. Viviani, Prime Minister, informed the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and London that Germany had notified Russia of her decision to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military preparations.

"M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, declares that in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as imminent; that she counts on the help of France as an ally; and that she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and France without loss of time.

"France is resolved to fulfill all the obligations of her alliance.

"She will not neglect, however, any effort toward a solution of the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversation entered into between the powers which are less directly interested still allows of the

hope that peace may be preserved; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defense, which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces.

"Yesterday, in the late afternoon, the German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of the republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret and that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them.

"I answered that the French Government had not taken any step which could give their neighbors any cause for disquietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted."

Ambassador Paléologue reported from St. Petersburg that, in deference to the desire of M. Viviani, no pretext be offered Germany for general mobilization, the Russian General Staff had suspended all measures of military precaution.

"Yesterday the chief of the staff sent for the Military Attaché of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honor that the mobilization ordered this morning was exclusively directed against Austria.

"Nevertheless, from an interview which he had this afternoon with Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador], M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received the same impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor William.

"Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German army and navy.

"In giving me this information Mr. Sazonof added that the Russian Government are continuing none the less their efforts toward conciliation. He repeated to me: 'I shall continue to negotiate until the last moment.'"

Ambassador Jules Cambon reported from Berlin of the official recall of the press announcement of German mobilization, but added that his apprehension of the plans of Germany was not diminished thereby.

"It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presidency of the emperor decided on mobilization, and this explains the preparation of the special edition of the 'Lokal Anzeiger,' but that from various causes (the declaration of Great Britain that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams between the czar and William II) the serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.

"One of the ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw Herr von Zimmermann at two o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary of State, the military authorities are very anxious that mobilization should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless, up to the present time the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilization, had been successfully prevented. In any case mobilization may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the 'Lokal Anzeiger,' a paper which is usually semiofficial, premature news calculated to cause excitement in France.

"Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the measures for mobilization which can be taken before the publication of the general order have already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilization first in order to attribute the responsibility to us."

M. Viviani instructed Ambassador Paul Cambon at London to inform Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of the following facts of French and German military preparations, to show that, "if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps."

"Although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred meters from the frontier, along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometers from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.

"By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

"In order to be convinced of this, it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before.

"In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reenforced by units transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Trèves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.

"The arming of the frontier defenses (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries, and strengthening of wire entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures.

"The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.

"Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor cars only circulate with permits.

It is the last stage before mobilization. None of these measures has been taken in France.

"The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole Sixteenth Army Corps from Metz, reenforced by part of the Eighth from Trèves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the Fifteenth Army Corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

"Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier."

FRIDAY, JULY 31, 1914

Austria-Hungary. On the following day Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed the ambassador at Berlin, Count Szögyény, an account of the discussion on the 30th inst. between Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the German Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky.

The ambassador was instructed to thank Secretary of State von Jagow for communications made to Austria-Hungary

"and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has since arisen through the mobilization of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir Edward Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia.

"The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military countermeasures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude."

Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg:

"The order for the general mobilization of the entire [Russian] army and fleet was issued early to-day."

Count Berchtold notified the Austro-Hungarian representatives abroad:

"As mobilization has been ordered by the Russian Government on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia.

"These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise exclusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions of any kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the former neighborly relations.

"*Pourparlers* between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburg appro-

priate to the situation are meanwhile being continued, and from these we hope that things will quiet down all around."

Ambassador Szécsen telegraphed from Paris that the German Ambassador had officially declared to France

"that if the general mobilization ordered by the Russian Government is not stopped within twelve hours, Germany also will mobilize. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours. The time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at one o'clock in the afternoon."

Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg that he had resumed conversations with M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that the "points of view on the two sides had not materially approximated to each other."

"Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations between the German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès] and M. Sazonof that Russia will not accept as satisfactory the formal declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the territory of the Serbian Kingdom nor infringe on Serbian sovereignty, nor injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere; since then, moreover, a general mobilization has been ordered on the part of Russia."

FURTHER EXCHANGES BETWEEN WILLIAM AND NICHOLAS

Germany. The Czar sent the following telegram to William II:

"I thank you cordially for your mediation, which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations, which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe."

This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following sent by the Kaiser, at 2 p. m.:

"Upon your appeal to my friendship and your request for my aid, I have engaged in mediation between your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place your troops were being mobilized against my ally, Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have

already communicated to you, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defense. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for you and your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by you if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Germany. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador Von Flotow at Rome:

"We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between his Majesty the Kaiser and his Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped, if they have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is becoming continually menacing."

The Chancellor telegraphed to Ambassador Pourtalès at St. Petersburg:

"In spite of negotiations still pending, and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her *entire* army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilization. Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication."

The German White Book states that Count Pourtalès delivered the note at midnight of this day (July 31).

"The reply of the Russian Government has *never* reached us.

"*Two hours after the expiration of the time limit* the czar telegraphed the kaiser as follows:

"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty which I have given to you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it

must be possible to our long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence your urgent reply."

The Chancellor telegraphed to Ambassador Schoen at Paris:

"Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet, therefore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. We have, therefore, declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within twelve hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in eighteen hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary."

William II telegraphed to George V of Great Britain:

"Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilization of his entire army and fleet. He has not even awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged, and he has left me completely without information. I am traveling to Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already taken up their position."

Russia. M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg:

"In spite of the general mobilization, my exchange of views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatsoever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of Serbia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun and to give Serbia a serious lesson, which would constitute a sure guaranty for the future."

Great Britain. Ambassador Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs:

"The [German] Chancellor [Bethmann-Hollweg] informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenseless while time was being utilized by other powers; and if, as he learns the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the emperor.

"His excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the czar had appealed to the emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the emperor was actually conforming to that request."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg that a conversation had taken place between Austria and Russia at Vienna, and that one at St. Petersburg had been authorized by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold, in which Austria would explain the ultimatum to Serbia and discuss any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations.

"I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin his hope for a satisfactory result from the Austro-Russian conversations.

"The stumblingblock hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Serbian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Serbia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided that they did not impair Serbian sovereignty and the integrity of Serbian territory. As your excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Serbian sovereignty and integrity. All powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

"You may sound the Secretary of State [Von Jagow] about this proposal.

"I said to German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it his majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.

"You can add this when sounding Chancellor [Bethmann-Hollweg] or Secretary of State as to proposal above."

Goschen telegraphed Grey that the whole Russian army and fleet were mobilizing, and that *Kriegsgefahr* (imminence of war)

will be proclaimed at once by Germany, as it can be only against her that Russian general mobilization is directed. German mobilization would follow almost immediately.

Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Russian general mobilization had been ordered because of news from Vienna

"that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Serbia.

"Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris:

"I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violates it."

The same telegram, with change of words, "French Government" to "German Government," was sent to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin. Grey asked Sir Francis Villiers, Ambassador at Brussels, to inform M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, of these telegrams, and to say:

"I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other powers to uphold and observe."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris:

"Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

"I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

"We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged his majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.

"I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development."

Bertie telegraphed to Grey that German Ambassador von Schoen had just informed M. Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Germany had addressed an ultimatum to Russia to demobilize, saying that, if it were not complied with

within twenty-four hours, Germany would order complete mobilization on Russian and French frontiers. Viviani wishes to know what, in these circumstances, will be Great Britain's attitude.

"German Ambassador is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow at 1 p. m. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to their attitude."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris that French Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin had reported to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, that uncertainty of Great Britain's intervention was encouraging Germany in her warlike attitude, and that a definite declaration by Great Britain on the side of Russia and France would decide the German attitude in favor of peace.

Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg the following proposition (sent also to France), made by M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Serbian territory; if, recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the great powers to look into the matter and determine whether Serbia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state of her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

M. Sazonof adduced the latest telegram of Nicholas II to William II as proof of sincerity of Russia's attitude. He proposed that the conference of the powers be held in London. He was grateful to Great Britain; if peace were secured, it would be due largely to her efforts; Russia would never forget her firm attitude.

Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin that he had spent an hour with Secretary of State von Jagow, urging him to accept Grey's proposal to make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe of a European war.

"He appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day [the ultimatum].

"I asked his excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in south as well.

He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization was directed only against Austria.

"His excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favorable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the emperor and chancellor.

"He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions—and telegraphic and the telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything."

Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that he had presented to M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grey's inquiry concerning France respecting Belgian neutrality.

"He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances [which may arise from Germany's ultimatum to Russia.]"

The German Embassy is packing up.

In a supplementary telegram Bertie informed Grey:

"French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day."

France. Raymond Poincaré, President of France, informed George V that Germany was pushing forward military preparations, especially on the French frontier, while France had till now confined herself to indispensable precautionary measures.

"We are, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events.

"From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged; if on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the *entente cordiale* would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.

"It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to your majesty's Government, and that, in the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable.

"But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the *entente* between Great Britain and France, the con-

fidence with which our two governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of the impressions of all France.

"It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend.

"We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our ally [Russia] an attitude of moderation from which they have not swerved. In concert with your majesty's Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.

"But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace.

"I beg that your majesty will excuse a step which is inspired only by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely reaffirmed."

Ambassador Paul Cambon telegraphed from London of Grey's reply to Germany on attitude of Great Britain in event of European war.

"The Cabinet Council took place this morning. After having examined the situation, the Cabinet thought that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their intervention; that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality; but that before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to develop.

"I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied.

"Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet on the situation had been formed only at the moment; that the situation might be modified; and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be called at once in order to consider it.

"I am informed that the Cabinet will meet again to-morrow, and that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be certain to renew the discussion.

"The letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to the King of England should be given to the king this evening. This step will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet."

M. Viviani notified the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of France's agreement to the

proposal of Great Britain to Austria-Hungary not to proceed further against Serbia after occupying Belgrade, and to await mediation by the powers.

"Sir E. Grey made this suggestion in the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides."

Russia had already agreed to stop military preparations if Austria eliminated from her ultimatum to Serbia all points which endanger Serbian sovereignty.

"Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government could agree to change their formula in the following way:

"That the powers would examine how Serbia should give complete satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or independence of the kingdom. In case Austria should declare herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to discuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, provided that the other powers acted in the same way."

M. Viviani telegraphed to the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople that negotiations had begun again between Austria and Russia, the latter having accepted the formula advised by Great Britain.

"Nevertheless . . . Germany . . . has not ceased to encourage the uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations continue; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula was declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria before that power had even been consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results can not be obtained, to make war."

Ambassador Dumaine telegraphed from Vienna:

"General mobilization for all men from nineteen to forty-two years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at one o'clock.

"My Russian colleague [M. Schebeko] still thinks that this step is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold [Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs]."

Ambassador Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin that Secretary of State von Jagow had informed him that, in the face of total mobilization by Russia, Germany had declared *Kriegsgefahrzustand* (imminence of war). German Ambas-

sador Schoen had been instructed to ask France what attitude she intended to adopt.

M. Viviani informed Ambassador Paléologue at St. Petersburg of the Schoen interview and the ultimatum he had delivered, to be replied to on the morrow (Saturday) at 1 p. m.

"I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

"I ask you to inform M. Sazonof [Minister for Foreign Affairs] of this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis."

Minister Klobukowski telegraphed from Brussels that *L'Agence Havas* having announced the proclamation of "imminence of war" in Germany, he had assured M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that France would respect Belgian neutrality.

"The Russian and British Ministers appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the British Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey."

Belgium. M. Davignon reported the above interview to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London, giving the exact words of the French Minister:

"No incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act.

"I thanked M. Klobukowski, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our neighboring states of their engagements toward us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic."

M. Davignon telegraphed to all the Belgian Legations abroad:

"The Minister of War informs me that [Belgian] mobilization has been ordered, and that Saturday, August 1, will be the first day."

He telegraphed to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris, that the British Minster had reported Sir Edward Grey's inquiry to France and Germany if they would respect Belgian neutrality, and now formally states that he presumes—

"that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other powers will respect and maintain it.

"I thanked Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality.

"I stated that our military forces, which had been considerably developed in consequence of our recent reorganization, were sufficient to enable us to defend oursleves energetically in the event of the violation of our territory.

"In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilize our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbors and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

"Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communicated to me."

He telegraphed to the same ministers that the German Minister, Herr von Below Saleske, had been informed of Belgium's military measures, and that it was explained to him

"a consequence of our desire to fulfill our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust toward our neighbors."

The German Minister was reminded of instructions his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, had given to his predecessor, Herr von Flotow.

"In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

"The [Belgian] Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

"Since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow [German Secretary of State] had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

"Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed."

SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, 1914

Austria. On the following day Count Szápáry, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, an interview with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. "I first warned M. Sazonof," said the count, "that in interpreting my instructions to him I must leave out of account the new condition of affairs in Vienna created by the general Russian mobilization. I then said that it was a mistake that Austria had declined further negotiations with Russia.

"Your excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned.

"I could only hope that the course of events had not already taken us too far; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the good will of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of good will, but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral *terrain* of London. I replied that your excellency, started from the point of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg, so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the subject with your excellency."

Germany. The German White Book states:

"As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, the kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German army and navy on August 1, at 5 p. m.

"The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg [Count Pourtalès] was instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. [He so declared at 5 p. m.] However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.

"Thus Russia began the war against us.

"The French Prime Minister [M. Viviani] gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1 at 1 p. m., which gave no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p. m., the mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.

"On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities."

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador Lichnowsky at London:

"Germany is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilization occurred to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until Monday, August 3, at 7 p. m., in case England's assent is received by that time."

Lichnowsky answered that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had asked him

"whether I thought I could declare that in the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the French. I told him that I believed that I could assume responsibility for this."

At 5.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed that Grey had just read to him the following unanimous declaration of the British Cabinet:

"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.

"On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the minister answered that that was impossible, but that this question would play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we violated Belgian neutrality in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a great part.

"He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I could think that we would give our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great Britain. The minister said he would make inquiries; he also recognized the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides."

At 8.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed:

"My communication of this morning is canceled by my communication of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is superfluous."

At 7.10 p. m. Ambassador Pourtalès presented at St. Petersburg a note repeating the ultimatum of July 31, and closing:

"Russia having refused to comply with [not having considered it necessary to answer*] this demand, and having shown by this refusal [this attitude*] that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honor, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your excellency as follows:

"His majesty the emperor, my august sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

"* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the Note."

Russia. A secret telegram was sent to Russian representatives abroad announcing Germany's ultimatum delivered at midnight, and stating the German Ambassador's reply to the inquiry if it meant war: "No, but we are very near it."

Ambassador Benckendorff telegraphed from London that Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, hoped that no great power would open hostilities before the formula for a peaceful settlement of the disputes, accepted by Russia and offered to Germany, had been considered. Later he telegraphed that France had agreed to respect the neutrality of Belgium, but that Germany had stated she could give no definite answer to the question.

Ambassador Isvolsky telegraphed from Paris:

"The Austrian Ambassador [Count Szécsen] yesterday visited Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] and declared to him that Austria, far from harboring any designs against the integrity of Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary

military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the guise of *Kreigszustand*, mobilization is in reality being carried out."

Later he telegraphed that, hearing from St. Petersburg of the German order of general mobilization, President Poincaré had signed the order for French mobilization.

"The German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] has just visited Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for moblization issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the powers. He added that mobilization did not necessarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg."

Great Britain. George V sent the following telegram to William II:

"Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of the negotiations between the powers concerned."

Upon receipt of the telegram from the German Kaiser of August 1, King George replied that there must be a misunderstanding in regard to the suggestion of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made to the German Ambassador, respecting avoidance of conflict between Germany and France, while the possibility remained of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia.

"Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his side."

King George replied to the letter of President Poincaré of July 31, assuring him of cooperation of their two Governments in the interest of peace.

"I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercising in not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one."

Grey sent a personal message from King George to Nicholas II in which he appealed to the czar to remove the misunderstanding that had evidently produced the deadlock between Rus-

sia and Germany, and offered his assistance in reopening the conversations between Russia and Austria.

The Czar replied to King George that attempts at peace had been that afternoon rendered futile by Germany's declaration of war, which was wholly unexpected by him, since he had given William II "most categorical assurances that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued."

"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you."

Ambassador Bertie, telegraphing from Paris, reported an interview that morning between the French Political Director and German Ambassador Schoen.

"M. Berthelot pointed out that general mobilization in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilization, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilize if all powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding.

"The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that he had packed up."

Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed from Vienna that a general mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and fleet had been ordered. Minister Villiers telegraphed from Brussels:

"Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs [Davignon] said that they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin that the Hamburg authorities had detained British merchant ships on un-

known grounds, and instructed him to request the German Government to order their release.

"The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible."

Later Grey telegraphed Goschen that he still believed it possible to secure peace if a little respite could be gained before any great power began war. Russia and Austria had at last agreed to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to objections raised to the original Russian formula.

"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope the German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to, in order to avoid tension. His majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."

In following telegrams Grey sent Goschen the Russian formula as amended by himself, and the acceptance of the same by Russia.

Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris information received from President Poincaré of German mobilization, etc., and Russia's desire to continue pacific conversations with Germany.

"The French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg that reliable news had come from Vienna that the Austro-Hungarian Government,

"though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of Russia, would, in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace, be ready to consider favorably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military countermeasures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization.

"You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Sazonof] and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to

preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government."

Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that orders for general mobilization had been given at 3.30 p. m., in answer to the German *Kriegsgefahrzustand* (imminence of war), which, by calling out troops up to war strength, is tantamount to mobilization.

"The Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes."

Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bunsen at Vienna an account of interviews with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in which Count Mensdorff gave him assurances that Austria would not impair the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Serbia, and said that, contrary to report, Austria was willing to continue conversations with Russia.

Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed Grey of an interview that morning with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which M. Sazonof recounted his conversation with Count Szápáry, the Austrian Ambassador, the evening before, in which he proposed the London conference.

Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed Grey from Vienna that the Russian Ambassador, Schebeko, thought that, as mobilization is too expensive to be continued long, Germany will attack Russia at once. Tension now is greater between Russia and Germany than between Russia and Austria. Russia would be satisfied, says Schebeko, with Austria's acceptance of the new formula.

"He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Count Berchtold] that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

"It is the intention of the French Ambassador [Dumaine] to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany."

Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin:

"Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the navy and army, the first day of mobilization to be August 2."

Later he telegraphed that Secretary of State von Jagow had expressed annoyance at detention of British ships at Hamburg, and promised to order their immediate release.

France. M. Viviani, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informed the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome of the two *démarches* made on the previous evening at Paris and St. Petersburg—"the one rather vague, the other precise and conciliatory."

"Unfortunately these [latter] arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany [in presenting her ultimatum to Russia].

"The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for it against France. [Here he recounted the interview with the German Ambassador Schoen at the French Foreign Office.]

"This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed with Russia to begin negotiations."

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported Austria's willingness to continue conversations with Russia.

"The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The question may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia."

He told of the interviews of the British Ambassador with Secretary of State von Jagow, in which Mr. Goschen vainly pleaded that Germany use her influence with Austria in the cause of peace.

"Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg, is characteristic of her warlike policy."

It looks as if she desired war on her own account.

M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the ambassadors at London and Berlin and the Minister of Brussels of

his pledge to respect Belgian neutrality as given to Great Britain.

Ambassador Barrère reported from Rome an interview of the German Ambassador with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Herr von Flotow had asked the intentions of Italy in the present crisis.

"The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war."

M. Viviani reported to the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and Constantinople the visit to him at 11 a. m. of German Ambassador Schoen.

"After having recalled all the efforts made by France toward an honorable settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the *pourparlers* which have been carried on since yesterday [in reference to Austro-Russian dispute].

"I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all *pourparlers*, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this power had just accepted the British formula (which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the countries which have mobilized) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France.

"Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a 'glimmer of hope' for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace.

"Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful.

"It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work toward an agreement. On her side France is taking all military

measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her."

Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London the situation between Great Britain and Germany, especially in regard to British neutrality and Germany's attitude toward Belgian neutrality.

"Sir Edward Grey will ask the Cabinet to authorize him to state on Monday in the House of Commons that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.

"In the second place, the British fleet is mobilized, and Sir Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues that he should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through, will oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of intervening in time."

Minister Mollard presented the request from Dr. Eyschen, Minister of State of Luxemburg, for an assurance that France would respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy. A similar request has been made to Germany.

M. Viviani returned the same assurance that he had given in the case of Belgium.

Belgium. M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to the Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to carry out the instructions [in case of war between France and Germany becoming imminent] of July 24; and to the Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg to carry out instructions [the same] of July 25.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 2, 1914

Austria-Hungary. On the following day, Ambassador Szögyény telegraphed from Berlin that no answer had been received from Russia to Germany's demand that she demobilize; that Russian troops had crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (southeast of Bialla); and that Germany therefore regarded herself at war

with Russia and had that morning given Ambassador Swerbeiev his passports.

Germany. Ambassador Lichnowsky telegraphed from London to Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had given up as impracticable his suggestions as to the possibility of creating lasting British neutrality, which were made without previous inquiry of France and without knowledge of mobilization.

RUSSIA EXPLAINS HER EFFORTS FOR PEACE

Russia. M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, published an announcement respecting recent events in correction of a "garbled version" appearing in the foreign press. This recited the circumstances of the Austrian note of July 23 to Serbia and Serbia's reply of the 25th.

"Russia considered that the humiliation of Serbia, involved in these demands, and equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful. . . .

"The Austro-Hungarian Government proceeded to mobilize and declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Sarajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia throughout all classes of European society.

"In consequence of this behavior of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilization in the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Serbian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

"The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four great powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

"This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed conference of the powers.

"Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Serbia.

"Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilization by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.

"All this time hostilities were continuing on Serbian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

"The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.

"The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for every emergency.

"But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

"In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on July 31 demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on August 1, and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilization.

"On the following day, August 1, the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs."

M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian representatives abroad "that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilize by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilization.

"The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Serbia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European—nay, the world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility."

Great Britain. Ambassador Goschen sent from Berlin two telegrams to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, one stating that Secretary of State von Jagow had just informed him that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed the frontier, Germany and Russia were in a state of war, and the other that the reason for the detention of British ships on the day preceding was laying of mines and taking other precautions.

Ambassador Villiers telegraphed from Brussels that a German force had entered Luxemburg. This was confirmed by a telegram from the Minister of State for Luxemburg, who gave details, and added:

"These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of his majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. [Paris was also informed.]"

Grey telegraphed Ambassador Bertie at Paris:

"After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon [French Ambassador in London] the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.

"I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that our Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did not give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

"M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point."

France. Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg that the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés was leaving the Russian capital that day, and that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Szápáry had not yet received instructions from Vienna as to the declaration of war.

M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and Constantinople:

"This morning, French territory was violated by German troops at Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

"You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against France without provocation on our part, or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilometers which we have maintained, even since the mobilization, between our troops and the frontier."

Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London Sir Edward Grey's declaration of the British Cabinet as to protection of France by the British fleet.

"Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the Convention of

1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the observance of this latter Convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaranteeing powers were to act in concert.

"The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a *casus belli.* It is a specially British interest and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the business world in which German influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing itself against Germany."

M. Viviani replied to M. Paul Cambon that the promise of the British Cabinet was "a first assistance which is most valuable to us."

"The help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be supported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and Channel. I would note that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet."

M. Viviani telegraphed to Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin to protest to the German Government against the violation of the French frontier by German armed forces, as "unjustified by anything in the present situation."

"The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility for these acts."

M. Marcellin Pellet, Minister at the Hague, telegraphed to M. Viviani that the German Minister had called on M. Loudon, Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain the necessity for the German violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg.

Belgium. M. Davignon, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to the ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, that he had warned the German Minister at Brussels, Herr von Below Saleske, that the French Minister, M. Klobukowski, would publish the formal declaration made by the German Minister on August 1, respecting Belgian neutrality.

"When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain toward our

eastern neighbors. I at once replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness toward Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude."

Later, the German Minister presented the following "very confidential" note to Belgium.

GERMAN DECLARATION OF INTENTIONS TOWARD BELGIUM

"Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

"The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost good will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guaranty against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

"In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:

"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

" 2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

" 3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

"4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

"In this event Germany can undertake no obligations toward Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

"The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighboring States will grow stronger and more enduring."

MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1914

Serbia. On the following day M. Yov. Yovanovitch, former Minister to Vienna, and now at Nish, the temporary capital of Serbia, made a long report to M. N. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, of events at Vienna from the days following the crime of Sarajevo to his departure from the Austrian capital. The points in this are:

SERBIA'S POSITION EXPLAINED

1. Constant police surveillance of the Serbian legation and menacing attitude of the public.

2. Sudden change early in July of Austro-Hungarian attitude to the Sarajevo incident. Press begins to represent it as a manifestation of Serbian intrigue which Austria must settle, and alone, with Serbia—eventually by war.

3. Assistance given by German Embassy to this press agitation.

4. Austrian financiers declare that "a settlement with Serbia" is the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria-Hungary since annexation of Bosnia. Gold secretly and gradually withdrawn from circulation.

5. Austrian Minister of War, Krobatin, and Chief of Staff, Hetzendorf, break leave of absence to return to Vienna, the latter having had a conversation at Carlsbad with German Chief of Staff, Count Moltke.

6. Reserves retained after stipulated period for maneuvers had expired and their numbers augmented.

7. Noncommittal answers of Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, to interpolations concerning Serbia in Hungarian Diet.

8. Refusal at Foreign Office in Vienna to discuss Sarajevo incident with foreign representatives, or if subject was mentioned,

assurances that nothing would be done against Serbia to give uneasiness to the powers, in particular Russia. Foreign ambassadors, thus assured, quit Vienna on long leaves of absence for watering places. All this indicates that Austria-Hungary was contemplating sudden action, which, when a *fait accompli*, would likely be accepted by the powers in order to avoid a general war.

9. German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, the only foreign representative informed of note to Serbia. He knew its minutest details, and there is reason to believe he helped draft it.

10. When note was published, French, British, and Russian representatives at Vienna asked me if it were not better to accept the demands and avoid war for the present.

"I said that the note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-Hungary had drafted such a note.

"The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko [then absent from Vienna,] previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several occasions to his colleagues and the Austro-Hungarian Government that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object the humiliation of Serbia. Hence the apprehension felt by the French and British Ambassadors and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary."

11. Expressed intention of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to chastise Serbia by arms without consent of European concert. Belief expressed by German Ambassador that Russia would permit this, owing to troubles in Asia, and assurances given by him that Germany would stand by her ally in the matter.

"These statements of Herr von Tschirschky have induced many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war, on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the latter had completed her military reorganization, *i.e.*, before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. 'The longer the matter is postponed, the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance.' On the other hand, rumors from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse [German Foreign

Office] did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von Tschirschky has exceeded the instructions given to him."

Great Britain. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made a statement in the House of Commons as to the diplomatic situation, particularly of Great Britain. The chief points in it were:

1. The peace of Europe cannot be preserved, despite Great Britain's earnest and consistent efforts to that end.

2. Great Britain's good faith in this matter is proved by her actions in the Balkan crisis, where it was generally admitted she worked for peace.

3. Parliament is free to decide on attitude of Great Britain.

Here the secretary referred to the Moroccan crisis of 1906, and said that then he had taken the same attitude with respect to France.

"That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, 'If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.' There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

"As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister [Henry Asquith] who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. They authorized that [answer], on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose."

Here the secretary read his reply to the French Ambassador, dated November 22, 1912, which was to the effect stated. It instanced the disposition of the French and British fleets at the time as "not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war," and went on to say

"that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace,

it should immediately discuss with the other whether both governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

The secretary said that the present crisis involved Great Britain's obligations to France in a less formal fashion.

"While we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support to France in the Morocco affairs, we were pledged to do so by a definite public agreement [the Treaty of April 8, 1904]. But no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. France is involved in it because of her obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. It is only fair to the House to say that that obligation cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian alliance. We do not even know its terms.

"I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. We have had a long-standing friendship with France. But how far that friendship entails obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe for himself.

"The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing.

"Let us assume that out of the situation come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defense of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral, should depart from her attitude, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean where our trade routes are vital to our interests? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. We would have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the assurance that if the German fleet undertakes hostile operations against the French coast or shipping the British fleet will give all the protection in its power, subject to the ratification of Parliament.

"I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. It is far too narrow an engage-

ment for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—of the neutrality of Belgium."

Here the secretary discussed the treaties of 1839 and of 1870 between the powers and Belgium respecting preservation of her neutrality, and cited in particular the real and written recognition by Prince Bismarck of the sacredness of this neutrality, and the speech in Parliament by William E. Gladstone on Great Britain's obligation to maintain it.

He then reported the promise he had just secured from France to respect Belgian neutrality, the evasive answer that had been given by Germany in regard to the same, and Belgium's promise to maintain her neutrality.

He then recited Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, and Belgium's appeal to King George.

"Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing, to be left alone and independent. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, and no action be taken [by the powers] to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone. Mr. Gladstone said:

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guaranty. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.

"If Belgium's independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power?

"It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it to intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt

whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

"We are going to suffer terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside, we should be in a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the west of Europe opposite to us falling under the domination of a single power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect.

"Mobilization of the fleet has taken place; mobilization of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take the question very carefully into consideration, until we know how we stand.

"What other policy is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We should sacrifice our good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

"As far as the forces of the crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty [Winston Churchill] have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores.

"The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us. The country has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support,

is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier.

"I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the west of Europe, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country."

France. Minister Klobukowski telegraphed from Brussels the answer the Belgian Government had given on the evening of August 2 to the German ultimatum:

"The information as to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been given by France, and were still quite recent; that Belgium, which since the establishment of her kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of her territory from whatever quarter it may come: and that, supposing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the powers, and notably by the King of Prussia."

M. Klobukowski added in a supplementary telegram:

"To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the guarantee of the powers against the violation of her neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Davignon] answered:

"It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee of the powers. At a later date the Government of the king will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take."

Ambassador Paul Cambon telegraphed from London:

"Sir Edward Grey has authorized me to inform you that he was making explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations would be as follows:

" 'In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war.'

"Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

"The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward Grey has

assured me of this and has added that the French Government were thereby authorized to inform the Chambers of this."

M. Paul Cambon supplemented this by a telegram stating:

"Just as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague [Prince Lichnowsky] came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great Britian did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.

"The German Ambassador has sent to the press a *communiqué* saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a *point d'appui.* My answer is that respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality."

Later M. Paul Cambon telegraphed:

"Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the intervention of the British fleet. He has explained, in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality; and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House.

"The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Government, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more and more in our favor."

M. Viviani warned M. Paul Cambon that the German Ambassador Schoen was reported to have said at the Foreign Office that yesterday eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck.

"Be good enough urgently to contradict this news which is pure invention, and to draw the attention of the [British] Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning."

German Ambassador von Schoen had a farewell audience at the Foreign Office at 6.45 p. m., at which he handed M. Viviani a letter stating that French military aviators had committed "flagrantly hostile acts" on German territory, one throwing bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg, and had openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory.

"I am instructed, and I have the honor to inform your excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers it-

self in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter power.

"At the same time I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of your excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity."

M. Viviani formally challenged as inaccurate the allegations of the ambassador.

M. Viviani instructed Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin to ask for his passports.

"I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg; against the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by which he has attempted to justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between Germany and France."

M. Allizé, Minister at Munich, was also instructed to ask for his passports.

M. Viviani reported to the French representatives abroad that German troops had violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich.

Belgium. Baron von der Elst, Secretary General, reported an interview at 1.30 p. m. with Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.

"The minister officially informed the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.

"The secretary general asked Herr von Below where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed by France."

M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicated to Herr von Below Saleske Belgium's reply to the German note.

"This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

"The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to

the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

"Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfill her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

"The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870 vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guaranty of the powers, and notably of the Government of his majesty the King of Prussia.

"Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

"The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

"The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty toward Europe.

"Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

"If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights."

M. Davignon reported this action to the Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, and The Hague. To the same representatives, except the Minister at The Hague, he reported a statement made to him by the French Minister at Brussels:

"Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable, that—unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance.

"I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guaranty of the powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done."

Count Lalaing, Minister at London, telegraphed to M. Davignon that Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had informed him "that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany."

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1914

Serbia. On the following day, August 4, 1914, M. Pashitch, Prime Minister, recalled the legation and consulate from Germany.

Austria-Hungary. Ambassador Mensdorff telegraphed from Berlin that Great Britain had sent to Germany its ultimatum concerning Belgium, and expected an answer to-night at twelve o'clock.

"Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why he should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Government, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the formality of a previous declaration of war. He does not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

"Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for Great Britain, as the ally of France, to cooperate with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean."

VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG EXPLAINS GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE REICHSTAG

Germany. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg spoke before the Reichstag (Imperial Parliament). The points of his address were as follows:

1. Germany has kept the peace and protected the peace of Europe for forty-four years, yet, under the pretense that she was desirous of war,

"enmity has been awakened against us in the East and the West and chains have been fashioned for us. The wind then sown has brought forth the whirlwind which has now broken loose. We wished to continue our work of peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated everyone from the emperor down to the youngest soldier was this: Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword fly from its scabbard.

"The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavors. Russia has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia and France—a war that has been forced upon us."

2. Germany has endeavored to localize the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. All other European Governments (particularly Great Britain) save one took the same attitude.

Russia alone asserted that she had to be heard in a settlement of the matter.

"Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threatening head."

3. Russia began to mobilize. On this, Germany declared that Russian military measures against Austria-Hungary would find her on the side of her ally, and that she would take counter-measures, coming near to actual war.

"Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for peace, and declared that she was making no military preparations against us.

"In the meantime, Great Britain, warmly supported by us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg."

4. Kaiser William II telegraphed to Nicholas II asking for the Czar's assistance in smoothing over difficulties between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Before receipt of this telegram the Czar asked the Kaiser to induce Austria-Hungary to aid him in inducing Vienna to moderate her demands on Serbia. The Kaiser accepted the rôle of mediator.

5. Germany influenced Austria-Hungary to resume the broken conversations with Russia.

"But before the final decision was taken at Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had mobilized her entire forces and that her mobilization was therefore directed against us also. The Russian Government, who knew from our repeated statements what mobilization on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this mobilization, nor did they even offer any explanation. It was not until the afternoon of July 31 that the emperor received a telegram from the czar in which he guaranteed that his army would not assume a provocative attitude toward us. But mobilization on our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of July 30-31, and France, though indeed not actually mobilizing, was admittedly making military preparations.

"What was our position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we had, up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up a single reservist. Were we now to wait further in patience until the nations on either side of us chose the moment for their attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on July 31, we called upon Russia to demobilize as the only measure which could still preserve the peace of Europe, and informed her that in case our demand met with a refusal, we should have to consider that a state of war existed.

"No answer was given, and we mobilized our forces on August 1, at 5 p. m."

6. France evaded our direct question as to whether she would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.

"In spite of this, the kaiser ordered that the French frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This order, with one single exception*, was strictly obeyed. France, who mobilized at the same time as we did, assured us that she would respect a zone of 10 kilometers on the frontier. What really happened? Aviators dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry detachments appeared on the territory of the empire! Though war had not been declared, France thus broke the peace and actually attacked us."

After this recital the Chancellor entered upon his oration proper.

"Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (*Notwehr*), and necessity (*Not*) knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.

"Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It is true that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained.

"He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through (*durchhauen*).

"Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.

"As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday show the standpoint assumed by the British Government. We have informed the British Government that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world, and I may add that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures against French commercial shipping.

"Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words of the emperor: 'With a clear conscience we enter the lists.' We are fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which Count Moltke said we should have to remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with clear confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle—behind them stands the entire German nation—the entire German nation united to the last man.

*Against express orders, a patrol of the Fourteenth Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2. They seem to have been shot down, only one man having returned.

"Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask you to pass them quickly."

Secretary of State von Jagow telegraphed Ambassador Lichnowsky at London:

"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by the fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that the German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

Great Britain. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed Ambassador Goschen at Berlin to protest to the German Government against its violation of the treaty safeguarding Belgian neutrality, and to request an immediate assurance that the demand made upon Belgium would not be proceeded with.

Ambassador Villiers telegraphed from Brussels that the German Minister, Von Below Saleske, had addressed a note to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

"stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed back that Great Britain expected the Belgian Government to resist by any means in their power Germany's invasion of their neutrality, and that the British Government were prepared to join Russia and France in common action to resist the German action and to guarantee to maintain Belgian independence and integrity in future years.

Grey protested, through Ambassador Goschen, to the German Government against the continued detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg and other German ports, as in direct contra-

vention of international law and of the assurances given by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.

Villiers telegraphed from Brussels:

"German troops have entered Belgian territory, and Liege has been summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed."

Grey, on the basis of this information, telegraphed Ambassador Goschen to ask the German Government that a satisfactory answer to his morning telegram be received in London by twelve o'clock at night.

"If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that his majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves."

As reported to Sir Edward Grey on August 8, after his return to London, Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, had an interview with Herr von Jagow on this same day, August 4.

SIR EDWARD GOSCHEN'S INTERVIEW WITH VON JAGOW

"In accordance with your instructions of the 4th inst., I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the name of his majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. He again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he

and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

"During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that, unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that his majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

"Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about seven o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, his majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

"I then said that I should like to go and see the chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the chancellor very agitated. His excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honor of Great Britain that

she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The chancellor said: 'But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted to his excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

"After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p. m. It was apparently never dispatched."*

Mr. Goschen's report went on to relate the attack that evening on the British Embassy by a mob excited by the report in a flying sheet of the "Berliner Tageblatt" that Great Britain had declared war on Germany. The German Government repudiated the report and did all it could, by the personal apology of the secretary of state and by police protection, to make amends for what Herr von Jagow termed "the indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin."

"On the following morning, August 5, the emperor sent one of his majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:

"'The emperor has charged me to express to your excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old Allies of Waterloo. His majesty also begs that you will tell the king that he has been proud of the titles of British field marshal and British admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles.'

*This telegram never reached the British Foreign Office.

"I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery."

At 11 a. m., August 5, Ambassador Goschen received his passports. He returned to London on the following day without molestation from the crowd, although this could not be said of the departure of the French and Russian Ambassadors. He closed his report with a compliment to the American Ambassador, Mr. Gerard, for assistance rendered by him in these trying times.

France. A message from President Poincaré was read at an extraordinary session of Parliament, the members of which remained standing during the reading. This announced the "violent and premeditated" attack on France by Germany in "insolent defiance of the law of nations" being delivered before any declaration of war, and asking for passports by the German Ambassador at Paris. The president recounted the pacific course of Frenchmen in "burying at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation, of the wrong done their country by Germany in 1871, and in using their rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity." In particular he spoke of the efforts France had made for peace since Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. He solemnly declared

"that France had made up to the last moment supreme efforts to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. (*Unanimous and repeated applause.*)

"On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peaceful conclusion Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia; she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg; she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation (*loud applause*), our neighbor and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (*Fresh and repeated applause.*)

"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was prepared; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilization of our national forces will be methodically completed. . . .

"In the war which is beginning France will have right on her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals. (*Loud applause.*)

"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined together as brothers

in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith. (*Loud and prolonged applause and cries of 'Vive la France.'*)

"She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (*loud applause*); she is supported by the loyal friendship of Great Britain. (*Loud applause.*)

"And already from every part of the civilized world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands before the universe for liberty, justice, and reason (*loud and repeated applause*) 'Haut les cœurs et vive la France!'* (*Prolonged applause.*)"

M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, spoke before the Chamber of Deputies. He recounted those actions of Germany in relation to the Austro-Serbian crisis on which the light of subsequent events cast a sinister interpretation. He gave the fabricated complaints against France for violating German territory presented by Ambassador von Schoen plainly to offset the true charges made by France of German violation of French territory, and declared:

"At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (*Loud applause.*)

"Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness.

"The mobilization of the Russian army also continues with remarkable vigor and unrestrained enthusiasm. (*Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.*) The Belgian army, mobilized with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardor to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. (*Renewed applause.*)

"The entire British fleet is mobilized and orders have been given to mobilize the land forces. (*Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)"

Belgium. Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, reported to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels, that Holland intended to institute war buoying on the Scheldt (Dutch river leading to Antwerp in Belgium). The river would be closed at night only, and navigation by day would be under Dutch pilots. Belgian lightships must be withdrawn from Dutch territory to facilitate maintenance of its neutrality.

M. Davignon presented passports to German Minister von Below Saleske. The minister intrusted the custody of the German Legation to the American Minister, Brand Whitlock. The

* Lift up your hearts, and long live France!

Belgian Minister, Baron Beyens, at Berlin, asked for his passports. Before leaving he telegraphed a report of the German Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag on the "infamous" violation of Belgian neutrality.

"It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognizes without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory, and that she is committing a wrong against us."

Count de Lalaing, Minister at London, telegraphed that Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium

"that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia in offering an alliance to the said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guaranty to maintain the future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is violated."

M. Davignon reported to the ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg all the important diplomatic happenings respecting Belgium from July 31 to the appeal to the powers to guarantee Belgian neutrality, which was under present deliberation.

M. Davignon appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia to cooperate as guarantors of her territory and independence, and to employ concerted action to resist by force German violation of the same, and at the same time

"to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defense of her fortified places."

King Albert made an address to the Belgian Parliament which closed as follows:

"The army is equal to its task. The Government and myself have full confidence. The Government understands its responsibilities and will maintain them till the end to safeguard the supreme good of the country. If the stranger violates our territory he will find all Belgians gathered round their sovereign, who will never betray his constitutional oath.

"I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends itself imposes respect on all and does not perish. God will be with us."

War was now on between Russia, France, Great Britain and Belgium on the one side, and Germany, soon and certainly to be joined by Austria-Hungary, on the other. While the diplomatic controversy continued, it was over minor subjects, such as what understanding, if any, had existed before the war between Great Britain and Belgium with reference to the former landing an expeditionary force on the soil of the latter in event of hostilities with Germany. By August 5, 1914, all the main evidence which the belligerent powers chose to present was before the court of the world's opinion. It has here been given in as full a form as the exigency of space has permitted, and in that impartial manner which a strict observance of editorial ethics insures. The editor has refrained from cross-references indicating a conflict of evidence, since this could not be made without exercising a judicial function into which biased opinion might creep. It will be easy for the reader to make these comparisons for himself, because of the listing of the correspondence by countries and dates. A careful study of the data here given should afford everyone an answer to the solemn inquiry, the greatest ever put before the civilized world: Who was responsible for the war?